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                                                                Abstract 
Corporate governance in general has become the new crucible in which corporations are tested 
and declared worthy of the trust of international investors. In an age when countries compete in a 
global economy, compliance with corporate governance standards has become crucial to the 
survival of businesses. Especially in the Middle East, which is culturally and politically distant 
from the rest of the world, compliance with the internationally accepted principles of corporate 
governance has become a challenge.  
This thesis aims to examine how a specific aspect of corporate governance—disclosure and 
transparency—is viewed and applied in the Saudi Arabian context. The results of this study are 
important primarily for Saudi Arabian businesses positioned to play a significant role in the 
global economy. The Saudi economy is one that has a number of industries such as the oil 
industry, which forms the largest contributor of the GDP of the nation; about 67%. Other 
companies in the country include those, which deal in consumer goods, the financial sector, the 
media, retail, telecommunications, technology, travel and leisure and telecommunications. The 
largest conglomerates are those that deal in the oil and gas industry. These companies could 
benefit greatly from the financial strength provided by international investments, the technical 
and strategic advantages offered by partnerships and joint ventures with foreign companies and 
the market leadership obtained by gaining the trust and confidence of consumers in the global 
market. Achieving these benefits becomes feasible only if Saudi firms can comply with the 
minimum disclosure and transparency requirements. 
The thesis employs critical and comparative analyses. It explores the academic literature on 
corporate disclosure and discusses the theories and principles espoused in the context of the 
Saudi Arabian legal and regulatory framework. Also discussed is the vital role of the Islamic 
principles in Sharia law, which forms the basis of the Saudi legal system. This study proposes 
corporate disclosure practices as the basis for comprehensive reform of Saudi Arabia’s Capital 
Market Authority. The idea of corporations is alien to the Islamic law, but the idea of disclosure 
and transparency is a fundamental of the Islamic corporate governance. The disclosures that the 
organizations make have a target of attaining transparency and the promotion of market 
discipline concerning the same institutions. There is also the conceptualization of the fact that the 
15 
 
effectiveness of the corporate organizations relies on how they complement the international 
standards.  The study offers recommendations for increasing transparency, disclosure and the 
associated principles in the Saudi Arabian stock market and better protecting minority 
shareholders. These recommendations follow the United Kingdom’s corporate governance 
approach but reflect the interests, culture, treaties, Sharia principles and legislative reforms of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The thesis concludes by presenting the Saudi perspective on 
disclosure and transparency and its prospects for future development. 
  
16 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis has been a fruitful journey on which I have not been alone. Some who shared this 
journey have simply given encouragement, while others have offered intellectual assistance 
enabling the completion of this work. First and foremost, all praises are due to Allah, who has 
given me the ability, strength and persistence to pursue my passion. My deepest appreciation and 
heartfelt gratitude go to my supervisor Professor Peter Jaffey whose guidance and suggestions 
helped improve the quality of the thesis. My warmest thanks are due to my wife and children for 
their continuous encouragement, interest and advice. My special thanks also go to all the Brunel 
Law School staff members who have helped meet all my needs.  
  
17 
 
Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Preamble 
At the outset, it will be useful to clarify the meaning of disclosure and transparency. Disclosure 
can be defined as a state in which corporations make themselves open to the public through 
actions with regard to their operations, such as releasing information about their administration, 
financial status and other aspects of governance and management. This openness helps members 
of the public to understand the corporation’s situation, thus shaping their attitude towards it and 
making corporate governance easier. Transparency entails the exercise of virtues such as 
accountability and goodwill by corporate managers and multinational corporations in the 
performance of their duties and responsibilities. These two concepts, disclosure and 
transparency, are extremely important; they enable companies to secure honest leaders who 
possess credibility and dignity and permit no ambiguity that could lead to various 
misunderstandings and problems in the future. Therefore, research on these concepts is of great 
importance. 
The objective of this thesis is to explore disclosure and transparency within the context of 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. A general overview of fundamental concepts and 
theoretical models of corporate governance are discussed first. This is followed by the history of 
the development of corporate governance in the United Kingdom (UK) and Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) frameworks. Next, the state of corporate 
governance and the level of disclosure and transparency in the Saudi context, including the legal 
system and accountability framework, are analysed. This study also examines how corporate 
governance is understood by various authors, present practices and frameworks of corporate 
governance and their impacts on different aspects of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
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1.2 General Background 
Corporate governance has existed since antiquity, when tribal communes supervised the 
activities of tribal members to ensure that they conformed to tribal norms. In the agricultural 
communities that followed, family councils performed family-centric monitoring for the same 
reasons as the tribes.
1
 The Roman Empire appointed municipal bodies to manage public affairs 
and compel administrators to be transparent in order to serve the public good. Elsewhere, 
nomadic tribes in the Arabian region held councils to enforce fair play and equitable dealings 
with one another. Later, when the great religions of Christianity and Islam arose, the religious 
hierarchies performed the function of oversight of community members.
2
 On the other hand, 
corporate governance refers to the set of rules, processes and practices that direct and control a 
company. Such activities may essentially entail the balancing of the interests of the stakeholders 
of the company such as the shareholders, the management, suppliers, customers and others. 
Corporate governance gives a framework that helps in the attainment of the objectives of a 
company through its encompassing of all spheres of management. Capital and securities markets 
are those concerned with financial investments that relate both indirectly and indirectly with 
capital. Therefore the laws that govern such processes are what this work will refer to as 
securities and capital market regulations.  
During the Renaissance and the era of discovery, traders and explorers from Europe travelled the 
seas to set up the first centres of global trading, and the earliest corporations were formed to 
conduct trade along these routes. Global traders reported their activities to their monarchs, 
similar to the modern concept of corporate governance in which corporate auditors report to 
government regulators or oversight agencies. Among the 16
th
 century naval voyagers, the best, 
most active traders came from England, which became the most powerful trading nation in the 
world. To ensure the accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and optimal performance of trading 
                                                 
1
 Lai Oso and Bello Semiu, ‘The Concept and Practice of Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The Need for Public 
Relations and Effective Corporate Communication’ (2012) 3(1) JC 4. 
2
 AP Kurkure, ‘Elements of Excellence in Corporate Governance Systems and Structures: Lessons Learned’ (UICC 
World Cancer Congress, Washington DC, 2006). 
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companies to the satisfaction of shareholders, the Bank of England formulated rules and a 
regulatory framework with which trading companies were required to comply.
3
 
The early beginnings of corporate governance are evident in the development of regulations and 
compliance procedures. These became institutionalised and adopted as common practices in 
industry. Many rules survived to form the basis for modern corporate governance, which was 
formalised in the 1970s and which continues to be the subject of serious debate worldwide. 
Reforms aimed at developing a world model for corporate governance that address cross-border 
investments in a global economy are expected to emerge as foreign shareholders are concerned 
with the exercise and enforcement of their rights in their overseas investments. To meet such 
concerns, corporate directors’ duties and powers might be expanded significantly in order to 
ensure they maintain their legal accountability and their duty of loyalty to shareholders and the 
company.
4
 
Modern discussions on corporate governance tend to reference three official documents released 
since 1990: the 1992 UK Cadbury Report, the 1998 and 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance and the 2002 United States (US) Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In addition, numerous models 
of corporate governance exist around the world. Such debates provide the background against, 
which Saudi Arabia’s business entities could learn the approaches of corporate governance even 
while the country does not have a similar approach to corporations as the west. The arguments 
provide some of the best practices that provide the similarities between the two economies 
especially with regard to the rules of disclosure and transparency. Such rules also provide the 
framework against which the rest of the countries across the world perceive investment in Saudi 
Arabia.  
The differences in these models depend on the extent to which they have adopted capitalism. For 
example, the Anglo-American model emphasises the shareholder’s interests, and the Japanese 
model shares these principle. Corporations are created according to and governed by the rules 
and regulations of a specific jurisdiction. When exploring the issue of corporate governance, it is 
prudent to evaluate the legal environment, specifically the applicable codes and guidelines. Key 
                                                 
3
 Oso and Semiu (n 1) 4–5. 
4
 Oso and Semiu (n 1) 5. 
20 
 
parties in corporate governance include government agencies, corporate management and stock 
exchanges. All corporate governance settings need mechanisms and controls that lessen the 
occurrence of inefficiencies which can arise within a corporation. Various researchers have 
developed theories to explain the concept of corporate governance.  
 
1.3 Research Significance 
Modern business affairs have forged linkages between multinational corporations and domestic 
enterprises in an increasingly globalised economy. For business transactions to flow freely, trust 
must be fostered among all partners and parties. This is the principal reason why companies, 
especially publicly listed firms, should abide by the universal tenets of good corporate disclosure 
even—and especially—across borders. Foreign direct investments are facilitated by an 
investment climate perceived as low risk, which can exist only with transparency and full 
disclosure of company information. A level playing field created by an appropriately regulated 
financial system is crucial for competition to spur a robust business milieu. 
The study of corporate governance, particularly transparency and disclosure, as applied in the 
business field is vital to understanding the free market regime under which international business 
systems thrive. This thesis sheds light on the issues of disclosure and transparency as they pertain 
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As the seat of Islam and the Middle Eastern country with the 
largest land mass and population, the Kingdom can play a pivotal role in the region’s emerging 
economies. An understanding of the status of corporate disclosure and transparency and how it 
can be improved will be crucial to these countries’ and the region’s economic success. 
 
21 
 
1.4 Research Problem 
The primary research question addressed by this thesis is: What are the roles of disclosure and 
transparency in enhancing corporate governance and its principles in Saudi Arabia? The research 
will also explain the conceptualization of the Islamic law with regard to corporations. Such an 
element of the work means that there is a review of the provisions that the Sharia law has on 
corporations after a consideration that the Islamic law is contractual. To achieve the objectives 
mentioned in the preceding section, this thesis also seeks to answer the following research 
questions: 
(1) What is corporate governance as conceived in the West and as understood under Sharia 
principles? 
(2) How is corporate governance, particularly disclosure and transparency, observed and 
practised in Saudi Arabia? 
(3) How have the Saudi legal framework and practices developed regarding international 
standards for corporate governance, particularly disclosure and transparency? 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This thesis employs critical and comparative analyses. The critical analysis reviews the available 
literature, laws and regulation in order to construct a comprehensive overview of the Saudi legal 
framework for corporate governance and to gain insights into possible reform measures. The 
review also includes legal opinions and decisions by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) Board 
and the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) in cases dealing with 
themes of corporate disclosure and transparency.  
This thesis presents a case study of Saudi Arabia’s corporate governance regime and its level of 
implementation. Special attention is given to the corporate governance framework established by 
the Capital Market Law
5
 (CML) and its implementing regulations. Although data were drawn 
                                                 
5
 The Capital Market Law, pursuant to Royal Decree No M/30, dated 31 July 2003 (CML). 
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mostly from secondary sources (written documents), primary information was obtained from 
visits to the CMA and the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA). During personal meetings, 
officials and personnel at these agencies provided numerous details. They clarified uncertainties 
in the secondary data and created a clear picture of how these bodies function and fulfil their 
responsibilities while developing good corporate governance practices. 
In addition, this thesis performs a comparative analysis of Saudi corporate disclosure regulations 
and their counterparts in UK statutes and OECD corporate governance principles, particularly 
with reference to the development of a suitable framework for corporate governance. 
Comparative analysis frames emergent legal controversies by how they are resolved in 
comparable legal jurisdictions, thereby extending the scope of laws and increasing the resilience 
of the resulting legal model.
6
 
 
1.6 Research Aims 
The general aims and objectives of this thesis are to:  
(1) Examine the concept and rationale of corporate governance; 
(2) Conduct a comprehensive assessment of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia; 
(3) Describe in-depth the status of disclosure and transparency in Saudi Arabia and the 
degree to which it complies with international standards; 
(4) Compare the corporate governance mechanisms and practices in the UK and Saudi 
Arabia; and 
(5) Describe the role of Sharia in Saudi corporate governance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Jonathan Hill, ‘Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory’ (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 102.  
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1.7 Research Scope and Limitations 
This thesis thoroughly investigates the issue of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia, focusing 
on disclosure and transparency and considering issues that directly or indirectly affect the state of 
corporate governance in the Kingdom. The study also assesses international standards of 
corporate governance to determine Saudi Arabia’s level of compliance with them. It examines 
the state of and laws regarding corporate governance in other nations, namely the UK, in an 
attempt to draw comparisons with Saudi Arabia. Regarding the social factors that influence 
corporate disclosure, the study considers Sharia law and its influence on the business 
environment. Disclosure and transparency are discussed with special reference to Saudi Arabia.  
 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
After the first chapter presents an overview and the general background of this research and its 
significance, methodology, aims, main questions, scope and limitations, the second chapter 
discusses the fundamental concepts of corporate governance and its importance, beneficiaries 
and models. The chapter also elucidates on theories concerning the development of corporate 
governance, including shareholder, agency, stakeholder and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) theory. The philosophies of different jurisdictions, such as the UK, US, Germany and the 
OECD, are also considered. In addition, the roles of disclosure and transparency in the stock 
market are addressed. 
The third chapter narrows the focus from the general area of corporate governance to the more 
specific issues of corporate disclosure and transparency. Definitions of disclosure and 
transparency are discussed, followed by the role, importance, advantages and principles of 
disclosure, including what types of information should be disclosed and to whom. This chapter 
also briefly considers important points regarding disclosure in financial and international 
scandals. In addition, this chapter considers various forms of disclosure applied to corporate 
governance as well as the legal and civil remedies for non-disclosure.  
The fourth chapter begins by describing the background of Saudi Arabia, its basic law and legal 
framework. This chapter outlines the institutional infrastructure of the corporate governance 
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framework in Saudi Arabia. The government agencies and institutions charged with the oversight 
and regulation of corporate activities in order to ensure compliance with corporate governance 
principles are identified and described. Included in this are the CMA; its subordinate unit, the 
General Department of Corporate Governance; the CRSD, which includes the Securities 
Disputes Committee and the Securities Conflict Appeal Committee; the SSE or Tadawul; the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry; and the accounting and auditing professions regulated by 
the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) The current practices of and 
improvements to the Saudi corporate governance framework are analysed and evaluated, 
including corporate governance regulations and the Company Law (CL).
7
  
The fifth chapter describes and examines minority shareholders and their protections under the 
CL. The Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR)
8
 and the role and rights of 
shareholders and stakeholders under it are discussed. Finally, this chapter turns to the 
accountability framework, including the influence of Sharia law in the Saudi business 
environment and the Islamic perspective on accountability. In addition, a description is given of 
the role of the board of directors in Saudi corporate governance and the principal fiduciary duties 
of corporations’ board of directors are explained: the duty of care, the duty of loyalty and the 
duty to act within the board’s powers. The roles and responsibilities that are created by these 
board members’ powers are also described. The determination of board members’ compensation, 
a sensitive topic in corporate governance in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, is 
highlighted. The Saudi ownership structure is also considered. 
Chapter Six deals with issues involving corporate transparency in the Saudi capital market. 
Topics discussed in this chapter include the Saudi approach to disclosure and transparency, 
disclosure provisions in the CML and regulations of market abuses, such as price manipulation, 
irregular trading and ‘name and shame’. The regulatory response to the market crash of February 
2006 is described, followed by the degree and manner of Saudi Arabia’s compliance with the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. This compliance includes investor protection, 
disclosure and enforcement. Shortcomings in the legal framework, such as the lack of separate 
regulation, scarcity of competent staff in capital markets and factors in the cultural environment, 
                                                 
7
 Company Law, Royal Decree No M/6, dated 22 July 1965 (CL). 
8
 Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, issued by the Board of Capital Market 
Authority pursuant to Resolution 1/212/2006, dated 12 November 2006 (CGR). 
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are identified. This chapter also suggests reforms and conditions necessary for the effective 
implementation of the principles of corporate governance, particularly disclosure and 
transparency. Disclosure and transparency provisions are highlighted in detail, along with the 
important role of disclosure performed by the board annual report.  
Chapter Seven summarises the main points of the thesis and presents conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
This first chapter defined the research problem and its context: determining the role of disclosure 
and transparency in enhancing corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. Corporate governance is 
seen as a requisite for participation and leadership in international trade and investments, and 
disclosure and transparency emerge as the miracle cure for corporate governance. The most 
important concern of multinationals and international businesses and investors is the eradication, 
or at least the reduction, of risk and exposure to loss. The assurances offered by comprehensive 
information that are provided through transparency and disclosures are necessary for risk 
reduction. 
This case study utilises critical and comparative analysis, focusing on Saudi Arabia’s attempt to 
enhance corporate governance as viewed against international standards and practices. This 
chapter also highlighted the general background, significance, methodology, aims, questions, 
scope and limitations of the research. 
The chapter concluded with a concise description of the thesis structure in order to show how it 
arrived at the logical conclusions that address the research problem and questions. The next 
chapter discusses the research proper, including the definitions of corporate governance, 
transparency and disclosure; international standards, models and theories; and the principal 
concepts upon which this thesis is based. 
The chapter also provides a prelude to what will take place in the following chapters. It traces the 
development of corporate governance through the years and the seven chapters, and in tandem 
26 
 
with the growth of the legal structure in Saudi Arabia. More importantly, the chapter considers 
the procedures and methodologies that will be involved in working on the paper. 
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Chapter Two  
 
Corporate Governance: Definition, International Standards, Models and Theories 
2.1 Overview 
The second chapter deals with the theoretical foundations of corporate governance and the 
accumulated body of knowledge on the subject. Establishing the theories on corporate 
governance is important to anchor the discussion of Saudi Arabian corporate governance within 
the literature and to explain where the Saudi framework is consistent with or differs from the 
contemporary models and the reasons why it converges or diverges.  
 
2.2 Fundamentals of Corporate Governance 
2.2.1 Definition and Fundamental Concepts of Corporate Governance 
The concept of corporate governance can be interpreted both narrowly and broadly, depending 
on whether it is viewed from the perspective of the shareholder or the stakeholder. In its narrow 
definition, corporate governance deals with the relationships between the corporation’s 
managers, board of directors and shareholders. This definition views proper corporate 
governance as the accountability of management to the board of directors and of the board to the 
shareholders, and as the management of the corporation’s affairs being consistent with the 
interests of the shareholders as they are the owners of the company.  
The broad definition encompasses the corporation’s relationship not only to shareholders but also 
to all stakeholders and society in general. This definition also includes the combination of 
numerous laws, regulations, rules of the stock exchange, codes of conduct and private sector 
practices that enable the firm to attract capital, perform according to its charter, generate profit 
and accomplish its obligations both under the law and in the expectations of society in general. 
Table 1 presents specific definitions of corporate governance. 
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Table 1. Definitions of Corporate Governance
9
 
 
The definitions in Table 1 include a fair representation of both the shareholder (narrow 
definition) and the stakeholder (broad definition) views. The definitions of Sternberg, Lipton and 
Lorsch and Hess all lean towards the narrow viewpoint, which is the traditional perspective and 
consequently has more proponents.
10
 However, the Centre of European Policy Studies definition 
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 Udo C Braendle, Alexander N Kostyuk and Rodolfo Apreda (eds), Corporate Governance (Virtus Interpress 
2007). 
10
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reflects the Continental European preference for the broad view of corporate governance.
11
 Other 
definitions adopt a neutral position between shareholders and stakeholders (the Cadbury Report, 
1992)
12
 or transcend the narrow definition without entirely adopting the broad view (Shleifer and 
Vishny).
13
  
There are many more definitions not included here, and this highlights the wide range of 
meanings attributed to corporate governance which sometimes results in ambiguity in corporate 
stakeholders’ expectations. Further development of this theme, therefore, is necessary. However, 
for the purposes of this thesis the broad definition is adopted with particular focus on legislative 
measures which affect particular actors (e.g. management, shareholders, board of directors) in 
the corporate governance framework. 
 
2.2.2 Concept of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is a process that targets the allocation of resources in a way that helps to 
maximize the stakeholders’ value. The stakeholders in this case could refer to the investors, the 
customers, suppliers, the employees as well as the environment that determines the nature of 
corporations. Corporate governance targets to hold the mentioned parties responsible through an 
evaluation of the decisions they make concerning inclusivity, transparency, responsibility and 
equity. Therefore, corporate governance refers to the existence of a set of processes, policies, 
customs and laws that influence the direction of a company and the nature of its operations. The 
process could also incorporate the existing relationships among the stakeholders mentioned and 
the functions for which there is governance of the companies.   
Corporate governance has nebulous beginnings, vaguely conceived of as a means with which to 
control, direct and make corporations accountable by focusing on the fulfilment of the social 
obligations of corporation leaders in the matters of wealth creation and sustainability.
14
 The 
concept of corporate governance has become more explicit and clear: it requires businesses to be 
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socially responsible, morally upright, transparent and accountable for their activities. It is no 
longer confined to the relationship of managers and shareholders but positions the corporation as 
a quasi-public institution answerable to its stakeholders and society in general. Corporate 
governance represents a paradigm shift in the philosophy of business management and has 
changed the environment in which businesses thrive.
15
 
While the regulatory framework of corporate governance varies among nations, a number of 
basic principles are common to all corporate governance models worldwide: 
(1) The fundamental rights and equitable treatment of shareholders are protected and 
guaranteed, including their full participation in the affairs of the corporation through 
general meetings.
16
 
(2) Corporations have the obligation to recognise the interests of stakeholders in the 
formulation of policies and the conduct of operations. 
(3) It is the role and responsibility of the board of directors to oversee the proper 
management of the corporation. Therefore, board members must have the competence, 
skills and understanding necessary to make decisions as members of the corporation’s 
highest decision-making body, along with the wherewithal to challenge management in 
the proper execution of their duties.
17
 
(4) Central to the practice of good governance is the maintenance of integrity and observance 
of ethical behaviour at all levels of the corporation, including ethical and responsible 
decision-making, the proper management of risk and compliance with the law in order to 
avoid lawsuits. Most corporations adopt a code of conduct that specifies favoured and 
discouraged or forbidden behaviours.
18
 
(5) Disclosure and transparency are requirements in the performance of management and the 
board’s dealings with the company’s stakeholders because the management and board are 
held to a high degree of accountability by the stakeholders, government and society in 
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general. It is the duty of organisations to publish the identities, roles and responsibilities 
of the board and executives, to regularly report their performance and executive 
compensation and to submit to an independent verification of the corporation’s financial 
reporting. In other words, the firm must fully disclose all material information concerning 
the organisation.
19
  
In addition, the principle of consistent policies that enables participants along the value chain to 
have accurate expectations and be stronger as a whole is also common. Companies should realise 
that they influence the mobilisation of resources, not only their own but also those of others 
along the value chain, and inconsistencies in their policies creates less stability for its suppliers, 
contractors, customers and investors.
20
 
 
2.2.3 Importance of Corporate Governance 
The growing prominence of corporate governance, especially in the past 20 years, indicates the 
importance of corporate governance in the modern business environment. There are five specific 
reasons for this growing importance.
21
 
(1) Wave of Global Privatisation 
The privatisation of productive undertakings is an international trend in business, especially in 
former communist countries whose economies are undergoing a transition to free market 
regimes. In Europe, it is necessary to adopt a free market economy with private enterprises 
participating actively in order to accede to the European Union (EU). The wave of privatisation, 
which originated in the UK, accounts for approximately 90% of privatisation proceeds in the EU 
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since 1991; while Australia, France, Italy, Japan and Spain account for 60% of all privatisation 
internationally since 1995.
22
  
Former state-owned corporations tend to perform a crucial function in the economy and society. 
Once privatised, their new ownership and control become critical issues because of the effect on 
how the companies are run and its impact on the economy and society. In Europe, great care was 
taken to ensure that control was transferred to large shareholders in order to ensure the 
continuing interest of a dominant, competent entity and encourage consolidation. In contrast, the 
UK constructed a form of ‘shareholder democracy’23 and conducted most sales by public 
offerings instead of private placements. The composition of and interests represented by the 
owners of a vital enterprise have a strong influence on the quality of corporate governance after 
privatisation, and the public interest and welfare rides upon this governance.
24
 
(2) Pension Fund Reform and Growth of Private Savings 
It is common in most developed countries, particularly the US, for sizeable resources to be set 
aside in anticipation of retirement by senior citizens. This practice has built pension funds and 
similar investment entities that have grown into massive, powerful institutions. This has 
contributed to the need for good corporate governance. In 2007, shortly before the subprime 
mortgage crisis, US institutional investors alone accounted for 60% of total equity investment in 
the OECD; combined with UK institutional investors, the percentage rises to 76%. Of this figure, 
40% consisted of pension funds in the UK and US.
25
 The managers of these funds have a duty of 
accountability to their individual investors, especially in light of the public welfare interest 
resting in the funds and the need for substantial appreciation to finance investors’ retirement.26 
The safety of such investments necessitates assurances of good corporate governance. 
(3) Wave of Mergers and Takeovers 
During the 1980s in the US and from the 1990s to the present in Europe, large corporations have 
merged with or acquired other companies across industries. Takeovers frequently have been 
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hostile, meaning that the acquisition of the target company was transacted without the agreement 
of the management (not necessarily the shareholders).
27
 Takeovers of large companies tend to 
concentrate power and control in a relatively small group of shareholders. Moreover, when the 
companies are in the same industry, they tend to create large corporations that operate as 
monopolies and discourage healthy competition. Cross-border transactions, such as the US$200 
billion takeover bid of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 2000, also partially shift regulatory control 
to another political jurisdiction. They have serious implications for corporate governance 
because of the relations between the new shareholders and management. The EU, therefore, has 
made regulation of takeovers part of its political agenda.
28
 
(4) Deregulation and Integration of Capital Markets 
The integration and linkage of world capital markets and the widening of cross-border transfers 
of equity capital has increased interest in corporate governance among global investors 
unfamiliar with the accounting report systems and legal systems in other countries where they 
might invest. The establishment of common frameworks for corporate governance is expected as 
companies continue to source capital from overseas investors.
29
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(5) Economic Crises 
Frequently, economic crises highlight weak corporate governance practices in many countries. In 
many cases, it is widespread corruption, deceit, failure to comply with the law and similar acts of 
poor corporate governance that trigger and spread economic crises. The proper workings of the 
free market economy depend heavily on the free flow of information and full disclosure of the 
affairs of corporations so that investors, suppliers and customer can make decisions which 
maximise their interest. Poor corporate governance prevents the economy from growing. 
Therefore, more consistent observance of good corporate governance will result in a stronger 
economy and fewer severe economic crises. The case of Saudi Arabia presents an economy that 
deals with the corporate governance regulations that have their foundations in religion. For this 
case, there are a number of complications that the system holds especially in its comparison to 
the West and main guiding principle is that of disclosure.   
 
2.2.4 Beneficiaries of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance produces a number of benefits.
30
 
 Good corporate governance increases shareholder value, leading to an appreciation of the 
share price. 
 Eight out of 10 institutional investors will pay a premium price for a well-governed 
company. 
 Company executives rank financial returns lower than transparency and honest practices. 
However, US companies with good corporate governance practices outperformed those 
considered to have below average corporate performance by 18.9% over a two-year 
period.  
 Good corporate governance practices can prevent corporate failure caused by: (1) poor 
strategic decisions; (2) over-expansion and ill-judged acquisitions; (3) greed, hubris and 
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the desire for power; (4) failure of internal control at all levels from the top down; and (5) 
ineffectual and ineffective boards.
31
 
Having identified the benefits, the beneficiaries become evident. Good corporate governance 
apparently works to the greatest advantage of corporate shareholders because all aspects of 
corporate governance first and foremost seek to protect the shareholders whose rights are 
guaranteed by law. As owners of firms, shareholders have the ultimate responsibility to ensure 
that the businesses they own earn profits and conduct their affairs legally. Therefore, they are 
entitled to be informed of the firms’ actions and empowered to exercise control over them.  
Institutional investors—those who buy shares not for the purpose of running the firms as owners 
but for capital appreciation and dividend income purposes—benefit from the firm’s reputation 
for good corporate governance. Companies reputed for their integrity and compliance with the 
law and norms can develop brand loyalty and customer patronage, driving sales and bottom lines 
that justify dividend pay-outs and price appreciation. Consequently, stock prices rise, thus giving 
investors an added incentive to purchase their shares.  
Employees, suppliers and contractors also benefit from good corporate governance. These 
stakeholders have direct dealings with the corporation, and the assurance that the firm abides by 
the principles of good corporate governance increases their confidence in the firm and their 
commitment to engage with it. This improves its stability and growth.  
Finally, good corporate governance benefits the government, community and society because the 
practices of transparency and disclosure create a bond of trust between the company and its 
external public. This allows the state to collect more taxes, supports public acceptance of the 
company and reliance on its sense of corporate responsibility and facilitates collaboration to 
address any environmental damage to the community. The ultimate result is that the company 
prospers.  
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2.2.5 Corporate Disclosure and Transparency 
Disclosure and transparency in the stock market play crucial roles in corporate governance, 
allowing organisations to publish data on key management practices, such as financial and non-
financial statements, CSR activities and audit reports. These policies make shareholders aware of 
events affecting investment. This constitutes an important aspect of shareholder theory, that the 
directors of the company should manage it on behalf of the shareholders. This is not a true 
agency relationship and so creates a fundamental problem in corporate governance regarding 
costs.  
Shareholders need to know about their capital in the company which is managed by corporate 
directors and make sure that the directors are leading the company for the benefit of the 
shareholders’ interests. Procedures and strategies for the organisation in order to reduce costs to 
shareholders that result from the failure of management in the performance of its duties are also 
necessary. Consequently, disclosure has become highly important in corporate governance. 
Interested parties should be aware of the company’s activities in order to determine whether the 
business is serving their interests. Disclosure can also reveal faults within the company and 
conflicts of interests between management and shareholders. In addition, disclosed information 
can affect the value of the company, the buying and selling of shares and the appointment and 
exemption of directors. 
The insider and outsider models explain the ownership structures of companies. In the models of 
concentrated ownership, shareholders control the management of the company whereas, in the 
dispersed ownership model, there is no controlling shareholder. The latter model prevails in large 
companies on the UK stock market. Small businesses in the UK and large ones in many other 
countries, including Saudi Arabia, usually follow the concentrated ownership type. These two 
mentioned approaches to disclosure differ. Protecting shareholders against abuse of management 
is the main concern of the dispersed model while the concentrated ownership model is concerned 
with protecting minority shareholders against controlling shareholders and management. 
The outsider model is also referred to as the Anglo-American model or the UK-US model, and it 
provides a more feasible option for shareholders to liquidate their shares as opposed to being 
37 
 
actively involved in decision making.
32
 On the other hand, the insider model, which is also 
referred to as the stakeholder model, is synonymous with the German corporate governance 
style. Unlike the shareholder model, this model enables the parties involved to be active in the 
decision-making process.
33
 
Based on this discussion, it is worth noting that the company directors have to deliver benefits 
for various interested groups, including consumers, suppliers and employees. Consequently, in 
corporate governance, disclosure is extremely influential and allows all parties to find out what is 
going on in the company and whether the company operations serve their interests.  
 
2.2.6 Corporate Governance Models 
A number of models highlight different aspects of corporate governance. The most popular 
models distinguish between the stakeholder and shareholder perspectives, as explained earlier 
concerning the outsider or shareholders model and the insider or stakeholders model. The two 
models are described in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Shareholder and Stakeholder Models  
 Shareholder Model  Stakeholder Model 
 Market regulations and legislation are the main 
channels for imposing control. 
 The owners of the corporation have only a 
temporary (i.e. speculative) interest in it, not an 
interest in running it for the long term. 
 There is distance (i.e. no close relationship) 
between the shareholders and the management. 
 There exists an active market for corporate 
control, in the form of takeovers, specifically 
hostile acquisitions. 
 Shareholder rights are accorded higher 
importance than those of other groups in the 
organisation 
 Corporate control is dictated by stakeholders, 
not market regulations or laws. 
 The firm’s owners have an enduring interest in 
seeing the company prosper and grow. 
 Stakeholders often occupy positions on the 
board of directors and senior management. 
 The management and the shareholders have a 
close, stable relationship. 
 Conditions for an aggressive market for 
corporate control are not present; that is, there is 
little chance of hostile takeovers. 
 Employees are accorded formal rights to have a 
say in important managerial decision.
34 
 
The stakeholder model emphasises external control in response to a hostile corporate 
environment. The presence of an active market for corporate control is created in part by the 
temporary nature of the relationship of the firm’s owners with the organisation itself. In such 
cases, shareholders are interested in protecting their rights only to the extent that it serves their 
speculative interest in the firm. In contrast, the insider model prevails when the owners of the 
firm have a long-term interest in it and meet attempts at hostile takeovers with strategic defences 
(e.g. poison pill, golden parachutes, supermajority, crown jewels defence).
35
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Specialised ‘crafted’ corporate governance models are specifically designed by experts who wish 
to add greater detail to aid practitioners. One such model, shown in Figure 1,
36
 seeks to address 
both structural and behavioural issues and link these aspects of corporate governance to a wide 
number of performance results. It also implements continuous improvements processes, like the 
tenets of total quality management, as a process undertaken by organisations. 
This model links the right people, the right team and the right process in order to provide the 
motivating force behind the corporate governance effort. These elements help disseminate timely 
and updated information, defined cultural values and principles and guidance based on the 
information consistent with the corporate mission and principles. These elements also assist in 
defining the processes, principles and rules for oversight.
37
  
Two integrating actions are involved: first, the immediate approach and deployment of corporate 
governance measures; and second, the long-term learning and development that take place 
during the course of the current deployment. Ultimately, the model’s effectiveness is seen in the 
business results from the firm’s operations relevant to the corporate governance measures and 
practices adopted. 
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Figure 1. Self assessment guide
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2.3 Theories Associated with the Development of Corporate Governance 
A number of theories of corporate management schemes in contemporary academic literature, 
including agency, and shareholder and stakeholder theories, have influenced the development of 
corporate governance. These began as Western theories but were gradually adopted by corporate 
theorists worldwide. The following analysis will be based on the comparison of shareholder 
theory and agency theory. It is noteworthy that the shareholder and agency theories have always 
had differing implications for corporate governance, and this has meant that these theories are 
perceived to be opposed to the role of corporate governance. For instance, shareholder theory 
focuses on improving the welfare of the shareholders of a given company while agency theory 
involves enhancing the financial growth of the company.
39
 In this case, it can be established that 
the agency and stakeholder theories have different perspectives of corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, the analysis in this paper will be largely based on the shareholder theory because it 
focuses on the welfare of the individuals that foster corporate governance. 
 
2.3.1 Shareholder Theory 
Interest in shareholder theory saw a sudden rise in the 20
th
 century. This theory differentiates 
between corporate ownership and management and asserts that the management acts as an agent 
of the shareholders of the corporation (or the owners of the business, whatever their legal form). 
Friedman first expressed this theory in 1970 when he claimed that business has only one social 
responsibility: to increase the firm’s profits by engaging in open, free competition without 
engaging in fraud or deception.
40
  
Theoretically, the agent should always act in the interest of the owners, and as the proxy for the 
owners, the management cannot decide or act in any other party’s interest. When management 
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decides or acts in the interest of parties other than the owners and these external interests conflict 
with those of the owners then management has violated its lawful power.
41
 
Ultimately, under shareholder theory, the shareholders’ rights are protected; indeed, most 
corporate governance frameworks do so. For example, the OECD principles declare that not only 
should shareholders’ exercise of their rights be protected and facilitated, but all shareholders—
minority and majority alike—should have equal access to the remedies afforded in law when 
unfairly disadvantaged in their shareholdings.
42
 
 
2.3.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory, on the other hand, holds that corporate shareholders are many and that their 
opinions and desires are divergent so management is better positioned to steer the company and 
provide the returns sought by the shareholders. Generally, managers are acknowledged to be 
more competent and skilled at running the business and, therefore, are entrusted with the power 
to decide the company’s direction, formulate its strategies and generate revenues and profits.43 
However, it is also understood that management will tend to make decisions on the basis of its 
own interests, which could conflict with shareholders’ interests.44 The implication of agency 
theory for corporate governance is the necessity to delegate broad powers to management but, at 
the same time, compel the principal agents—the board of directors and the top executives—to be 
transparent, honest and accountable to the shareholders for their decisions and the exercise of 
their authority. 
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2.3.3 Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Of the three primary theories, stakeholder theory is the most expansive as it takes into account 
the interests of the greatest number of people. Stakeholder theory is grounded in organisational 
strategy. Its central idea is that organisational success depends on the successful management of 
relationships with key groups: direct stakeholders who have contractual relationships with the 
firm and indirect stakeholders who, despite having no firm legal relationship with the 
organisation, nevertheless are affected by its actions and decisions and, therefore, have a stake in 
the results of operations.
45
  
Some authorities believe that a firm is accountable to its direct stakeholders for corporate 
governance accountability (i.e. employees, suppliers, contractors, customers) while its 
accountability to its indirect stakeholders falls under the more general concept of CSR. Some 
scholars, however, do not make this distinction and hold that corporate governance and CSR 
apply to both direct and indirect stakeholders.
46
 
 
2.4 Development of Corporate Governance 
The background provided earlier describes the early history of corporate governance, which has 
evolved dramatically over the centuries. Modern corporate governance concepts are embodied in 
the different approaches adopted by states and global regulatory organisations. The most 
prominent models are discussed by jurisdiction in this section. 
 
2.4.1 UK-US Corporate Governance 
The general view of corporate governance in Anglo-American countries, primarily the UK and 
US, is considered to be liberal. It gives priority to the shareholders’ benefits and, consequently, 
the influence of banks and financial institutions in corporate governance is very limited. This 
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model arose in these countries after a long period of rising demand for capital in companies. This 
model best meets this need and has become common throughout the world.
47
  
Over time, financial crises in firms in different parts of the world were caused by their inability 
to repay banks. In response, financial institutions asked for significant measures to reform loan 
mechanisms and modify corporate governance in companies in order to avoid repeating such 
crises. Under the new system of corporate governance, existing companies found it necessary to 
comply with the new regulations as they provided the fundamental source of funds.
48
 
Due to the increase in capital requirements, firms created new sources of capital to fund their 
activities, including selling shares. Consequently, corporate governance had to take into 
consideration new parties—namely, shareholders—and their rights and interests. A mechanism 
to manage companies was needed so shareholders elected a certain number of themselves to 
form a board of directors to direct the company in serving shareholders’ interests.49  
As stated, the primary goal of Anglo-American corporate governance is to protect shareholders’ 
rights and interests in companies, and this has made it the dominant and preferred model in most 
countries.
50
 This philosophy of maximising profits and protecting shareholders’ interests reflects 
that of Friedman, who holds that businesses owe social responsibility only to their owners and 
have no duty other than to increase profits.
51
 
 
2.4.2 German Corporate Governance 
The German concept of corporate governance follows the more magnanimous approach of 
Freeman, who contends that organisations, like individuals, have a moral relationship with the 
people and organisations affected by their conduct. Two principles support this theory: first, 
deontological ethical reasoning stresses that no moral individual should harm the rights of others 
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or unjustly prevent them from enjoying these rights; second, on the basis of teleological ethical 
reasoning, the organisation is responsible for the effects and repercussions of its actions.
52
 In this 
case, the corporate governance structure of Germany is aimed at shielding the involvement of 
shareholders in a corporation from the involvement of directors of a corporation and other 
executives. However, the greater emphasis of Germany’s corporate governance is based on the 
requirement to protect the stake of the creditors of a company from those of the AG and its 
shareholders. The protection of the shareholders’ stake against the directors and other members 
of a company’s executive is achieved through the Stock Corporation Act, the principle statute 
governing German corporations, and the statutory accounting principles.
53
 As a result, this 
approach towards corporate governance in Germany differs greatly from Anglo-American 
corporate governance methods.
54
 One of the major reasons for the differences between the 
Anglo-American corporate governance model and the German corporate governance model is 
that the German model mainly focuses on protecting the rights of shareholders who operate 
within the company. Therefore, the German governance model protects the rights of stakeholders 
of a company due to the fact that it focuses on the insiders of a given corporation.
55
 
  
2.4.3 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
Issued in 1999 and amended in 2003, the aim of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
is to provide specific guidance for improving the legal, institutional and regulatory framework 
underpinning corporate governance, specifically for publicly listed companies trading on stock 
exchanges. The Financial Stability Forum endorsed the principles as one of the 12 key standards 
essential for financial stability. The OECD Principles address six main areas of corporate 
governance frameworks:
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I. Ensure the basis for an effective corporate governance framework by promoting 
transparent, efficient markets consistent with the rule of law and clearly dividing 
responsibilities among the supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities; 
II. Protect and facilitate shareholders’ exercise of rights and key ownership functions; 
III. Ensure the equitable treatment of shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders, and allow all shareholders the opportunity to obtain redress for violations 
of their rights; 
IV. Recognise the legal and contractual rights of stakeholders in corporate governance and 
encourage active collaboration between corporations and stakeholders in creating 
wealth, jobs and sustainability in financially viable enterprises;  
V. Ensure timely and accurate disclosure on all matters of importance about the 
corporation, including its financial situation, performance, ownership and governance;  
VI. Ensure the strategic guidance of the company, effective monitoring of management by 
the board and the accountability of the board to the firm and its shareholders. 
In these principles, the OECD clearly seeks to incorporate the best aspects of both the 
stakeholder and the shareholder models of corporate governance. Principles II and III enshrine 
support and equitable treatment of shareholder and their rights, while Principle IV emphasises 
the financial health of the firm and the commitment to honour the legal rights of stakeholders and 
economic benefits from corporations’ partnership with stakeholders. The OECD Principles adopt 
a balanced approach to the stakeholder-shareholder divide and hold that the firm must first be 
financially robust before it may be held responsible for fulfilling its social obligations. 
 
2.5  Summary 
This chapter is grounded in actual situations and practices. The following fact-based analyses are 
also grounded in the practices and principles of corporate governance explained in this chapter. 
The definitions, concepts and their significance explained here aim to prepare the ground for a 
discussion of the Saudi situation. The scope, implications, beneficiaries and models of corporate 
47 
 
governance are introduced, along with the various theories that influenced the development of 
schools of thought on corporate governance (shareholder, stakeholder and agency theory). 
Finally, a brief account of the development of corporate governance in major jurisdictions (the 
UK-US, Germany and OECD) is presented to provide the basis for comparison and contrast with 
Saudi Arabia. 
In this chapter, the definition, theories and models of corporate governance have been gradually 
introduced and discussed. In addition to these three, international standards that are of varying 
importance are also briefly discussed with a view to establishing and deriving proper meanings 
from them. Definitions generally in the social sciences and law have somewhat different 
semantic interpretations, and the one at hand is not different. Agency, shareholder and 
stakeholder theories have been discussed as part of the recent theories developed in corporate 
governance literature sweeping through the academic world. In essence, these are Western 
derived theories but they have found relevance in different parts of the globe. However, it is 
obvious that both theories reflect the performance of a company differently, and so they embody 
dissimilar perspectives. Nonetheless, the chapter is more focused on the shareholder theory 
rather than the agency theory.  
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Chapter Three 
  
An Overview of Corporate Disclosure and Transparency 
3.1 Overview 
Out of all corporate governance principles, the twin concepts of disclosure and transparency have 
been most praised and most broadly accepted worldwide. These cornerstone principles have 
become the benchmark against which corporate governance systems in all advanced economies 
have been measured.
57
 In this chapter, the concepts of disclosure and transparency are discussed, 
along with their purpose and significance in practice. An understanding of the requisites and 
elements of the practice of disclosure leads to a discussion of its benefits and advantages, as well 
as the consequences of the absence of transparency in financial scandals. 
 
3.2 Definition of Disclosure and Transparency 
Transparency, defined in its legal sense, is the lack of any hidden agenda in releasing 
information. It is a requisite for free, open exchange between parties.
58
 Disclosure and 
transparency inform market anticipations, supporting the stability of the market in uncertain 
times and increasing the efficiency of declared strategies.
59
  
In corporate governance, free, open exchange takes place primarily between corporate leaders, 
including management and the board of directors, and investors and shareholders who are most 
in need of information to guide their decisions about their capital invested in the corporation.  
The authoritative Black’s Law Dictionary defines transparency as the ‘degree of disclosure 
minimum for all verified agreements, practices and dealings’, that is, any and all transactions, 
agreements and dealings, to be valid and binding.
60
 When transparency is lacking and the 
minimum level of disclosure is not met, the party not in possession of complete information 
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makes decisions without the full facts, and any consent that the party gives in agreements or 
negotiations is impaired. The concepts of transparency and disclosure thus are intertwined; 
disclosure is the action or the tool by which transparency, a condition or status, is achieved.  
In order to establish the context of disclosure in corporate governance it is necessary to analyse 
the various forms of disclosure predominantly applied on corporate governance. In most cases, 
rules with regard to disclosure rely on the period within which the disclosure covers. For 
instance, the rules of disclosure may vary on the following conditions: 
(i)  Disclosure in advance of a listing of shares: The essence of disclosure before 
listing of shares to the public relies on the ability to demonstrate the validity of 
shares. In this case, companies are allowed to disclose information through a 
prospectus which outlines all the details concerning the government’s resources and 
liquidity position. This is in order to ensure that individuals willing to purchase shares 
have adequate details on the security that comes with the shares.
61
  
 
(ii) Disclosure in the annual report: The aim of disclosure on an annual basis is based 
on the requirement of corporations to provide details on the basic business activities 
of a company in addition to the financial position of a corporation.
62
 In this case, 
disclosure in an annual report aims at establishing the performance of a company in a 
financial year. 
 
(iii) Disclosure to the market as events occur: Based on the fact that corporations are 
given a mandate by law to operate, it is essential for the corporations to disclose any 
information in the event the corporations desire to make changes. This is in order to 
ensure that any activities conducted by corporations based on the market changes 
should be recognised by law in order to facilitate regulation by government 
authorities.
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(iv) Disclosure to the board meeting: Disclosure of information to the board in a 
meeting is critical to the performance of the corporation based on the agency and 
stakeholders’ theory.64 In this case, with regard to agency theory, non-disclosure of 
information by managers to the board puts the rest of the shareholders and potential 
investors at a disadvantage of a company’s operations. In addition, the stakeholders 
theory also establishes that lack of disclosure of information to the stakeholders of a 
company puts the company at risk based on the fact that the stakeholders involved 
cannot effectively run the company.
65
 As a result, disclosure of information to the 
board is essential since it enables the board to analyse the loopholes in the company’s 
policies. This would enable the board of the company to implement effective policies 
of a respective company.  
 
3.3 Consequence of non-disclosure  
Disclosure is meant to enhance a corporation’s accountability and performance. As a result, there 
are no definite legal implications due to non-disclosure. Moreover, the rules of disclosure are 
flexible, and this subsequently leads to a lack of definite rules that provide remedies for non-
disclosure.
66
 However, in extreme cases there may be a requirement for intervention since non-
disclosure may be exploited to facilitate fraud within corporations. Therefore, the legal and civil 
remedies for non-disclosure may depend on the statutory policies with regard to non-disclosure 
during the specific period of non-disclosure as witnessed in the following situations: 
(i) Criminal proceedings or regulatory proceedings to impose penalties: Criminal 
proceedings may be imposed on the entire company or individuals involved in the event 
that shareholders exercise their right to facilitate other resolution options. However, 
based on the fact that frequent criminal proceedings hinder the management process, it is 
essential for a company to avoid reliance on criminal proceedings.
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(ii) Civil proceedings by minority shareholders for a civil remedy: Under the civil 
procedure requirements, minority shareholders have the right to impose a derivative 
action in court in the event that a minority shareholder seeks a civil remedy for a wrong 
committed by the majority shareholder. The derivative action requires the minority 
shareholders to prove to the court that civil wrong has been perpetrated by a majority 
shareholder.
68
 
(iii) Civil proceedings in connection with a particular purchase of shares arising from 
non-disclosure in connection with the purchase: The civil proceedings with regard to 
such cases would be based on a breach of fiduciary duty. Civil proceedings in this case 
accord a shareholder the right to proceed with civil proceedings provided the shareholder 
shows that the non-disclosure was perpetrated by an individual who consented to a 
purchase of shares.
69
 
 
3.4 The Role of Disclosure 
Disclosure is a soft law considered crucial to adequately inform shareholders and other 
stakeholders of the conduct of the company’s top management and the board of directors. The 
principal role of disclosure and transparency is significant because they allow shareholders and 
regulators to monitor the actions of corporate leaders.
70
 In addition, disclosure and the 
institutions designed to facilitate reliable disclosure to investors and shareholders
71
 give them a 
reliable basis on which to assess the risks they assume if they maintain their investments in the 
company. The nature of soft law permits the required coordination as well as cooperation in a 
real of rapidly developing as well as the politically contentious environments. Is such 
environments experts ensure that there is no pressing legal strengths unless through the 
constitutional reviews that ensue a balance between the involved parties. There are clear limits 
for the scope of the laws, or even flaws in the use of the legal structure in some cases, but there is 
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a need in the current global world to allow institutions to control their trade.Without such 
mechanisms, management might intentionally hide the true condition of the company—that is, 
not fully disclose corporate health—so that shareholders will not sell the stock in a panic and 
depress its price or react similarly. Doing so might protect for a short while board members and 
executives who quietly decide to take an advantageous position in the market before the price 
becomes volatile in reaction to whatever bad news is released. Such actions are deceptive, utterly 
unfair to shareholders and contrary to the principles of corporate governance if disclosure is any 
degree less than it should be. 
 
3.5 Importance of Disclosure 
3.5.1 Concrete Advantages for the Market 
Transparency in a firm’s disclosure methods creates many advantages in the open market. The 
perfect market conditions for securities and the perfectly competitive market for goods and 
services both depend on the free flow of information through which people can form well-
considered decisions. A company that practices full disclosure provides shareholders the means 
by which to more effectively exercise their rights of ownership. Annual reports and general 
meetings, which are elements of transparency and disclosure, enable shareholders to assess the 
continued viability and profitability of the business. Thus, current shareholders and potential 
investors can weigh the potential risks and likely returns in their investment decisions.
72
 
Another benefit of full disclosure is the trust it engenders among players in the market. This 
allows the market price of the firm’s shares to approximate their true value. Stock market action 
is not devoid of a healthy level of speculation because a stock price rises and falls in the short 
term based on the most recent rumours about the company. While rumours persist, speculation 
continues, and the longer speculation-driven market action occurs, the greater market players’ 
fear that the volatility might be manipulated or staged. With full disclosure, whatever rumours 
that might be circulating will eventually be resolved and the uncertainty settled, thus maintaining 
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the integrity of the market and eliminating unscrupulous traders. Disclosure dispels uncertainty, 
which reduces both market participants’ fears and the risks they face in the stock market.73 
 
3.5.2 Concrete Advantages for the Company 
Disclosure and transparency are also beneficial to the company. In this context, disclosure takes 
the form of accurate, timely reports to managers and employees. Managers, in particular, need 
information to support decision-making especially during contingencies which require quick, 
correct and decisive action. An empowered managerial structure enables the firm to build 
leadership traits down the chain of command, developing a pool of future upper-level managers 
and increasing the productivity, growth and profitability of operations.
74
 
Disclosure to employees is important in matters relevant to the conduct of their jobs and personal 
circumstances. Employee engagement is a vital, useful tool in employee retention and job 
satisfaction and can be secured only in an atmosphere of trust and open communication between 
firm and employee.
75
 It is important that a firm not only improves communication with its 
workforce but also that it is perceived as doing so in good faith, with concern for employees’ 
welfare. 
While the internal effects of disclosure work to create greater trust, the same is true regarding the 
effects of disclosure on communities and how residents regard the company. There are many 
reasons why a firm prefers to be regarded favourably by its neighbours and those further away. 
Most immediate is the opportunity to promote the company’s brand and engender loyalty, which 
increases sales. Good community sentiments towards the company can also alleviate the effects 
of possible negative publicity about the firm. In addition, resources in the community, such as 
water and power sources, sustain the firm and, if limited, might create friction with residents. 
Therefore, it is important for the firm to generate a sense of trust and acceptance in its locality 
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(or those of its branches and networks) by adopting a policy of disclosure and open 
communication with community leaders and the public at large.
76
 
 
3.6 Advantages and Principles of Disclosure 
The principles of disclosure and transparency have long been embraced in the democratic West 
and have been spread worldwide through the workings of multinationals and the global 
economy. However, these principles do not easily translate into Arabian culture and society, 
particularly in Saudi Arabia where notions of democracy are not harmonised. The alternative of 
adopting the Western model in toto is ill-advised because of natural resistance to the intrusive 
imposition of foreign norms and customs. 
A useful approach is to examine the crucial issues and unintended consequences of the evolving 
international standards and to explore areas of compatibility between the foreign and indigenous 
standards. Such issues include the determination of the parties to whom disclosure should be 
made, what information should be disclosed and the manner of disclosure. In its most basic form, 
disclosure consists of the publication of periodic financial reports for the benefit of the public, 
shareholders, creditors, potential investors and government regulators. This is mandated by Saudi 
Arabia’s laws (the CL and CGR). There is a need however for a clear distinction between 
corporate transparency and political transparency. As such, corporate transparency defines the 
rules that the govern principles of disclosure of information concerning commercial activity. On 
the other hand, political transparency refers to the existence of a system that holds responsible 
and accountable all the political leaders of a nation. However, there is a considerable relationship 
between the two aspects of transparency because the corporations operate in the political 
environments.  
Similarly, although not mandated by law, there is the publication of reports on company 
sustainability and CSR compliance for the firm’s various stakeholders, including employees, 
suppliers, contractors, environmental regulators, the community and society. Through these 
reports, the board and executive management have a regular channel through which to explain to 
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their various publics the rationale behind their decisions and their expectations and reservations 
concerning the foreseeable future, in addition to facts about company operations. 
Some information naturally is of a sensitive or even uncertain nature and may properly not be 
disclosed depending on the company’s discretion.77 On the other hand, some related party 
transactions, although not pertinent to the firm’s internal operations, must be disclosed to dispel 
doubts about the firm’s agenda.78 Non-financial disclosure, unlike financial disclosure, is not 
legally required but is subject to executive discretion. Corporate leaders then must prudently 
decide what information can be made public without unnecessarily agitating a sensitive stock 
market (the case of publicly traded companies) or misleadingly sensationalising minor 
developments. 
 
3.7 Information that should be Disclosed According to Company Strategy 
The degree to which a company is transparent is determined by the depth of information about 
itself it is willing to disclose, within the commonly accepted limits of prudence.
79
 In many cases, 
the markets for goods and services and for capital funding provide more opportunities for 
companies that engage in greater disclosure and are perceived as more transparent because of the 
higher level of trust based on the available information about them. Strategically, the most vital 
information a company can provide is included in reports by executives and the board to the 
shareholders and externally audited financial statements and mandatory reports to state 
regulators, such as Form 10-K to the US Securities and Exchange Commission or the audit 
reports and forms.
80
  
Some industries or businesses, especially those which need high levels of innovation, require a 
high level of confidentiality. The amount of capital investment in cutting-edge research and 
development requires a measure of secrecy to protect pipeline projects from industrial espionage. 
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Intellectual properties, such as technical designs or pharmaceutical formulae, cannot be divulged 
due to the risk of piracy by unscrupulous competitors. To overcome public anxiety or suspicion 
about the propriety or safety of these products without full disclosure of the products’ details, the 
firm has to rely on its reputation for integrity and trustworthiness or on the favourable 
assessment or endorsement from government regulatory agencies and respected experts. 
 
3.8 To Whom Information should be Disclosed 
Stakeholders are important to a company as they own part of it. Hence, they should be in charge 
of deciding who should receive vital information about company operations. Information about 
the company’s financial status should be made available to the lenders.81 
These measures ensure that the company can confirm the net worth of the security used to secure 
a loan. Specific information about the company should be available to outside investors to assure 
them that certain shareholders do not receive preferential treatment.
82
 The availability and 
accessibility of information to shareholders increases their confidence in the firm’s ability to 
conduct its operations with their best interests at heart. The public needs access to some company 
information in order to become familiar with their service providers. It is hard for a company to 
claim a large market share if it operates in anonymity.
83
 A level of disclosure and transparency is 
needed when dealing with the public. It is important to note that these groups have access to 
different types of information.
84
 
 
3.9 Financial Scandals and Disclosure 
In more severe cases, a lack of compliance with or deficiency in meeting disclosure requirements 
leads to the filing of criminal charges. It should be noted that transparency is not a hard and fast 
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requirement under the law, and the absence of it does not of itself constitute an infraction of the 
law deserving punishment. A lack of transparency is ambiguous, and the degree to which a firm 
lacks transparency is undefinable. However, regulations stipulate that all businesses must 
disclose some information, particularly pertaining to the submission of specific reports and 
filings at a certain time and in a specified form. The mandate is more severe and strict for 
companies listed and traded in the open exchanges because of the increased public interest and 
implications for public policy.  
 
The criminal nature of the act of non-filing, whether advertent or inadvertent, does not proceed 
from the mere failure to submit the required documents or errors in the contents thereof but from 
the imputed intention to mislead, misrepresent, conceal, defraud, evade or otherwise elude efforts 
to provide shareholders and other stakeholders with information vital to making crucial 
decisions. 
The required transparency of the capital market operations is fair. Information regarding listed 
companies is usually available, while the Tadawul website classifies listed companies according 
to industry and provides monthly, quarterly and annual financial information. However, a 
number of factors decrease the transparency and efficacy of the SSE: 1) insufficient publicly 
available non-financial information, particularly with respect to beneficial ownership; 2) the lack 
of foreign competition due to the ban on foreign companies in the Tadawul; and 3) inappropriate 
behaviour and abuse of position by brokers and industry insiders. These considerations have 
prompted increased awareness that the creation of a dependable and more transparent capital 
market requires the introduction of corporate governance disclosure conditions. This need is all 
the more crucial as the number of listed companies is constantly increasing. For instance, from 
2004 to 2007, the number of listed companies rose from 73 to 111.
85
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3.10 International Standards 
From the foregoing account of the Al Gosaibi vs Al Sanea case, even when the scandal had been 
revealed and the case was under litigation, the very procedure to resolve the controversy itself 
was mired in a lack of transparency. The protagonists needed to resort to cross-border 
jurisdictions in order to obtain a fair hearing of a case affecting more than 100 global banks. This 
case highlights the urgency of harmonising national and international standards of transparency 
and disclosure if a state wishes to remain a significant player in international business and 
finance.
86
 As such, the relevance of the case to the Saudi Arabian context is the impact that it 
creates on the needfulness of transparency in the country. Far as much from the political 
jurisdiction of the US, the case still gives a basis for the evaluation of the levels of transparency 
required.  The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance provide the best model for national 
laws to adopt. As discussed in Chapter 2, the OECD recommends addressing six key issues in a 
country’s corporate governance structure: 
 The establishment of a legal framework for corporate governance;  
 The assurance of shareholders’ rights and key ownership functions; 
 Equitable treatment of all shareholders, whether majority or minority;  
 Recognition of stakeholders’ wider role in corporate governance; 
 Disclosure and transparency; 
 Determination of the various responsibilities of the board.87 
Of these areas, the international community lays the strongest emphasis on disclosure and 
transparency, particularly regarding the actions and decisions of firms’ boards and executives. As 
in the cases of DP World and Al Gosaibi vs Al Sanea, large businesses with transnational 
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operations often have an impact upon states and business institutions entangled in crises and 
scandals, which adversely affect the lives and circumstances of many individuals. Such effects 
cross borders and spread contagion during financial and economic crises, drawing further 
attention to the need for countries to adopt the OECD governance framework. 
 
3.11 Summary 
This chapter has defined the dual concepts of disclosure and transparency and has explained how 
they have set an international benchmark of corporate governance. Their importance, advantages 
and the principles by which they operate are analysed from a theoretical perspective. Scandals 
and disclosures in real-world global and regional events are examined in order to understand how 
a lack of transparency and disclosure can undermine corporate governance efforts. Insights 
obtained from this study of global disclosure and transparency are applied in the next section to 
the realities in the Saudi capital market.  
In this chapter, the practices related to these concepts in Saudi Arabia are also described. 
Examples are given which suggest the extent of the application of these concepts by listed 
companies and the importance of disclosure and transparency in offering accurate information 
and creating a good investment environment. In addition, disclosure and transparency 
requirements are investigated and a range of these requirements which listed companies have 
broken and the fines imposed by the CMA Board are discussed, following the defamation 
approach for punishing violators.
88
 
Disclosure and transparency are both beneficial to the company. In this context, disclosure takes 
the form of accurate, timely reports to managers and employees. Managers, in particular, need 
information to support decision-making, especially during contingencies which require quick, 
correct and decisive action. An empowered managerial structure enables the firm to build 
leadership traits down the chain of command, developing a pool of future upper-level managers 
and increasing the productivity, growth and profitability of operations.
89
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Disclosure to employees is important in matters relevant to the conduct of their jobs and personal 
circumstances. Employee engagement is a vital, useful tool in employee retention and job 
satisfaction and can be secured only in an atmosphere of trust and open communication between 
firm and employee.
90
 It is important that a firm not only improve communication with its 
workforce but also that it be perceived as doing so in good faith, with concern for employee 
welfare. 
The next chapter examines the current practices and development of the Saudi corporate 
governance framework. A review of Saudi Arabia’s history as a state and developing economy 
leads to a focused discussion of the Saudi CGR, CL and CML. As the vital element in corporate 
governance, this chapter provides a compelling discussion on disclosure and introduces current 
issues on disclosure.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Current Practices and Improvement of Saudi Corporate Governance Framework 
4.1 Overview 
The preceding chapter described the notions of disclosure and transparency and their purpose 
and importance in practice. An understanding of the requirements and elements of the practice of 
disclosure leads to a discussion of its benefits and advantages, as well as the consequences of a 
lack of transparency during financial scandals. The Saudi approach to disclosure and 
transparency is also examined based on the evidence given in board annual reports. This chapter 
highlights the way the Saudi legal system evaluates corporate governance and its legal basis.  
 
4.2 Background information about Saudi Arabia 
In 1932, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud succeeded in consolidating the 
kingdoms of Nejd and Hejaz to create the independent Islamic monarchy of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia following three decades of sporadic fighting.
91
 Since early August 2005, Saudi 
Arabia’s head of state has been Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques His Majesty King Abdullah 
Ibn Abdul Aziz Al-Saud. King Abdullah serves as president of the Council of Ministers through 
which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is administered.
92
 He is supported by numerous ministers, 
including the first deputy premier (His Royal Highness Crown Prince Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz Al-
Saud) and second deputy premier (His Royal Highness Crown Prince Nayef Ibn Abdul Aziz Al-
Saud). 
The Basic Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia confirms the country’s position as an Islamic 
monarchy.
93
 The Basic Law outlines a precise structure for the country’s government. The 
Consultative Council, established in 1993, is charged with providing the Council of Ministers 
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with advice regarding Saudi Arabia’s policies and reviews and commentary on contracts, 
international accords, special rights, laws and bylaws. The Consultative Council also gives 
feedback on the various government ministries’ yearly reports. Saudi Arabia is made up of 
thirteen provinces, which are further divided into governorates, districts and, finally, centres. 
Each province has its own provincial governor, selected by King Abdullah, and a vice governor. 
Provincial councils are made up of these two individuals and a minimum of ten other members. 
To become a member of a provincial council, an individual must first be nominated by the 
provincial governor, then approved by the Minister of the Interior and appointed by the King. 
Provincial councils submit requests for funds from the annual budget, suggest improvements and 
initiatives for their area and have the power to determine the particular developmental 
requirements of their area.
94
 
The majority of Saudi citizens are Muslim, and Saudi Arabia is an Islamic nation and part of the 
Muslim world. Miles and Goulding claim that the Muslim world is often written off as being 
behind the times, rife with corrupt leaders, terrorist activity and low literacy. The appeal of 
Muslim markets would be minimal if all of these claims were borne out in reality.
95
 However, 
Miles and Goulding note that there is increasing interest among the global academic community 
in researching the commercial and company law of Islamic nations, which now conduct 
significant amounts of trade with the Western world. It is estimated that Islamic nations conduct 
87% of their trade with non-Islamic countries, meaning that only 13% of trade is carried out 
between Islamic nations themselves.
96
 Foreign traders and investors cannot ignore the 
importance of the Muslim world, especially as the international market continues to diversify.  
Saudi Arabia is notable among developing Islamic nations because it enjoys good political 
stability, offers its private business sector liquidity and financial incentives and has a solid 
infrastructure, inexpensive labour and energy and low taxes. In addition, Saudi Arabia’s 
considerable gas and petrol reserves
97
 make it a creditworthy and active global market.
98
 Oil 
takes a leading role in any discussion of Saudi Arabia. The country has slightly less than 245 
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billion barrels of oil in its reserves, thought to account for more than 66% of the oil in the Middle 
East and 25% of the world’s oil supply. Saudi Arabia also has as much as 1 trillion recoverable 
barrels of oil in its territory and thus faces no competition in oil-related industries.
99
 All elements 
of Saudi Arabian life reflect the country’s oil-rich status, and this wealth forms the foundation of 
the liquidity in Saudi Arabia, providing high levels of confidence in investments in the Saudi 
Arabian market.
100
  
El Sheikh has observed that, as investors are primarily interested in making a profit, the high 
liquidity enjoyed in Saudi Arabia is a strong selling point.
101
 Saudi Arabia’s economic resources 
have also enabled it to create an infrastructure that meets high global standards. Investors pay 
very little or even no tax, and do not have to make any substantial contribution to infrastructure, 
such as roads, telecommunication towers or energy stations.  
Considering the substantial benefits of investing in the Saudi Arabian business market, it would 
be reasonable to think that domestic and international investment in the country faces no real 
barriers. Sadly, this is not true. A key barrier to investment is the Saudi Arabian commercial and 
company legal system, especially its treatment of minority shareholders in private firms. The CL 
was implemented before commercial activity in the region began to grow. Its provisions appear 
to take their inspiration from civil law. Saudi Arabian company and commercial law hinder both 
domestic and international investment. An American or British lawyer would find it nearly 
impossible to provide appropriate guidance to clients operating in this jurisdiction without the 
support of a local legal expert.
102
 Investors and businesspeople have become acutely aware of the 
importance of legal systems and the need for clear provisions. Consequently, the Saudi legal 
system alone might reduce investment.
103
 This section describes Saudi Arabian company law and 
how the legal system treats both foreign and local minority shareholders. 
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4.2.1 Basic Law of Governance 
Dispersed written rules were codified as Saudi statutory law in 1992 under King Fahd Al Saud’s 
(1921–2005) ratification of the reform of the constitutional law. The King explicitly laid out four 
substantial sets of laws: the Basic Law of Governance, the Regional Law, the Council of 
Ministers Law and, lastly, the Consultative Council Law.
104
  
The Basic Law of Governance is the most vital set of laws, and contains nine chapters with 83 
legal articles. The first part of the Basic Law of Governance establishes the country’s framework, 
religion, language and capital city.
105
 The second part sets the succession of the Saudi throne 
from the parents and sons of the country’s founder.106 The third part declares the fundamentals of 
Saudi civilisation,
107
 emphasising the importance of education in making each Saudi citizen a 
positive member of society.
108
 
The Basic Law of Governance addresses economic affairs and stipulates that the government 
owns all natural resources.
109
 It identifies the country’s overall financial statements110 and 
controlling governmental organisations (whether financial or administrative).
111
 Specifically, the 
Basic Law of Governance advises that the government should treat and counsel all citizens 
equally and fairly.
112
 Furthermore, it tasks the government with protecting human rights, civil 
rights and autonomy so no citizens or residents may be detained without any legal actions.
113
 
It is claimed that Saudi Arabia has no statutory law because its legal system is based on the 
Quran and the Sunna. This claim is reinforced by Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance 
which states that: ‘The religion in Saudi Arabia is Islam and the constitution is the Book of God 
and the Sunna (traditions) of His Messenger’.114 Although the Basic Law of Governance is called 
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the country’s constitution, the term ‘constitutional’ has a different meaning in Saudi practice than 
in common law. From the Saudi perspective, the term indicates the fundamentals of Saudi 
society. Others believe that the Basic Law of Governance established constitutional law. 
Therefore, the Basic Law of Governance can be understood as preserving the core values of the 
constitution, thus acting as a true constitutional law.
115
 Consequently, there are conflicts between 
the Basic Law of Governance as constitutional law and the principal foundations of Sharia law. 
 
4.2.2 The Saudi Legal Framework  
As mentioned earlier, Sharia law is the fundamental source of law in Saudi Arabia and consists 
of basic principles taken from a number of texts, most notably the Quran, scholarly work on the 
Sharia and a collection of the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed known as the Sunna. Law in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is also established by legislation enacted through Royal Decrees, 
Royal Orders, Ministerial Circulars, Ministerial Resolutions and the Council of Ministers 
Resolutions. However, any enacted legislation is subject to Sharia law and must be firmly in line 
with the principles of Sharia. 
Various different adjudicatory organisations and courts of law form Saudi Arabia’s judicial 
system, including a number of specialised committees, the Board of Grievances and Sharia 
courts. Typically, the Sharia courts preside over civil claims, excluding those claims falling 
under the jurisdiction of another of the country’s adjudicatory organisations. Sharia courts see 
cases concerning a range of property issues as well as family law. Most criminal prosecutions 
take place in a Sharia court. The country’s specialised committees were created by different 
government agencies and ministries and have very specific jurisdictions specified in their 
constitutive rules. Three key specialised committees are the Committee for the Settlement of 
Labour Disputes, the Negotiable Instruments Offices and the Committee for the Settlement of 
Banking Disputes. Certain specialised committees act independently of both the Board of 
Grievances and Sharia courts.
116
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A new Law of Judiciary enacted by King Abdullah in 2007 undertook significant reform of the 
Kingdom’s judiciary system.117 The law reorganised Saudi Arabia’s judiciary bodies and dispute 
resolution bodies, including the creation of specialised courts, such as labour, commercial and 
criminal courts. The Board of Grievances now acts as an administrative court. Enacted in 2007, 
the Law of Judiciary is being introduced in stages and has not been fully implemented. 
Whilst the principle of legal precedent that lies at the heart of the UK common law system 
provides a level of predictability and impartiality, the ambiguous nature of legal precedents in 
Islamic courts create uncertainty. In Saudi Arabia, there is no concept of a judicial precedent, 
which means that the decisions of a court or a judicial committee have no binding authority in 
other cases.
118
 In general, the Kingdom lacks a system of court reporting so it is not always 
possible to conclude how a Saudi court or judicial committee will view a particular case.The 
systems of governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Basically, the nation’s legal framework 
is one that finds its relevance in the teachings of Islam, one of justice, equity and fairness. The 
corporate governance processes of the country also have the same inclinations. Considerably, the 
law does not permit the exploitation of people by means of business. Such a case is contrary to 
the external world, especially the West in which, there is a competitive atmosphere for all 
business people. As much as the laws of such nations do not allow people to exploit others, there 
are considerable levels of exploitation considering that the law is not a fundamental teaching.  
The non-precedent nature of Saudi/Islamic law creates further potential for scepticism by 
Western organisations and cultures, which may feel unsure of the validity of the legal system, 
particularly in foreign disputes. Therefore, foreign judgments should abide by Sharia codes and 
public rules.
119
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4.3 Institutional Corporate Governance Framework 
This section first focuses on government and government-regulated institutions established to 
enforce compliance and see that the actions of corporations are in line with the corporate 
governance law. 
 
4.3.1 The Capital Market Authority 
The CMA was created in 2003 pursuant to the CML.
120
 It enjoys legal, administrative and 
financial independence, reporting directly to the King in his capacity as President of the Council 
of Ministries. The CMA exercises executive and legislative powers in passing and adopting 
regulations supporting the validity and reliability of the market’s valuation mechanism. Due to 
its regulatory functions, the CMA is prohibited from engaging in commercial activities of any 
kind, to have any interest in any profit-making endeavour, to lend or borrow any funds or to 
acquire, own or issue any financial instruments.
121
 The CMA is endowed with the authority to 
create rules, enforce regulations and exercise mandatory power to properly discharge its duties. It 
may subpoena witnesses, collect evidence and compel parties to produce any books, papers, 
records or other documents deemed material and relevant to its investigations.
122
 
The limitations on engaging in commercial activities extend to each employee, agent and 
member of the board of the CMA,
123
 including their relatives. Article 8 of the CML states that: 
Any person who becomes an employee or a member of the Board of the Capital Market Authority 
should, immediately upon accepting its functions, disclose to the Capital Market Authority, in the 
manner set forth in the regulations of the Capital Market Authority, the securities he owns or has 
at his disposal or the disposal of one of his relatives, and thereafter declare any change thereon, 
within three days of becoming aware of such change.
124
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Furthermore, Article 9 of the same law affirms that: 
The members of the Board and the employees of the Capital Market Authority shall not engage in 
any other profession or job, including occupying a position or a post in any company, in the 
government, or within any public or private institutions. Furthermore, they shall not provide 
advice to companies and private institutions.
125
 
While the individuals mentioned in the Article may hold or acquire securities and therefore have 
interests in commercial gains, there is a strict requirement for full disclosure of these holdings 
and interests, including those of their relatives, and of any changes made to these holdings and 
interests within three days. Full disclosure is also mandated for the agents of the CMA in matters 
related to the work entrusted to them by regulations.
126
 
The CMA is a semi-governmental body governed by a board whose members are appointed. 
Five permanent members, who must possess high qualifications, serve for a term of five years, 
which may be renewed only once. After appointment, members nominate the chairman and 
deputy chairman and receive salaries predetermined by Royal Order.
127
 The CMA develops the 
implementing rules and regulations for the laws passed by the legislature or by Royal Decree in 
consultation with experts in the government agencies and the private sector. Regulations passed 
by the CMA include the following:
128
 
 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Rules; 
 Authorised Persons Regulations; 
 Corporate Governance Regulations; 
 Glossary of Defined Terms used in the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market 
Authority; 
 Investment Fund Regulations; 
 Listing Rules;  
 Market Conduct Regulations; 
 Merger and Acquisition Regulations; 
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 Real Estate Investment Funds Regulations; 
 Securities Business Regulations.129 
The principal objectives of the CMA are to: 
 Develop the Saudi market; 
 Regulate the issuance of and trading in securities; 
 Achieve transparency and fairness in securities transactions;  
 Monitor the disclosure of information connected to securities and listed companies; 
 Adjust the actions of the stock exchange and listed companies.130 
To achieve these objectives, the CMA performs the following functions: 
 Lays down policies, work plans and regulations necessary to achieve the agency’s 
objectives; 
 Formulates the implementing rules and regulations necessary to effect regulations; 
 Grants the flotation of securities; 
 Adjourns stock exchange actions for designated periods of time; 
 Bans for cause any security traded on the stock exchange;  
 Develops vital principles for external auditors who review the reports of the stock 
exchange, brokerage companies, investment funds and listed companies.
131
 
It is evident that the CMA’s principal role is to enact and implement regulatory measures to 
ensure that the SSE is properly governed and operating. The CMA Board initiates activities that 
until recently were performed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The specific function 
of overseeing corporate governance provisions is delegated to the General Department of 
Corporate Governance. 
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4.3.2 The General Department of Corporate Governance 
The CMA is organised so as to be able to perform its functions under the CML. It created the 
General Department of Corporate Governance which is charged with the improvement and 
implementation of the corporate governance system through the following duties:
132
 
(1) Developing communication with specialised institutions, both local and international, 
which are involved in the corporate governance of publicly traded companies; 
(2) Encouraging perceptions of transparency, disclosure, liability and equality; 
(3) Increasing investors’ knowledge of listed companies through the appropriate CGR 
provisions; 
(4) Promoting and overseeing implementation of corporations’ self-regulation of their 
corporate governance policies; 
(5) Training representatives of listed companies in the proper implementation of corporate 
governance practices.
133
 
The Corporate Governance Department has direct responsibility for monitoring and regulating 
companies’ compliance with the CGR. The department also has the power to bring legal actions 
against corporations which violate the CGR through the CRSD. In the course of its oversight 
functions, the department analyses listed corporations’ articles of associations, online and print 
announcements, pronouncements through the stock exchange, and annual board financial reports. 
The department passes its decisions about violations onto the CMA Board, which reviews the 
decision, the recommended penalties and the legal basis for them.
134
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4.4 Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes 
Judicial authority in Saudi Arabia is conferred on three institutions: the Sharia courts, Board of 
Grievances and quasi-judicial committees under bodies which discharge executive and 
legislative functions. The quasi-judicial committees are not firmly structured because of their 
limited jurisdiction and oversight by governmental and semi-governmental bodies. Unlike 
impartial judicial bodies which take no sides, dispute committees are charged with protecting 
investors and market equity and resolving disputes involving the CML and its implementing 
regulations.
135
 
 
4.4.1 Securities Disputes Committee 
Two committees that perform vital roles in the implementation of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia are the CRSD and the Securities Conflict Appeal Committee. The CRSD is a quasi-
judicial committee composed of several legal advisors with expertise in Islamic financial and 
legal transactions, capital market laws and the interpretation of financial contracts. The legal 
advisors are appointed by the CMA Board for terms of three years with the opportunity for 
reappointment after the first term. It is necessary that the advisors and their relations to the fourth 
degree have no direct commercial interest with the parties involved in grievances being heard.
136
 
This qualification is intended as an assurance that the legal advisors’ decisions are not biased. 
The CRSD has jurisdiction to hear a broad range of disputes, including:
137
 
(1) Public cases or actions brought against parties who refuse to comply with provisions of 
the CML and its implementing regulations; 
(2) Private cases or actions brought by investors against groups in authority; 
(3) Grievance cases or claims by parties against complex regulations and proceedings 
implemented by the CMA Board or the stock exchange; 
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(4) Temporary cases presented to the CRSD to obtain a ruling on transitory matters. 
Despite the CRSD’s broad scope of authority, it may hear cases only with the permission of the 
CMA, which has 90 days to consider the issue.
138
 Claimants may not proceed directly to the 
CRSD within this period. This would be seen as an intervention by the CMA in the CRSD’s 
authority which extends beyond listed companies and exceeds that of the CMA. 
 
4.4.2 Securities Conflict Appeal Committee 
The Securities Conflict Appeal Committee comprises three members nominated by the Council 
of Ministers’ Royal Decree. They serve for a term of three years subject to renewal. In most 
cases, the appointed members are representatives from the Ministries of Finance and Commerce 
and Industry and from the Bureau of Experts under the Council of Ministers.
139
 Decisions by the 
CRSD can be appealed to this Committee within thirty days of the decision. The Appeals 
Committee may decide to accept or refuse an appeal, and its decision is final and binding.
140
 
 
4.5 The Saudi Stock Exchange 
The SSE was established in 1984 in response to the launch of other stock exchanges in 
neighbouring countries, particularly Kuwait and Jordan. In addition, the public exhibited 
growing awareness and interest in stocks and stock trading, and Saudi corporations planned to 
switch from national to public ownership. The SSE was created under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry and SAMA
141
 and initially had 70 listed companies. By 
1996, with a capitalisation of $45.9 billion and a market price-to-earnings ratio of 13.1 times, the 
SSE ranked as the thirteenth largest developed market in the world and the dominant stock 
market among Arab Gulf countries.
142
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In 2003, the new SSE was reformed under the CML for the purpose of trading in securities.
143
 
The SSE is governed by a board of governors representing a number of governmental agencies, 
including the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce and Industry and SAMA. Other 
members include representatives from four licensed brokerage companies and two listed 
corporations.
144
 Over time, the number of listed companies has more than doubled from the 
original 70 to 150.  
Among the SSE’s most important responsibilities in relation to the corporate governance 
framework is the oversight and enforcement of the requirement for corporations to hold annual 
GSMs and to ascertain that shareholders are accorded their rights through these meetings as 
guaranteed by law. The SSE also discharges obligations to:
145
 
(1) Guarantee the equity of listing requirements; 
(2) Ensure that transactions are impartial and fair; 
(3) Ensure that firms meet transparency requirements; 
(4) Certify technical mechanisms and information for securities listed on the stock 
exchange; 
(5) Resolve disputes between board and shareholders and approve regulations. 
The SSE represents a form of self-regulation because of the broad participation by 
representatives of brokerage companies and listed companies. Regulation is not only a one-way, 
top-down approach but follows a more responsive and more effective approach. The self-
regulation mechanism give the SSE a sense of practice for corporate governance in the principles 
of sharia law. The mechanism is one that ensures that the Saudi stock exchange has differentiated 
aspects that protect it from the manipulation of the westernized concepts.  
The International Company Listing For SSE 
 Banks & Financial Services (12) 
 Petrochemical Industries (14) 
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 Cement (14) 
 Retail (14) 
 Energy & Utilities (2) 
 Agriculture & Food Industries (16) 
 Telecommunication & Information Technology (4) 
 Insurance (35) 
 Multi-Investment (7) 
 Industrial Investment (14) 
 Building & Construction (17) 
 Real Estate Development (8) 
 Transport (4) 
 Media and Publishing (3) 
 Hotel & Tourism (4) 
 Not Listed (106) 
 
4.6 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
The major government agency which oversees regulatory measures and corporate governance is 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. It is charged with certifying that the listing of 
companies is performed with full compliance with the CL, good corporate governance principles 
and respect for shareholders’ rights.146 A vital department under the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry is the Department of General Companies. It is responsible for assessing and modifying 
the articles of association of newly-established corporations.
147
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4.7 The Accounting and Auditing Professions and the Saudi Organization for Certified 
Public Accountants 
Standing vanguard over the entire corporate governance framework is the auditing profession, 
which acts with professional detachment and strict standards. Audits assess the financial 
condition and conduct of the company, particularly managerial actions. Auditors are subject to a 
wide range of liabilities in the conduct of their functions, which ensures the competent and 
impartial assessment of firms’ governance. Recent events in the international collapse, however, 
have cast a negative light on this profession. Its members have been perceived as remiss in the 
discharge of their functions and a causal factor in the global financial crisis.
148
 The Saudi 
accounting and auditing profession is believed to have issued unprofessional and misrepresenting 
assessments, which were a principal cause of the Saudi stock market collapse in 2006. 
The first accounting and auditing firm in Saudi Arabia was established by the Ministry of 
Finance in 1957. The Ministry issued permits to seven duly licensed accounting and auditing 
companies, one Saudi and the rest foreign.
149
 There was no earlier licensed Saudi accounting or 
auditing firms because of the lack of suitably educated and trained accountants and auditors.
150
 
The CL specifies the qualifications for certification in accounting and auditing firms, including 
nationality, residence, professional standing, members’ certificates and experience. The CL has 
become a significant driver of the continued professionalisation of the accounting and auditing 
field. 
The CL orders corporations to submit their financial reports to a chartered public accounting and 
auditing company. The chartered company is also empowered to access the company’s records, 
demand information about its operations, assets and liabilities, and perform the necessary due-
diligence asset inspection to determine the accuracy of valuations.
151
 However, the accounting 
profession is still hampered by the lack of an appropriate set of accounting standards applied 
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uniformly to companies with comparable operations. The CL also lacks the body of appropriate 
legislation to properly regulate the accounting and auditing profession.
152
 
For these reasons, the SOCPA was founded in 1992 with the task of overseeing the accounting 
and auditing profession and promoting its development and the formulation of accounting 
standards and principles. SOCPA’s stated functions are to:153 
 Review, develop and approve accounting standards; 
 Review, develop and approve auditing standards; 
 Establish the necessary rules for fellowship certificate examination (CPA exam), including for the 
professional, practical and scientific aspects of the auditing profession; 
 Organise continuous education programmes; 
 Establish an appropriate quality review programme to ensure that certified public accountants 
implement professional standards and comply with relevant provisions and by-laws; 
 Conduct special research and studies in accounting, auditing and related subjects; 
 Publish periodicals, books and bulletins on accountancy- and audit-related subjects; 
 Participate in local and international committees and symposiums relating to the profession of 
accounting and auditing. 
To help professionalise accounting and auditing as instruments of corporate governance, the 
SOCPA has issued recommendations to the boards of directors of various listed Saudi 
corporations about the inadequacy of transparency in their audit committee functions and the 
lack of satisfactory control rules. It is largely due to the perseverance of the SOCPA that these 
corporations have committees discharging the board’s nomination, remuneration, risk and audit 
oversight functions. The first of these specialised committees were established only two years 
ago.
154
    
 
 
 
                                                 
152
 S Mohammad Al-Amari, ‘The Development of Accounting Standards and Practices in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’ (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow 1999) 71.  
153
 Saudi Certified Public Accountants (2007) 10. 
154
 SOCPA (n 153) 10. 
77 
 
4.7.1 Accountability from an Islamic Perspective 
The concept of accountability is one of the most important aspects of Islam because of its link to 
belief in the Day of Judgment. This belief is one of the six articles of faith for Muslims, for 
whom, not the present life, but life after death is not the ultimate goal. The Quran calls the Day 
of Judgment by many names, including the Day of Accountability, the Day of Resurrection, the 
Hour and the Last Day, when all will be called to give an accounting of our decisions, including 
those made in business and work. For Muslims, therefore, accountability is not only an ethical 
concept but more a moral and spiritual one, for which all good Muslims are eternally answerable 
to God.
155
 As all people will be questioned about their actions, Sharia law stipulates that all 
deeds be free of cheating and stealing. This belief supports the concept of disclosure and 
transparency in corporate governance as all the company proceedings and operations will be 
shown honestly to the public. Therefore, a conclusion drawn out of the thought is that 
accountability in the Islamic corporate world is a religious obligation guided by the sharia 
principles. Corporate institutions have the obligation of keeping their business transactions 
accountable to the governing authorities and the stakeholders. Such are principles that govern 
disclosure in the Islamic context. Zakat and  sharia direct that all business people in the Islamic 
world have the transparency and accountability required of them by the community because they 
are directives of Allah. Furthermore, the corporate leaders such as the managers and the directors 
and other concerned parties should be responsible for their actions. 
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4.8 Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations (2006) 
The CMA first introduced the CGR as a set of voluntary, not mandatory, guidelines, unlike other 
regulatory functions (e.g. market conduct and merger and acquisition regulations) which were 
compulsory from the start. The CMA declared that the role of the CGR was to provide standards 
for the administration of listed corporations and encourage compliance. At its discretion, the 
CMA may enforce the CGR articles provided that the CMA Board determines the measure is 
appropriate for the Saudi market.
156
 
Shareholders and other stakeholders play a vital role in corporate governance by providing a 
counterbalance to the board and management who tend to act in their own interests which might 
conflict with stakeholders. The interests of the stakeholders are the motivation for the practice of 
good corporate governance. Stakeholders (employees, shareholders, community, society) are 
most affected by corporation actions decided by the board and management but are the least 
directly involved in the making of these decisions. 
The World Bank (WB) ranked Saudi Arabia 17
th
 out of 183 countries evaluated for the 
protection of investors, particularly minority shareholders.
157
 This indicates that Saudi law is 
well within the norms of most countries. The rights accorded shareholders are specified in 
Article 3 of the CGR:
158
 
(1) The right to a share of the profits of the firm through dividends; 
(2) The right to a proportionate share of the corporation’s assets when liquidated; 
(3) The right to dispose of their shares in the firm according to their preference; 
(4) The right to attend the general shareholders’ meetings, to contribute to the discussion, to ask 
management to explain their decisions and to vote on applicable resolutions; 
(5) The right to oversee the activities of the board of directors; 
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(6) The right to file responsibility claims in a liability action against board members; 
(7) The right to request and access information without prejudice to the corporation’s benefits 
and in a way that does not reverse the CML and the implementing regulations; and 
(8) The right to appoint and remove members of the board of directors. 
Regarding the rights of shareholders in Saudi Arabia, the 2009 WB Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) states that Saudi Arabia has either fully or broadly implemented all 
the sub-principles within Principle IIA on shareholder rights protection. Regarding shareholders’ 
rights to participation and information about fundamental corporate changes, the ROSC finds 
that Saudi Arabia has ‘broadly implemented’ all the sub-principles within Principle IIB. The 
exception is Sub-principle IIB 3 on extraordinary transactions. It has not been implemented, 
indicating major shortcomings in this area. According to the assessment, the available legal 
provisions ‘appear too broad to capture the essence of the principle’.159 
The Returns of Spontaneous Circulation in the ROSC highlight a number of shortcomings 
regarding this principle. Several obstacles impede some entitled shareholders, mostly those 
holding less than a specific number of shares, from attending general shareholder meetings 
(GSMs). There are no requirements for companies to disclose their remuneration policies. 
Shareholders may not vote by post or electronically although they may, in writing, delegate 
another shareholder to vote on their behalf. While companies may issue different classes of 
shares and are required to disclose descriptions of groups granted disproportionate control, the 
disproportionate control resulting from shareholder agreements are not disclosed.
160
 
In Saudi Arabia, the CMA’s Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation161 regulates corporate 
takeovers, with the Competition Law containing certain restrictions against mergers. In addition, 
companies must treat all shareholders equally during a takeover. The assessment observes that, 
unless stated by internal company policy, there appears to be no obligations for institutional 
investors to vote or consider voting.
162
 Therefore, the Saudi corporate governance laws that 
relate to shareholders are less well established and arguably do not demand the same level of 
confidence as their counterparts in non-Islamic-based law systems.  
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Principle IIIA on minority protection states that all holders of the same class of shares should be 
treated equally. For these sub-principles, Saudi Arabia received ratings ranging from fully and 
broadly implemented to partially implemented in the 2009 WB ROSC. The assessment also 
found Principle IIIB on the prohibition of insider trading and abusive self-dealing to be partially 
implemented and Principle IIIC on the disclosure of material interests of board members and key 
executives to be broadly implemented. This evaluation details several ex-ante and ex-post 
protection measures available to minority shareholders. Under certain circumstances, however, 
these shareholders do not have the means to require the company to purchase their shares.
163
 
In addition, voting by proxy is still limited in Saudi Arabia although the evaluation does note that 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
164
 is considering the option of issuing rules on making 
use of phone and internet for contribution purposes. The CML and Market Conduct Regulations 
define and prohibit insider trading and manipulative practices.  
Al-Fawaz claims that the voting system in Saudi Arabia is not compatible with corporate 
governance and economic health, which contribute to the development and the flow of capital 
markets.
165
 The voting system allows for the largest shareholder or allied shareholders to use 
their votes to tighten the control of other shareholders by nominating themselves. Majority or 
large shareholders can take advantage of such companies as many individual shareholders (small 
shareholders or speculators) do not attend GSMs, and these require a quorum only of those in 
attendance. It follows that a large part of the ownership is representative of the board of directors 
which sometimes possesses up to 10% of company stock. The practical result of this voting 
system is that not all shareholders have equal rights, duties and interests. This arguably is a 
manifestation of individual control at the expense of the institution. 
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Al-Fawaz argues that the solution is to expedite the issuance of new corporate law even though 
national economic interests might make it advisable to delay reform of the voting system (one 
vote per share).
166
 The law requires that company boards describe all interests and rights of their 
members, key executives and immediate family who have shares in the company or its 
subsidiaries. Violations of such rules by board members or managers are subject to fines.  In 
Saudi Arabian corporate governance, stakeholders are also of great importance, as reflected in 
the laws which protect them. Companies have proposed system guarantees of minority rights 
through reform of this flaw in voting so it is advisable to expedite the approval of this reform.
167
 
Companies have proposed system guarantees of minority rights through reform of this flaw in 
voting so it is advisable to expedite the approval of this reform.
168
 
Further to that, legislation displays a lack of enthusiasm for corporate governance. Advocates 
hope to apply the CMA’s obligations in full and give the SAMA another role in the governance 
of the banking sector. Several parties have resisted these regulations in an attempt to maintain a 
comfortable, profitable monopoly. Amid talk of economic and financial reforms, and price 
increases in the Kingdom, perhaps the first step to resolve these conflicts is to break this 
monopoly and force entrepreneurs to innovate, take risks and not exploit the system to maximise 
their narrow interests at the expense of those of the nation, citizens, transparency and radical 
economic reforms. The government, too, should be cautious as it has influential shares in some 
joint stock companies (JSCs). Developing mechanisms for electronic voting is also 
recommended. 
However, investors have no cause to engage in insider trading. In addition, the law requires that 
company boards describe all interests and rights of their members, key executives and immediate 
family who have shares in the company or its subsidiaries. Violations of such rules by board 
members or managers are subject to fines.
169
 In Saudi Arabian corporate governance, 
stakeholders are also of great importance, as reflected in the laws which protect them. 
The case of Saudi Integrated Telecom Company (SITC) shows that official departments are 
willing to interfere to resolve an issue. This is not the first incident which has affected the rights 
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of minority shareholders. Multiple companies had done so earlier but what happened to the SITC 
had not happened to any other company. The company offered public subscriptions without 
paying the full share of the founders and used bank guarantees instead of bank certificates of 
deposit from the shares owned by shareholders. Many parties contributed to the accumulation of 
the problems. First, the bank abrogated its responsibility in pledging to cover the Initial Public 
Offering (IPO), an action known to run contrary to statutory procedures for IPOs. As the source 
of collateral, the bank should bear responsibility for the silence about the preliminary prospectus 
which shows the use of financial guarantees as certificates of deposit for shares possessed by the 
company’s principal owners. For its silence, the newsletter also shares responsibility for the 
consequences.  
This process also involved two institutions reputed to be cautious and conservative: the SAMA 
and Ministry of Commerce, which did not prevent explicit violations. The CMA also has some 
responsibility to bear for tolerating offering the company shares without applying the LR which 
the prospectus refers to. In addition, the silence of the Telecommunications Authority and the 
monetisation of non-adherence to the safeguards to stop trading shares raise questions about this 
body’s role in misleading shareholders and other official bodies during the establishment of the 
company without supportive market conditions.  
The CMA suspended the shares of SITC on the SSE on 4 January 2012. Order 05/09/1433 AH 
adjusted the company’s status. The CMA stated that it would consider further action if the 
company had not repositioned itself six months after the date of this decision.  
This issue was clear cut. The company founders had not abided by corporate law or listing rules 
and procedures and, intentionally or unintentionally, exposed shareholders to high-risk practices. 
Thirty-five per cent of the company’s shares were owned by shareholders who did not know the 
direction of the company and were unfamiliar with the CMA, Ministry of Commerce, SAMA 
and Board of Grievances.
170
  
These practices prove beyond doubt that the status of shareholders, especially minority ones in 
Saudi Arabia, is still in the early stages compared to developed markets. There is no absolute 
answer to who is responsible for the lack of protection of minority shareholders. No unions or 
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clear legal procedures to recover their rights or receive compensation for losses suffered as a 
result of errors by company leaders and other regulators exist. In developed countries, such 
incidents prompt the enactment of laws to address problems that have occurred, but many 
countries remain silent about such situations. 
Although the CMA’s 2004 Market Conduct Regulations include laws to prevent market 
manipulation, protection of minority shareholders is not guaranteed in the execution of laws and 
regulations. Small shareholders might be afraid of taking the initiatives as they do not know the 
risks. Therefore, the CMA, as the regulator of the financial market, should invite small 
shareholders to create blocs protected by a specially formed CMA special unit. This unit should 
be made of expert jurists familiar with the financial markets who can inform shareholders or 
groups of shareholders of their rights and advise them during any legal claims.
171
  
For example, the CMA stopped the trading of stocks in Bisha in January 2007 because its losses 
reached a large percentage of its capital. The CMA asked the company to reissue its financial 
statements for the third quarter. Where was the board of directors when the company suffered 
losses in successive years? Over the past three years, as sales decreased, the company sought 
liquid investments in investment funds. The board of directors certainly sought any priority or 
initiative to improve the status of the company’s primary activities. However, the company did 
not have a legal official at the time of the auction for the sale of outstanding shares. This created 
new problems with the auditor and with calculating the return on the auction revenue, and 
required doubling the integrity of financial systems and control.
172
 
It has been proven that limiting the Governing Council which handles shareholders’ money 
allows shareholders to claim the legal rights to determine corporate governance, control the work 
of the board and hold members of the council responsible.  
According to the 2009 WB ROSC, Principle IVA on the adherence to the rights of stakeholders 
is broadly implemented in Saudi Arabia. Both Principle IVB on the effectiveness of redress for 
violations of stakeholder rights and Principle IVC on the development of performance-enhancing 
mechanisms for employee participation were found to be partially implemented.
173
 Principle IVD 
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on stakeholder participation in the corporate governance process was not applicable in the Saudi 
Arabian context. The 2009 assessment deemed Principle IVE on the protection of stakeholder 
rights in the reporting of illegal or unethical behaviour not to have been implemented. Saudi 
Arabian law contains ‘no specific whistle-blower mechanisms’.174 Principle IVF on the existence 
of a complementary insolvency framework was assessed as broadly implemented.
175
 
In addition, the CL does not have provisions that give stakeholders the right to provide input on 
matters related to company governance. The CGR, however, require that companies establish 
written policies organising boards’ relationships with stakeholders.176 While the CGR requires 
dispute settlement mechanisms between companies and their stakeholders, such mechanisms are 
not detailed or distinguished for different types of stakeholders. Despite the CGR requirement 
for written CSR policies, the assessment found that few Saudi companies included these in their 
annual reports. According to the 2009 ROSC, recent amendments to the Offers of Securities 
Regulations introduced employee share options and incentive schemes but, at the time of the 
report, these had not been ratified.177 
Regarding the legal principles of disclosure and transparency in Saudi corporate governance, 
Principle VA outlines the standards for the disclosure of different types of corporation material 
information. Its sub-principles were all rated as either broadly or partially implemented, with the 
exception of Principle VA7. This sub-principle on the disclosure of stakeholder issues was found 
not to have been implemented as the CGR disclosure requirements regulating company-
stakeholder relationships were still ‘too new to be tested’.178 
The 2009 WB ROSC also found that Saudi Arabia had partially implemented Principle VB on 
the standards of financial and non-financial disclosures, Principle VC on auditing and auditor 
requirements, Principle VD on auditor accountability and Principle VE on the accessibility of 
disclosed information. Principle VF on the disclosure of conflicts of interest by analysts, brokers 
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and rating agencies was assessed as not implemented.
179
 Although the Authorised Persons 
Regulations appear to capture most core principles of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) Statement of Principles for Addressing Sell-side Securities Analyst 
Conflicts of Interest, the legal framework as a whole does not necessarily address these 
regulations.
180
  
Public disclosure and periodic reporting requirements of listed companies are detailed in the CL, 
CML and CMA LR. However, the evaluation observes that disclosures related to beneficial 
ownership ‘appear to be still limited in relation to intra-group relations and significant cross-
shareholdings’.181 The LR require prompt ex-ante disclosure of transactions between the 
company and related parties but no disclosure before such a transaction is carried out. Listed 
companies in Saudi Arabia must comply with local financial reporting standards issued by the 
SOCPA. The 2009 action plan issued by SOCPA for the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) states that SOCPA has set as an objective the convergence of national standards with 
International Financial Reporting Standards.
182
 It has been noted that the board of a corporate 
organisation, as well as its shareholders, is of crucial importance to the notion of corporate 
governance. What, therefore, of the legislations that dictate the actions and responsibilities of a 
board in a corporate organisation in Saudi Arabia? 
The above analysis relates to the thesis because it outlines the generalised approaches of 
corporate governance. As such, the regulations realised in this section interpret the situation in 
relation to the Islamic sharia. The obligation  that all corporate institutions have in the country 
require them to be transparent in terms of disclosure. The principles of Islamic laws have a 
fundamental principle of non-exploitation, which makes the above principles relevant to the 
scenario.   
According to the evaluation, fiduciary duties are still emerging legal concepts in Saudi Arabia, 
and compliance with the CGR on the board’s key functions is still in the early stages as is the 
effective enforcement of penalties for violations of fiduciary duties.
183
 .
184
 The scenario is still 
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applicable under the sharia laws, which gives the directives of the types of activities that take 
place. The sharia laws require that parties partaking of the fiduciary duties should observe the 
three fundamentals of Islamic laws. The emergence of the same concepts in the country relate to 
the slow rate of incorporation of the concepts into the concepts of sharia laws. 
Shareholders possess the right to file liability lawsuits against directors through the redress 
mechanisms described in the CL. However, no laws or regulations pertain specifically to 
minority shareholders.
185
 To date, no lawsuits involving directors’ liabilities have been filed in 
Saudi Arabia. The evaluation finds that the CL requires disclosure of remuneration methods and 
thresholds but there are no specific laws or regulations on aligning the compensation of the board 
of directors and senior executives with long-term company and shareholder interests.
186
 
Similarly, the evaluation also noted a lack of provisions in the CL and CGR concerning the 
disclosure of board nomination procedures. The WB evaluation also observed that not all 
companies possessed an internal audit function. The IFC and Hawk Amah Institute for Corporate 
Governance’s regional survey, as cited by the 2009 WB ROSC, found fairly low cross-board 
memberships across Saudi Arabia.  
This discussion has given an overview of company law and its operation in Saudi Arabia. A 
related theme will now be considered: the accountability framework within the context of Saudi 
corporate governance.
187
 
The legal protection of minority shareholders does not mean that they and their interests cannot 
be relegated to a position inferior to that of other shareholders. Minority shareholders rights are 
defined, enforced and protected by law. However, as seen in Abu Aynain’s 2013 article in Al-
Riyadh, these reforms are inadequate to protect shareholders’ rights and guarantee transparency 
of operations. Aynain discusses a crisis involving integrated telecommunications company 
Almutakmilah which had a difference between the book value of its shares at SR900 million and 
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the value at market price of SR2,430 million. This could be a distorted picture as the market 
increased the price of the stock shares of a firm accused of offences.
188
 
The second-generation family managers of Saudi firms are not well prepared to appoint 
independent boards of directors and professional chief executive officers (CEO) to manage the 
company according to the board’s decisions. Consequently, firms’ financial disclosure is not 
sufficient, and shareholders companies do not have enough accurate information about the 
companies in which they have invested. Therefore, the Saudi government is encouraging firms to 
adhere to corporate governance practices without resorting to mandatory regulation. 
Regarding the jurisdiction process, Al-Nasiry describes the SITC case in which the company 
lawyer revealed that the responsible bodies did not agree to bring issues to the judiciary.
189
 
However, the company management felt that the process was contrary to the company’s interest 
and violated regulations. Although there was a liquidation process, its liquidation was settled by 
bureaucracy instead of a court of law. This situation indicates the lack of legal resort for parties 
involved in liquidation.
 
 
This regulatory shortcoming might result in shareholder losses during liquidation. The 
liquidation decision on SITC gave non-founder shareholders 9% less than the book value of their 
shares and nearly 60% less than market value. Bypassing the judiciary harms the voiceless 
shareholders who must appeal the decision in a court of law—a lengthy process because unclear 
regulations on liquidation might delay or deny justice.
190
 
Although regulation of the liquidation process is lacking and the law modifies the term of limited 
companies, it is crucial to understand that Article 180 of the CL is the only statutory limitation of 
the doctrine concerning the separation of legal personality in Saudi Arabia. This article states 
that, if a limited liability company’s losses exceed 50% of its share of capital, its shareholders 
lose their limited liability and become responsible for the company’s debts.191 At this point, 
dividends may not be distributed to shareholders except for net profits. If shareholders receive a 
                                                 
188
 F Abu Aynain, ‘The Market Value of the Shares of the Integrated 2430 Million and Shareholders’ Equity Fell to 
900 Million’ (Al-Riyadh Newspaper, 9 May 2013). 
189
 I Al-Nasiry, ‘Responsible Bodies Reject the Judiciary and the Withdrawal of the License of Historical Precedent’ 
(Al-Eqtisadi Newspaper, 2013) Issue 7150. 
190
 AH Omari, ‘Integrated: Who Will Pay for the Mess?’ (Al-Eqtisadi Newspaper, 2013) Issue 7154. 
191
 CL (n 7) Article 180. 
88 
 
distribution that is not from the net profits, they can claim from shareholders the amount that 
exceeds the net profit. During the dissolution of a company, creditors need to be paid from 
profits before shareholders are. What remains is then distributed among shareholders.
192
 
In addition, thirty days after the 50% limit has been exceeded, a meeting must be called to 
consider whether the company should continue to exist or be dissolved before the expiration of 
the period indicated in the company’s articles of associations.193  
Article 176 limits the company’s ability to distribute profits to shareholders. This Article 
stipulates that a company must set up reserves and accumulate a reserve fund of up to 50% of 
share capital. Each financial year, companies must transfer at least 10% of their annual profits 
into reserves until they equal or exceed 50% of the company’s share capital.194 
 
4.9 Evaluation and Analysis of the Saudi Corporate Governance Framework 
The Saudi Corporate Governance Framework is benchmarked against the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, and is subject to the ROSC, a programme under the joint auspices of the 
WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This analysis focuses on listed companies but 
does make country-wide observations on the general regulatory and legal framework for 
governance and accountability. The 2009 ROSC country assessment for Saudi Arabia noted an 
emerging awareness of the importance of good corporate governance as a result of the deep 
slump and volatile market of 2006 that was caused by a lack of disclosure and transparency 
among listed companies.  
Since then, several initiatives to promote legal and institutional reform in the Saudi corporate 
governance system have been undertaken, which observers feel will ensure that companies use 
their resources more efficiently and will engender better relations with workers, creditors and 
other stakeholders. The Saudi framework includes the 2006 CGR for listed companies, 
guidelines on corporate governance best practices for banks and strengthened supervisory 
functions in the financial sector. 
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The CMA ‎is responsible for regulating and managing the Saudi Arabian capital markets and 
other areas related to corporate governance, as defined and established in the first chapter. The 
CMA has a level of legal, financial and bureaucratic autonomy and answers only to the prime 
minister.
195
 The CMA’s responsibilities include the following: 
(1) Setting financial rules and regulations;  
(2) Ensuring that these rules are followed; 
(3) Acting as an independent committee for the resolution of disputes;  
(4) Ensuring the growth of capital markets and the corporate elements of the Saudi 
Arabian economy (including the governance of the SSE); 
(5) Ensuring, through its Corporate Finance and Issuance Divisions, that any potential 
and actual investors are given all the information they may require to take objective 
decisions about their investments, and that all parties adhere to the rules and 
regulations, as above; and 
(6) Contributing to policy ideas and implementations conducive to the growth of the 
Saudi economic markets and infrastructure.  
To show the CMA’s seriousness in enforcement, it filed a case against Muteb Bin Saeed 
Adullah Al-Ahmary for violating Article 49 of the CML and Articles 2 and 3 of the Market 
Conduct Regulations
196
 when trading shares of various companies in 2008. The CMA 
charged him with committing fraud, manipulation and creating misleading impressions. He 
was banned from offering securities through his website, which was closed down. He was 
ordered to pay the revenue due to the CMA as well as a penalty.
197
 
The CMA is chiefly responsible, within the Saudi power structure and hierarchy, for 
implementing the rules, instructions and procedures that amount to the implementation of the 
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corporate governance regulations in accordance with the cultural (Islamic) laws of the 
land.
198
 Unsurprisingly, there are a number of proposed recommendations which, if followed, 
will enable Saudi Arabia to bring its actual and proposed corporate governance closer to what 
is expected by international standards.
199
 These recommendations include changes to the 
structure of the CGR and better implementation of the principles of the law in legal practice. 
The WB report notes that:  
The CMA is in the process of implementing a three-phase approach to improving corporate 
governance practices in Saudi Arabia. Phase one was completed with the publishing of the CGR 
and phase two, which is currently in progress, aims to educate market participants on its 
application. The third phase will comprise revisions to the CGR, with a possibility of making 
compliance with some or all of the regulation mandatory.
200
 
That the World Bank, in its ROSC, could conclude impartially that the Saudi corporate 
governance laws, regulations and institutions ‘generally reflect international good practice’ is 
significant, particularly given the allegations of economic corruption aimed at Saudi Arabia, as 
discussed previously. This conclusion should encourage non-Arabic corporate organisations to 
carry on business in Saudi Arabia and with Saudi companies.
201
 
It has been established that the CMA has the power to investigate and enforce rules and 
regulations within the context of corporate governance.
202
 On this subject, however, one might 
add that, according to the 2009 World Bank ROSC, the CMA has also improved its consultative 
process and started more actively interacting with relevant stakeholders in developing new 
regulations. The 2009 ROSC found a clear division of responsibility between the CMA and the 
SAMA and, in general, observed a ‘significant degree of cooperation between the various 
financial sector regulatory bodies’.203 Both the CMA and SAMA seem to possess adequate 
supervisory resources and are economically independent. They work to build awareness of the 
importance of sound corporate governance practices amongst companies, shareholders and 
stakeholders.
204
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As the legal context in Saudi Arabia is based upon Sharia law and the law is derived from Sharia 
principles and notions of justice, it is necessary to return to this legal framework to provide a full 
picture. In the early 1980s, SAMA, the central bank of Saudi Arabia, issued a document 
addressing the responsibilities of the board of directors of Saudi commercial banks, including the 
implementation of a system of accounting and internal controls.
205
 A further guidance document 
issued in 1996 concerned the role of the board’s audit committee.  
In 2004, the SAMA published a circular that affected bank directors and senior managers. Until 
2003, the SAMA had been in charge of regulating and monitoring market activities in Saudi 
Arabia. The CMA was established in July 2003 under the CML, leaving SAMA with the role of 
regulating banks and insurance companies. As noted earlier, the CMA issued the CGR following 
the 2006 market correction, when market regulators focused on legislative and institutional 
reforms to improve corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. The 2009 World Bank ROSC found 
general adherence to be low in the first year of the adoption of the CGR, applicable to listed 
companies on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis. The SAMA is also ‘drafting a corporate governance 
manual for banks’.206 
This history proves how Islamic law is being affected and is evolving within the business and 
economic setting of Saudi Arabia. If the Saudi economy is to grow as desired, a shift from Sharia 
law towards more international (i.e. European and American) business laws and rules is 
necessary. However, this evolution must not come at the expense or alienation of the Arabic 
world which is itself so intertwined with the Saudi economy at a cultural and a financial level. 
According to the 2009 World Bank ROSC, companies in Saudi Arabia adhere to a one-tier board 
system. The Tadawul serves as Saudi Arabia’s Stock Exchange, which is the largest in the Arab 
world, with a market capitalisation of US$519 billion at the end of 2007. According to the World 
Federation of Exchanges, the Tadawul had 122 listed companies as of June 2008. Despite some 
market liberalisation in 2006, foreign investors still have limited access to investing in Saudi 
shares. The 2009 ROSC does note that there remains an on-going domestic debate on whether to 
further liberalise the market. Some of the largest companies in Saudi Arabia are not listed 
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because the abundant liquidity in the market, along with well-capitalised banks, reduces the 
incentive to go public.  
The ROSC also states that ownership tends to be concentrated in government and founding 
family holdings. In 2009, investor protection in Saudi Arabia was higher than the average 
achieved by OECD member states and well above the regional mean, as noted in the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank’s (IBRD/WB) 
2010 Doing Business Report. The IBRD/WB ranked Saudi Arabia on the Investor Protection 
Index, which is a subcomponent of the IBRD/WB 2010 Doing Business Indicators and consists 
of three dimensions of investor protection: transparency of transactions (Extent of Disclosure 
Index), liability for self-dealing (Extent of Director Liability Index) and shareholders’ ability to 
sue officers and directors for misconduct (Ease of Shareholder Suits Index).
207
 The indices range 
between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating greater disclosure, liability of directors, powers 
of shareholders to challenge the transaction and investor protection. Saudi Arabia scored 9.0 on 
the Disclosure Index, compared to a regional average of 6.3 and OECD average of 5.9. The 
Kingdom scored 8.0 on the Director Liability Index, compared to a regional average of 4.8 and 
OECD average of 5.0. Finally, it scored 4.0 on the Shareholder Suits Index, compared to a 
regional average of 3.7 and OECD average of 6.6.
208
 
Before looking at company law in Saudi Arabian corporate governance, the role of audit 
committees in the Saudi Arabian corporate sector is considered.
209
 
 
4.10 Role of Environmental Matters and Auditing in Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance practices are determined by regulations and assessed by auditing practices 
and environmental requirements. From the time of the commercialization, the system of Islamic 
corporate governance has seen a rapid rise and reached the acceptable standards globally. 
However, there continues to be criticism with regard to the absence of uniformity in the 
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application of the sharia laws. The sharia supervisory board in in charge and consequently, has 
the directions concerning the same concepts.   
 When considering the case of SITC, Aynain points out that Ministerial Decisions should address 
a lack of transparency in sensitive financial and market issues, holding accountable those who 
cause shareholders losses and consider the precedent of publishing the findings of decisions 
concerning the liquidation of listed companies in the capital market.
210
 Aynain claims that 
shareholders are eager to learn whether, when a company’s assets are liquidated, shareholders’ 
funds will be returned. Investors who bought their shares in the trading market at high prices are 
particularly concerned.  
Aynain shows that the book value of the shares amounted to SR9 and that equity fell to SR900 
million. When calculating the value of shares issued according to the price of the last closing 
share of SR24.30, it is clear that the market value of those shares was in the range of SR2430 
million. This gives a distorted picture of the market. The value of stock in companies accused of 
offences of incorporation rose to record levels, while the value of shares of some companies sat 
near their nominal prices.
211
 
Moreover, Aynain shows that the SITC crisis revealed serious errors in the administrative 
organisation and the relationship between the ministries and bodies concerned. The multiple 
sources charged with issuing permits allowed errors to happen. The case of the SITC is linked to 
three such sources: the Ministry of Commerce, the Communications Authority and the Markets 
Authority.
212
  
The SITC crisis also exposed the mechanism for applying the criteria for establishing companies 
along with other disparities in the official bodies of company founders. In addition, Aynain 
highlights the transparency of government ministries and agencies alongside the Financial 
Market Authority.
213
 
He stresses that the repeated errors committed in the capital market adversely affected the 
Kingdom’s credit status, which became less than receivable. The main cause of this classification 
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was the weakness of the capital market. He also points to specialised company classifications 
which seemed to be exposed after the SITC crisis. Aynain states that legal consequences 
continue after the decision for liquidation. The matter does not end at this point, especially if the 
available funds do not fulfil shareholders’ rights and the responsibilities of the company’s 
founding shareholders.
214
  
Aynain stresses that the CMA is responsible for tracking restrictions on selling company shares 
in order to avoid disasters. The agency also seeks to find market manipulators and to force them 
to settle accounts. Restrictions imposed by the CMA may not be concealed. In the face of these 
developments, Aynain calls for the CMA to review its weak enforcement, to revise allowances 
and to tighten the criteria for inclusion in a manner that preserves the rights of investors and 
traders and restores lost market confidence. In respect of this, the issuance of permits should be 
performed by a comprehensive service centre in order to ensure that those who issue a statement 
are responsible for its consequences even though many actors are involved in the formation of 
the final declaration.
215
 
As a result, the decision made in the case of SITC did not satisfy legal experts. Alanfa indicates 
that the financial market system demanded that matters be made public when publications 
included incorrect data about substantial matters or failed to mention substantial facts. Those 
who purchase securities subject to these publications are entitled to compensation for harm 
caused by it. Such statements or omissions are substantial if the evidence presented to the 
committee settling securities disputes indicates that the investor knew the impact on the price 
that he bought it.
216
  
Shareholders must study the reasons for the withdrawal of a licence and deliberate whether their 
rights have been violated. They may bring a case against the responsible parties, whether 
company officers or others, if specific mistakes caused the withdrawal. These cases are a real test 
of the application of the corporate governance systems and bylaws protection of shareholders’ 
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rights. These cases are an indicator of the level of shareholders and investors’ confidence in the 
Saudi market and the reputation of companies in the Kingdom.
217
 
Alanfa points to Aynain’s opinion that the matter does not end at this point.218 Stakeholders 
might bring the matter to judicial courts because of the loss they incurred due to the decision. 
Aynain emphasises the CMA’s weakness and inability to ask companies about transactions, 
allowances and stricter criteria for trading shares. The whole matter indicates the lack of 
supervision and commercial regulations necessary for the CMA to monitor companies’ activities 
and take timely actions.
219
  
This discussion leads to that analysis of auditing and environmental issues. One can successfully 
link auditing and environmental practices when corporate governance practices are at a 
reasonable level. In this context, Chiang emphasises the comparative perspective for 
investigating and analysing the development of internal audit departments in Saudi Arabia.
220
  
 
4.11 Role of Sharia Law in the Business Environment 
Under the absolute Saudi monarchy, Sharia law forms the foundation upon which Royal Decrees 
are based. Sharia law is a collection of principles derived from several sources, principal among 
them is the Holy Quran and the Sunna. Most Saudi regulations are interpreted consistently with 
the law of Islam. 
Generally, Saudi law follows the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence, which has majority 
and minority views on a number of issues, and bases its approach to legal construction on justice 
and fairness. Other Sharia principles contrary to Western business practices are the prohibitions 
of riba (interest) and gharar (uncertainty) and the lack of an irrevocable power of attorney.
221
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Islamic law is concerned with the relationship between humans and God as defined and 
understood by Islamic theology. Implicit in this theological relationship are dual levels of 
responsibility: firstly, responsibility between an individual and God; and secondly, the 
relationship between an individual and other humans.
222
 While ibadat—meaning worship—
relates to the first, muamalat—or interactions—relates to the second. Anthropologically, it is 
necessary for Western and non-Muslim readers to understand the importance of these notions to 
those involved in the Saudi business context.
223
 One cannot separate the concept of 
accountability in business from the concept of accountability in the Quran, between a person and 
others and between a person and his God.
224
 The main belief of Muslims is that all creatures will 
be held accountable and judged for their deeds on Doomsday. Such a belief makes believers keen 
to do the right things and avoid the bad ones as defined by Sharia.
225
 
 Basically, the principles of the Islamic corporate governance have the foundations on the 
teachings of religion. The most complicated part of the laws relate to the accounting system 
because they sharia laws guard people against exploitations that occur through financial 
manipulations. However, the laws that regulate the accounting systems within the same context 
have significant levels of influence on corporate governance. 
Arguably, approximately all the principles of corporate governance have their concentration on 
the sustainability of the benefits of the stakeholders because they have contractual dealings with 
the same corporations. Such a principle is mentioned in the corporate governance are also in the 
Islamic perspectives as the undertaking of contracts.
226
 The objective of wealth from the Islamic 
point of view concerns the involvement of contracts and requires all the Muslims to record 
information regarding their business contracts. The Muslim faith holds particular views 
regarding wealth. As such, they believe that Allah reveals that all that believes in the 
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fundamentals of Islam should write their contracts down. Allah further shows that the process 
should involve a scribe who should so in justice and that no scribe should refuse to do what He 
has thought him.
227
 
Additionally, undertaking contracts focuses on fair dealings for all the parties involved in the 
process. For this case, Allah declares that not all those who believe in Islam should eat up their 
property among themselves in unjust manners except in trade between them in terms of mutual 
agreements and that they should not kill themselves. There is a need to base corporate 
governance practices on the undertakings of company managers. Therefore, according to the 
teachings of Islam, there is a need that the corporations undertake contacts with Muslim 
managers with particular reference to the Islamic laws (Sharia). Altogether, there is a need to 
realize that the managers are not to dominate their debtors and should respect them. 
Nevertheless, there is also the need to consider that contacts should consider the nature of 
products under the contract as well as specify the rights of both the buyer and the seller. 
Under Islam, disclosure should include all information on legal and illegal activities, employee 
policy, resource use and environment, and this is associated with principles such as vice-regency 
and justice.
228
 Based on the concept of accountability, it is necessary to disclose this information 
even when it conflicts with the company’s interests.229 Ultimately, human beings are not the 
owners of their surroundings but are only ‘vice-regents’ entrusted by God with the responsibility 
for such things as family, property, resources and businesses. 
Therefore, humans must be honest and should use property and resources according to Sharia 
law and Allah’s will. In this way, they can fulfil their accountability to Allah. In Islam, the 
principle objective of accounting is to be accountable to Allah. This differs from the business 
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accountability perspective in Western countries which gives stakeholders and owners priority.
230
 
A business owner or manager must follow Sharia law in all transactions, including avoiding 
dealing with interest when borrowing or lending and reporting any activities that are not 
compatible with Sharia law.
231
 The Quran mentions the prohibition of interest several times and 
emphasises that Islamic law does not allow it.
232
 
For many, there is no ambiguity in the accountability demanded in Islamic culture and business, 
and thus, in Saudi culture and business. Sharia instructions apply to all activities of Muslims, 
whether managers, shareholders or employees.
233
  
 
4.12 Summary 
This chapter has examined the Saudi legal system for the capital market and has given the 
historical background of the country and the Basic Governance Law. The current practices of 
and improvements to the Saudi corporate governance framework and regulations have been 
analysed. In addition, the application of the Sharia concept of accountability in the Saudi 
business environment has been described. This lengthy chapter provides a detailed analysis of 
the current practices and the improvement of the corporate governance framework in Saudi 
Arabia. Background knowledge of Saudi Arabia’s legal structure and its development throughout 
the years is very important in understanding the growth of corporate governance to the present. 
The foundations of Saudi Arabia’s legal structure are based on Islam, and the tenets of the 
religion fuels corporate governance. However, there are codified statutory laws, and four sets of 
laws laid out by the monarch have been instrumental in the creation and development of the 
corporate governance in the country. The Basic Law of Governance, Regional Law, Council of 
Ministers law and the Consultative Law are the four statutory laws that were codified in 1992. 
Further, the country’s CMA ratified a number of changes and established a set of corporate 
governance regulations which was developed to be in tandem with international standards. This 
chapter has described the institutional infrastructure that supports the corporate governance 
                                                 
230
 Baker Alserhan, ‘The Principles of Islamic Marketing’ (United Arab Emirates University 1999) UAE. 
231
 Z Iqbal and A Mirakhar, An Introduction Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice (2nd edn, John Wiley & Sons 
(Asia) 2011) 
232
 Quran, Surat 'Āli `Imrān Iuah (130). 
233
 Myers (n 228). 
99 
 
framework in Saudi Arabia. The government agencies and institutions charged with the oversight 
and regulation of corporate activities to ensure compliance with corporate governance principles 
have been identified: the CMA, with its General Department of Corporate Governance; the 
CRSD, under which are the Securities Disputes Committee and the Securities Conflict Appeal 
Committee; the SSE; the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; and accounting and auditing 
professions regulated by the SOCPA. Finally, the Saudi ownership structure has been 
highlighted. 
Furthermore, the chapter has introduced the CMA; its core functions in lieu of corporate 
governance; and its functions and other roles within the public sector. Further, the chapter 
engages in a deep discussion and exploration of institutional corporate governance structure, of 
both public and private institutions. Within the body of the chapter, the stock exchange becomes 
an important item of discussion with respect to corporate governance as well as an avenue for 
retribution in case of malpractice and issues that go against good and ethical corporate 
governance. Finally, the chapter provides a raft of comparisons on corporate governance 
practices in other parts of the world in relation to present corporate practice in Saudi Arabia. 
The Islamic corporate governance structure has a similarity with the conventional structures. 
However, the context of Islamic models, the foundation lies on the conventions of Islam, which 
require that the corporations be as transparent as possible. The same rules require that the 
institutions take the wellbeing of stakeholders at the centre of their operations. On the contrary, 
the conventional apart from holding the fundamentals of transparency, has some levels of 
exploiting of some stakeholders. As such, the distinction lies in the manner that the Sharia 
supervisory board is at the centre of the regulations of the Islamic regulations.  
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Chapter Five 
The current rights of minority shareholders in Saudi Arabia 
 
The preceding chapter examined the legal framework of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia 
and the important elements of the institutional framework for Saudi corporate governance. The 
discussion in this chapter first focuses on government and government-regulated institutions 
established to enforce compliance and see that the actions of corporations are in line with 
corporate governance law. This chapter then examines minority shareholdings interests and 
rights and investigates minority shareholder protection under the CL. In addition, the board of 
directors is described, which controls and guides firm operations in compliance with corporate 
governance standards and regulations.  
 
5.1 Outline of Minority Shareholdings 
Before discussing minority shareholding in Saudi Arabia, it is first necessary to briefly describe 
minority shareholdings themselves. The minority does not control the firm’s operations by 
voting (either with others or independently). Of course, the fewer shares firms or individuals 
possess, the less say they have in the running of the business. If a single shareholder possesses 
the majority of shares, this shareholder enjoys significant influence over the firm’s operations. A 
majority shareholder can push forward decisions in general meetings and meetings of the board 
of directors where typically a majority vote determines decisions.
234
  
One shareholder wielding significant control over a firm can give rise to serious concerns. The 
primary concern is that the majority shareholder’s influence might result in negative outcomes 
for the business for which it cannot seek any remedy.
235
 A firm is a separate legal entity from its 
shareholders, and thus if damage is done to a firm it is only the firm that may seek legal redress. 
If the action of a director sanctioned by the majority of shareholders causes damage, individual 
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minority shareholders have no recourse to redress this wrong. A firm’s actions are frequently 
directed by the majority shareholder through the decisions made at general meetings.
236
 
Minority shareholders might also find that a majority shareholder unfairly treats or oppresses 
them. This situation arises when the business is operated in a manner detrimental to the minority 
shareholders’ interests. The legal remedies offered for unfair actions of majority shareholders 
focus on protecting minority shareholders from such actions not on protecting the company from 
damage. Regardless of the fact that shareholders have a lower stake in the company than the 
majority shareholder, the minority shareholder also needs to be involved in the disclosure 
process. For instance, if the majority shareholders proceed to initiate a company project while 
excluding the minority shareholder, the majority shareholders may be culpable of non-disclosure. 
Therefore, the minority shareholder may initiate a legal process against majority shareholders 
based on an irregularity referred to as fraud of minority.
237
 When determining whether an action 
against a majority shareholder can be pursued, the court considers the equitable issue of valid 
expectations as well as the lack of confidence between shareholders. The law must offer minority 
shareholders, as well as firms, potential remedies for any unfair or illegal behaviour which has 
negative impacts on them.
238
 
 
5.1.1 Source of Problems and Current Remedies for the Protection of Minority 
Shareholders 
The Gulf States have drawn a number of international investors. Indeed, a survey recently 
revealed that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are the best parts of the Arab world to 
undertake business. In addition, Saudi Arabia is listed among the top twenty nations for 
conducting business globally.
239
 This survey considered a number of factors: how easy it was to 
start a business and obtain credit; the degree of protection given to minority investors; and the 
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operation of cross-border trade.
240
 Kjaer recently observed that the business model of these 
nations is founded on drawing in foreign investment, and thus there is an emphasis on more 
astute regulation. However, oil revenues and high liquidity, which lead to the quick development 
of businesses, are also a strong draw for foreign investors.
241
 
Thus, it is fair to assume that these nations have developed comprehensive, efficient and easy-to-
use systems of company law in order to protect the interests and rights of all parties. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case with Saudi Arabia. Despite reforms to Saudi Arabian company 
law, the legal system of Saudi Arabia, as it stands, does not afford adequate protection for 
minority shareholders.
242
  
The Saudi legal system allows minority shareholders to make a complaint against the majority 
shareholder but not the board of directors about any unfair or illegal behaviour thought to be 
taking place.
243
 A strict limitation on this right is that any complaint must be made before the 
behaviour or action that is being questioned is completed. A minority shareholder has no right to 
seek a review of any behaviour or actions once they have concluded. In addition, a majority 
shareholder may choose to sanction certain conduct after it has occurred, in which case minority 
shareholders have no recourse. Typically, courts will take the side of the majority shareholder in 
order to avoid intervening in the internal operations of a firm. Even when an abuse of power is 
obvious, only the majority shareholder has the authority to hold directors accountable for their 
actions or fire a misbehaving director.
244
 
As a result, company law in Saudi Arabia does not provide adequate protection of the interests 
and the rights of minority shareholders. Overall, company law gives majority shareholders 
unlimited control over a firm’s interests and gives explicit powers to minority shareholders to 
bring a legal action on a firm’s behalf against majority shareholders or directors suspected of 
wrongdoing. This deficit in the protection afforded by legislation leaves it to shareholder 
agreements to safeguard the interests and rights of minority shareholders.  
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In Saudi Arabia, shareholders may legally include whatever clauses and terms they wish in 
shareholder agreements provided that these clauses or terms do not conflict with the relevant 
company statutes.
245
 Shareholder agreements allow shareholders to protect themselves when 
dealing with especially disputatious issues.
246
 Serious problems can arise without a well-crafted, 
written agreement. An agreement can also establish exit processes in case an impasse is reached. 
This allows a minority shareholder to leave a firm without causing serious disturbance to its 
operations. In addition, express terms to prevent conflict during the removal or cancellation of 
the directorship of a minority shareholder can be included in shareholder agreements.
247
 
  
5.1.2 Necessity of Protecting Minority Shareholders 
The lowering of trade barriers makes it increasingly simple to invest in businesses across the 
world. Competition for investment is no longer confined by national boundaries but has become 
international. As this trend continues, Saudi Arabia has created systems catering to desirable 
foreign investors. The protection afforded to shareholders by the legal system is a vital 
determining factor in attracting foreign investment to a specific jurisdiction.
248
 Both foreign and 
domestic investors need to feel confident that a firm is run by efficient, transparent and honest 
management, that managers and shareholder receive fair, equal treatment and that a reliable 
system of protection is in place.
249
 Crucially, a system that effectively protects shareholders’ 
interests and rights, including minority shareholders, is needed. The goal of this system should 
be to create a mechanism that prevents majority shareholders from misusing their influence and 
control. Minority shareholders must always have a way to seek relief when necessary.
250
 
A number of legal scholars have investigated minority shareholder protection but mostly in 
relation to different exit processes and the issue of court interference. Virtually no researchers in 
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Saudi Arabia and only a rare few in the UK have explored the philosophical and theoretical 
reasons for the need to protect minority shareholders’ interests and rights. 
 
5.1.3 Vulnerability of Minority Shareholders 
To understand how majority shareholders can abuse their influence and control, it is necessary to 
form a picture of how they can deal with a firm or a minority shareholder. A majority 
shareholder can make displays of strength in order to obtain personal benefits without any 
concern for the interests of minority shareholders. 
 
5.1.4 Interests and Rights of Minority Shareholders that Require Protection 
This section reviews the rights and interests of minority shareholders and how statutes should 
recognise and protect them. When investors provide funds to a business, they generally receive 
particular interests, rights and powers in return. These benefits require protection. ‘Investor 
protection’ is understood to refer to the set of laws and rules laid down to protect the interests 
and rights of investors. It also includes the degree to which legal organisations can ensure the 
enforcement of relevant laws.
251
 A minority shareholder falls under the term ‘investor’ and thus 
must be afforded particular interests and rights by law, which the legal system safeguards. It is 
reasonable to assume that minority shareholders generally are more inclined to invest in a firm 
that provides mechanisms for seeking relief should their interests or rights be violated.
252
 
Legislation and the effectiveness of the enforcement of the law determine the interests and rights 
enjoyed by different shareholders and how effectively they are protected.
253
 Thus, a key issue is 
what powers, interests and rights a shareholder, specifically a minority shareholder, actually 
holds when purchasing company shares.  
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To fully understand the precise nature of the interests, rights and powers enjoyed by 
shareholders, it is first necessary to explain investors’ connection to a firm and their interests and 
rights in it. A ‘shareholder’ has been defined as an investor who places funds into a firm with the 
expectation of receiving a return on this investment.
254
 The investment does not represent a 
direct interest in the firm’s assets but a financial interest in the firm itself. The firm is a separate 
legal entity to its shareholders and retains possession of its assets.
255
 That is, when shareholders 
place money into a firm, they receive interests, rights and powers in return which can then be 
used in connection with the business’s operations and capital.  
The OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance256 lists six essential rights that all shareholders 
should be afforded: 
1) The right to safe ownership registration processes; 
2) The right to transfer new shares; 
3) The right to acquire pertinent information regularly; 
4) The right to be active and vote in meetings; 
5) The right to remove and elect board members; and 
6) The right to share in profits. 
The OECD Principles also includes two rights reserved for minority shareholders: 
1) The right to take legal action against majority shareholders or directors for alleged abuses 
of power against the company or the minority shareholder; and 
2) The right to an understandable, fairly priced exit procedure. 
All these interests and rights can be assumed to be automatically bestowed upon shareholders 
when purchasing even a single share, save for situations in which different provisions are 
included in the shareholder agreement or constitution of a firm (as they exist when the shares are 
purchased). 
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A firm’s articles of association or shareholder agreement must allow for the issuing of shares 
with alternate interests or rights. Rock and Wachter have argued that courts should limit and 
determine the right to obtain pertinent information regularly.
257
 However, this viewpoint does not 
recognise that if this right is based in statute, it is much easier for minority shareholders to 
comprehend and use than if the courts must decide this issue. In addition, minority shareholders 
need regular updates of relevant information in order to make full use of their other rights. 
Therefore, legislation should expressly provide for the right to access information so that 
minority shareholders can enjoy it without interruption and impediment. Indeed, statutes should 
include all the interests and rights mentioned here to make them easier to protect and to prevent 
misunderstandings, oversights or lack of awareness. 
 
5.1.5 Definition and Scope of Corporate Governance and protection of minority rights 
Minority shareholders can be protected by a number of difference sources, such as ethics, 
statutes, external control mechanisms, the judicial system, corporate governance principles and 
regulations, shareholder agreements and the voluntary implementation of an internal code.
258
 
Nonetheless, corporate governance stands as the most valuable source of protection of minority 
shareholders. In addition, corporate governance provides a wide-ranging benefit system for 
people dealing with a firm. Despite an extensive body of literature on corporate governance, no 
one definition of the concept has been generally accepted by scholars. The term ‘corporate 
governance’ was first used only two decades ago, and its full meaning has not yet been 
thoroughly analysed. In general, corporate governance is understood to mean the system that 
controls and directs companies.
259
 This is a very imprecise definition that does not explain the 
true nature of corporate governance.  
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Du Plessis has put forward a more detailed definition of corporate governance which attempts to 
incorporate its various features and tasks. He explains that corporate governance is both the 
method for regulating and overseeing corporate behaviour and a process for balancing the 
interests of internal stakeholders and other parties who might be impacted by a firm’s activities. 
According to du Plessis, corporate governance seeks to ensure responsible corporate conduct 
while maximising company profits and efficiency.
260
 This study benefits from adopting this more 
precise definition which depicts corporate governance as a comprehensive system that takes into 
account the interests and rights of all shareholders (and other stakeholders) and makes use of 
diverse legal areas to ensure their exercise. For example, corporate governance can refer to 
contract law
261
 when negotiating agreements and to company law when listing and adopting, 
particularly shareholders’ interests and rights. Company and contract laws are vital components 
of corporate governance as is the ability of regulatory bodies and courts to enforce these laws.
262
 
Although this definition is an improvement on previous ones, it does not provide for corporate 
governance to play a part in supplying legal remedies. The definition needs to be broadened in 
order to extend the purview of corporate governance beyond firms’ internal environment. Most 
importantly, corporate governance cannot guarantee that it safeguards shareholders’ rights and 
interests if it does not ensure the availability of sufficient remedies.
263
 Before elaborating on the 
goals and functions of corporate governance, it must be stated that robust protection for minority 
shareholders is not essential to establishing an environment that nurtures good corporate 
governance practices, as some claim.
264
 In fact, the opposite is true. Protection for minority 
shareholders is one among many elements that make up corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is designed to support all stakeholders, not only minority shareholders.
265
 Thus, any 
definition of corporate governance should highlight that the concept itself supports strong 
minority shareholder protection. 
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5.1.5.1 The Role of Corporate Governance in Providing Remedies 
The role of corporate governance lies primarily in protecting the goals of corporate governance. 
In the current context, the goals of corporate governance are to strike a balance between 
conflicting interests in order to protect minority shareholders and to provide remedies if disputes 
do arise. Corporate governance must guarantee four key elements to adequately protect minority 
shareholders. 
1) The interests and rights of minority shareholders must be safeguarded, and minority 
shareholders fairly treated.
266
 
2) The litigation processes and mechanisms open to minority shareholders must exist in a 
clear and straightforward form in law. 
3) A remedy should be available for every form of abuse of power and unfair treatment. 
4) Minority shareholders must be able to sell their shares at a reasonable price when they 
decide to exit a firm. 
Of all the goals of corporate governance, perhaps the most important is to provide legal 
mechanisms and remedies in case unfair treatment or abuses of power occur. Corporate 
governance does not leave minority shareholders to the internal mechanisms of a firm but grants 
them certain legal remedies. To achieve this goal, the corporate governance structure needs to 
spread accountability and responsibility among shareholders.
267
 Even so, if a minority 
shareholder does not have recourse to clearly delineated processes and remedies, holding a 
malefactor accountable for illegal or harmful behaviour might be impossible. Lazarides has 
argued that corporate governance must clearly delineate the interests and rights of minority 
shareholders and establish effective legal, judicial, penal and regulatory systems in order to 
ensure that minority shareholders can access these remedies and serve the overall goal of 
protecting such shareholders.
268
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The function of corporate governance in making available particular legal remedies benefits both 
minority shareholders and the courts by clarifying which remedies are available in a given 
situation. Courts might not be able to judge a case without restriction and find a just outcome if 
there are no explicit statutory provisions on the issue. The American case of Wheeler v Pullman 
Iron & Steel Co
269
 is one example of the failure of statutes to deal adequately with company law. 
In this case, it was decided that the court did not have the power to order the winding-up of the 
firm in question if that remedy did not already exist in statute.
270
 Inadequate or unclear statutes 
can change outcomes and result in deep uncertainty and doubt for judges and shareholders alike. 
The lack of a statutory mechanism that clarifies legal remedies renders any corporate governance 
mechanism redundant.
271
 Creating a list of minority shareholder rights and interests but 
neglecting to implement any legal remedies cannot establish a practical, effective form of 
corporate governance that offers any real protection. If a majority shareholder were aware that 
corporate governance gave minority shareholders the ability to pursue real, legal actions to 
redress wrongs and unfair treatment then that majority shareholder would be dissuaded from 
acting inappropriately.
272
 Corporate governance also refers to the directions that the businesses 
and their leaders ought to take if they have to make the best of their existence. Such could 
involve the options for guidelines that lead them to the making of strategic decisions. Another 
concept is that of oversight in terms of leadership to institutions. The mangers in this case 
provide the role models for other institutions, which creates the overall concept of leadership. To 
conclude, it is evident that protection for minority shareholders is a significant aspect of 
corporate governance. 
To conclude, it is evident that protection for minority shareholders is a significant aspect of 
corporate governance. To ensure adequate protection, corporate governance must specify 
litigation remedies and give the courts and minority shareholders real power in the running of a 
firm. There is a positive correlation between corporate governance and protection for minority 
shareholders; better corporate governance will likely lead to effective protection of minority 
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shareholders. However, if corporate governance is not supported by statutory remedies for all 
forms of mistreatment and abuses of power then its efforts serve no purpose. Clearly, for any 
corporate governance system to be effective, it must have a broad foundation that covers all 
types of wrongdoing. The following section explains the present bases for bringing legal action 
and why they need to be broadened. 
 
5.1.5.2 Present Bases for Bringing Legal Action Regarding Corporate Interests 
Certain grounds recognised and described by statute must be satisfied for a minority shareholder 
to bring legal action. Fraud is the most common basis for legal action. Indeed, in jurisdictions 
including Saudi Arabia, fraud is the only clear basis for action by a minority shareholder. 
Minority shareholders are thus faced with severe difficulties when wrongdoing does not 
constitute fraud. As there are no specified legal remedies for other acts, such as abuse, misuse 
and pure negligence, a minority shareholder must prove fraud as a basis for action. 
UK common law
273
 provides an example of a system that in the past allowed a minority 
shareholder to bring an action to court solely due to fraud. UK courts established the common 
law legal mechanism of a derivative action. This allowed minority shareholders to bring an 
action on a firm’s behalf but only in an obvious case of fraud.274 Establishing fraud as the sole 
basis for legal action was onerously restrictive as all misconduct had to constitute a form of 
fraud. Unsurprisingly then, case law reveals that only rare actions were brought by minority 
shareholders against majority shareholders under common law.
275
 The plight of minority 
shareholders was made all the more difficult as they did not have free access to the information 
that could have proven that fraud had occurred. Pavlides v Jensen
276
 clearly indicates the 
importance of proving fraud. In this case, the minority shareholder did not prove that the 
negligent disposal of assets constituted fraud, and thus it was unsuccessful. However, in the latter 
case of Daniel v Daniels,
277
 the court permitted a derivative action in which only negligence was 
                                                 
273
 This is no longer the case in English company law as this device has been moved to the statute under the 
Companies Act 2006 instead of common law.  
274
 Reisberg (n 236) 337. 
275
 M Almadani, ‘Derivative Actions: Does the Companies Act 2006 Offer a Way Forward?’ (2009) 30(5) CL 135. 
276
 [1956] 2 All ER 518. Fraud affecting the minority was also seen in Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch 406; All ER 89 
Ch D. 
277
 Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch 406. 
111 
 
alleged. The judge in this case appears to have chosen to view the significant profit that a 
majority shareholder made at the expense of the firm’s well-being as selfish negligence that 
could be seen as a form of fraudulent behaviour. This complex, fragile basis of fraud for a legal 
action was limited in scope and difficult to apply in practice, allowing numerous instances of 
mistreatment and abuse of power to stand.
278
 
Finally, in the latter part of the twentieth century, a number of reviews
279
 demonstrated that 
restricting the grounds for a legal action to fraud alone had negative effects. In response, a 
number of proposals and suggestions were advanced to broaden the scope of liability to include 
numerous other forms of misconduct beyond fraud. These proposals also aimed to eliminate the 
need to prove that a malefactor was in control of a firm in order for an action to be brought. The 
Companies Act 2006 incorporated all of these suggestions. The statute states that a derivative 
action may be brought not only in cases of fraud but also those involving a breach of trust or 
duty, abuse, negligence, misuse or default. Fraud does not have to be proven; each instance of 
misconduct, in and of itself, can form the basis of an action. 
To conclude, the history of UK law should serve as a useful lesson for jurisdictions that accept 
only fraud as a suitable basis for a legal action regarding corporate misconduct. The need to 
include a broader range of bases on which a minority shareholder can bring an action should be 
considered because of the benefits that widening the scope of actions can bestow on firms 
themselves. If a wider approach is not taken, numerous examples of wrongdoing will go 
unpunished to the detriment of the companies involved. 
 
5.1.5.3 Towards an Optimal Protection Model 
Jurisdictions across the world overwhelmingly use one model (of only two) for protecting 
minority shareholders. The first model is used in civil law countries, including France, the 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain, while the second is used 
in common law countries, including the UK, the US, India, and Canada. The first model is a 
French model, and the second is based mostly on UK law and thus is referred to as the Anglo-
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Saxon model. Common law nations offer shareholders relatively greater legal protection from 
mistreatment than civil law nations.
280
 However, pre-emptive measures are more effective in 
civil law nations than common law jurisdictions. Pre-emptive rights
281
 are designed to avoid the 
issue of below-market share prices and to ensure that shareholdings are not diluted. However, in 
common law nations, these rights are not very effective. Overall, common law jurisdictions are 
preferable for minority shareholders. Lazarides has argued that other legal systems cannot 
manage and monitor firms in the same way as common law systems and that the better protection 
afforded by common law jurisdictions is due to the specific legal protections they give to 
minority shareholders.
282
  
Compared to other legal systems, common law jurisdictions offer a set of laws that provides the 
highest level of protection for minority shareholders—primarily their access to various legal 
mechanisms.
283
 For example, the UK grants minority shareholders five mechanisms:  
1) Personal action: Minority shareholders can bring a personal action if their rights have 
been violated.
284
 
2) Derivative action: Minority shareholders can bring a derivative action if the interests of 
the company have been damaged.
285
 
3) Oppression/unfair prejudice action: Minority shareholders can bring an unfair prejudice 
action in instances where an action by a firm damages their interests in their capacity as a 
member of the firm.
286
 
4) Winding-up order: Minority shareholders may pursue a winding-up order when doing so 
is equitable and fair.
287
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5) Investigation request: A minority shareholder may request that a firm be investigated 
when its operations are not being dealt with properly (this occurs most frequently in 
relation to public firms).
288
  
A review of the forms of protection available under different jurisdictions and legal systems 
provides important information about the establishment of an optimal model of minority 
shareholder protection. The following six principles are essential to ensuring the 
minimum protection of minority shareholders’ interests and rights. 
1) When minority shareholders have a reasonable belief that their or the firm’s rights have 
been infringed, they must have access to straightforward legal mechanisms to seek 
redress.
289
 
2) A minority shareholder must be able to bring an action on the firm’s behalf in relation to 
a wide variety of types of inappropriate behaviour. 
3) The courts must be empowered to deal effectively with shareholder conflicts and to 
intervene and make enforceable decisions if needed. 
4) Majority shareholders should not have decision-making control when it comes to 
litigation. Instead, when a firm’s interests are mishandled or when a shareholder wishes 
to enforce the rights owed to the firm, the issue should be handed over to the courts, 
which can dismiss nuisance claims brought by shareholders. 
5) Clear exit procedures must be put in place. These must offer a reasonable price for shares 
and be carried out in a timely manner. 
6) The practical realities of protection for minority shareholders must be reviewed and 
evaluated so that any required legal reforms can be addressed immediately. 
Legislators must keep in mind these principles when drafting statutes with provisions designed to 
protect minority shareholders. It is extremely challenging for legislators to balance minority 
shareholders’ need for protection (and thus the ability to sometimes check majority shareholder 
actions) and majority shareholders’ need for the room and licence to effectively operate a firm.290 
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That is, legislators constantly struggle to take into equal account all the different interests at play. 
A similar problem confronts the courts and judges when they decide upon disputes between 
different shareholders. Of particular difficulty are cases when it is not in a firm’s best interests 
for litigation to go forward successfully but a minority shareholder has the right to bring an 
action.
291
 The German model is applicable for this case because of its call for observance of 
transparency and the respect for others. The freeman’s model provides principles that have 
similarities with the concepts of Islamic sharia.  
5.1.6 Minority Shareholder Protection under Saudi Company Law 
The Saudi Commercial Code is based on the French system although some scholars have argued 
that the system implemented by the Gulf States is an adaptation of the legal system transmitted 
by the Ottoman Empire that controlled this region.
292
 This viewpoint can help explain why Saudi 
Arabian company law does not reflect the precise provisions found in contemporary French 
company law and why Saudi company law deals with a number of corporate bodies not present 
in French law or civil law jurisdictions. Egyptian legal experts made additional refinements to 
the French commercial system on top of the Ottoman changes, establishing the French/Egyptian 
model which Saudi Arabia adopted as the foundation for its company legislation.
293
 Of course, 
Saudi Arabian law does not exactly match the French/Egyptian model as Saudi legislators 
selected what they considered the most appropriate provisions given the unique character of the 
country’s commercial experience. Islamic jurisprudence, known as Sharia law, has and continues 
to have a dominant influence over Saudi Arabian company law. Sharia law sets down 
fundamental principles covering all facets of the law.
294
 Thus, Saudi company law draws on a 
number of different sources, all of which have left their mark. 
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Saudi Arabian councils (e.g. the Panel of Experts, Shura (Consultatory) Council and the Council 
of Ministers)
295
 and legislators have focused on improving the country’s commercial 
environment in order to make the economy more diverse and less reliant on oil.
296
 The Foreign 
Capital Investment Law 2000
297
 is a clear example of this attitude. This flexible, practical law 
improved the situation for foreign capital investments in the country. The primary goal of this 
law is to promote and facilitate foreign investment in order to make Saudi Arabia an open market 
for interested parties. 
Saudi company law has also attempted to establish adequate protections for shareholders of 
public firms who now have the statutory right to seek a legal remedy against directors.
298
 
Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the CL state, respectively, that if the directors’ handling of company 
operations results in abuse, wrongdoing or misuse, they are jointly liable to compensate the firm 
or its shareholders. A liability action
299
 may be filed by the company against its directors if their 
actions have harmed the position of all shareholders who take this action on the firm’s behalf. A 
liability action against the directors may also be brought by each shareholder should the 
directors’ actions have caused specific damage to the shareholder in question. Shareholders can 
only bring such an action if the firm’s right to litigate remains valid, and they must inform the 
firm that they are bringing the action. 
Although the government of Saudi Arabia has pledged to reform various fields, including the 
field of trade, no significant changes have been made to the CL. Its efficiency continues to 
decline as it fails to direct attention to numerous key aspects of the rights of shareholders in 
listed organisations. In this situation, the Saudi legislature should make decisions to improve the 
Kingdom’s investment environment and, in particular, to provide greater protection to investors 
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in joint-stock companies. Such decisions will likely encourage investment in the Saudi financial 
market.
300
 
Despite a number of major amendments, the main limitations of the CL have not been resolved 
to the satisfaction of the local businessmen and foreign investors who firmly disapprove of the 
current law. Strongly criticised, this law now lags behind modern advances in commercial 
activities and is especially dissonant with the Saudi government’s privatisation strategy, efforts 
to attract foreign investment and accession to the World Trade Organization, which demands that 
national laws meet the requirements of international trade. In 2007, the Saudi government 
developed the final draft of a new law intended to supplant the old one. However, seven years 
later, the new law has not been promulgated. Its ratification by the Council of Ministers is 
pending.
301
 
The considerable attempts to amend the CL have not met substantial success for various reasons, 
chief among them are bureaucratic setbacks and centralised decision-making. The lack of 
significant changes to the law so far is confounding, especially given the pressure from 
numerous specialists and professionals. At the moment, the law is seriously outdated and 
includes an insufficient number of provisions. This renders it unsuitable for implementation. 
Some have claimed that the CGR addressed these limitations to a certain extent. However, the 
CL forms the basis of a majority of the provisions in the CGR. Moreover, the CGR are not 
binding or peremptory and are intended only to serve as guidance. Saudi Arabia’s experience in 
business and trade is still limited as it is a developing country. As such, it should seek to learn 
from the expertise and knowledge of other countries, particularly developed countries such as the 
UK. When formulating laws, Saudi Arabia would do well to draw inspiration from UK laws, 
which provide an appropriate model for the structure and content of flexible, modern laws. 
Generally, the CL specifies the rights of shareholders but does not guarantee appropriate 
protection or effective application of them. Therefore, it is necessary to consider a number of 
related factors to ensure the efficacy of shareholders’ rights. Among these, the structure of 
company ownership, the legal system, cultural and religious customs and the political climate are 
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of particular importance. These factors exacerbate the challenges and problems that affect 
activity in the commercial and industrial fields.
302
  
The level of protection granted to the rights of shareholders is heavily influenced by the structure 
of ownership: the fewer the number of shareholders, the weaker the protection of minority 
shareholders.
303
 The protection of shareholders’ rights also depends heavily on the Saudi civil 
litigation system. A wide range of legal studies have addressed this issue. According to a 
comprehensive, in-depth analysis, shareholders and creditors in JSCs are more effectively 
protected from the tactics and manoeuvres of the company board or the majority shareholders in 
countries that follow a common law system.
304
 
On the other hand, in countries that apply the French civil law system minority shareholders have 
limited power to intervene in the activities undertaken by the corporate managers.
305
 This 
situation occurs commonly in the Saudi system where majority shareholders’ powerful influence 
on corporate management allows them to pursue their interests without hindrance, completely 
disregarding minority shareholders and forcing minority shareholders to comply with their 
actions. Moreover, in Saudi Arabia, the majority shareholders are also usually the company 
owners because most listed companies began as family companies and later became JSCs.
306  
The CL clearly illustrates this situation as it grants greater control over a company to those who 
own a larger number of shares. It is generally agreed that the majority shareholders should be 
afforded greater participation in organisational management than minority shareholders. 
However, showing complete disregard for minority shareholders and their rights and interests is 
unacceptable. Considering the principles of justice and fairness, all shareholders should be given 
fair treatment, regardless of the number of shares they possess, and no group of shareholders 
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should be granted influence and power to the detriment of another group.
307
 Although not all 
shareholders are equal, the equity and rights of the minority shareholders must be acknowledged 
and respected by the majority shareholders and not infringed under any circumstances. 
Therefore, the rights of the minority shareholders must not be diminished or overlooked even 
though the majority shareholders possess most shares in the company.
308
 In addition, majority 
shareholders should in no way take advantage of their status to manipulate or direct 
organisational decisions to serve their interests, especially when such decisions are unfavourable 
to the interests and rights not only of the minority shareholders but also of the company as a 
whole. 
Thus, when they exercise their right to participate in corporate management and decision-making 
activities, majority shareholders should not focus on their own interests but on those of the 
company as it is a business operation whose purpose is to generate financial returns for the 
shareholders. In addition, the interests of the minority shareholders are no less valuable than 
those of the majority. Therefore, the majority shareholders should give due consideration to the 
interests of other shareholder groups, no matter how small.  
Amended in 2009, the Global Corporate Governance Principles of the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN) specify a number of points with regard to these considerations. 
These principles highlight the need for the fair treatment of all the shareholders of a company 
and the protection of the rights of all investors. Organisational boards should promote as much as 
possible shareholders’ ability to exercise their rights whilst attempting to eliminate unnecessary 
obstacles.
309
 Regrettably, the situation is different in many developing countries. For example, in 
Saudi Arabia, minority shareholders have a weak position in listed companies compared to 
majority shareholders who have significant influence over and can manipulate management 
decision-making to serve their personal interests, often without any regard for the company’s 
interests. In these circumstances, it is necessary to emphasis the fact that, although majority 
shareholders have a stronger position in a company due to the large number of shares they 
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possess, they have no right to abuse this position and the power that comes with it. To prevent 
such abuse, clear provisions must be made in related laws to keep the power of the majority 
shareholders in check and ensure fair treatment of all parties.  
Both protection and restriction measures should be employed to guarantee justice and fairness. 
Provisions must protect minority shareholders against any infringement of their rights or interests 
even if the rights or interests of the minority have not been breached. Most importantly, 
appropriate legal provisions should ensure that the majority shareholders do not impose their 
agenda or special interests on the minority shareholders. The power granted to majority 
shareholders in JSCs entails a set of responsibilities and obligations and should be exercised in a 
way that is not detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders and the company.
310
 
The economic factor also has great importance. A higher level of protection encourages minority 
shareholders to participate and invest in JSCs. The main interests of any shareholder, whether 
local or foreign, are financial security and the assurance that the investment made is put to good 
use by individuals whose priority is accomplishing organisational objectives, not personal 
interests. Investors’ desire to protect their interests and rights is quite understandable. Ultimately, 
regardless of the length of the investment, the extent to which the company has accomplished its 
objectives and promoted the interests of its shareholders or favoured the interests of a specific 
group is always disclosed. In this respect, a company’s public reputation is an effective 
barometer of its performance in achieving those objectives and shareholder interests. 
Investors are attracted to make investments in a company for two important reasons: efficient, 
appropriate protection of shareholder rights and acceptable limitations on their responsibilities.
311
 
Although lacking controlling shares in the capital, minority shareholders nonetheless are a key 
source of capital for listed companies. Therefore, their input should be taken into account, and 
they should be granted fair treatment. Possessing a large number of shares grants great authority 
over organisational activities but not more rights than minority shareholders. In addition, legal 
provisions for the protection of the rights of shareholders aids in the development of companies 
by stimulating increased liquidity. Consequently, the company does not require creditor loans, 
thus helping it avoid financially burdensome obligations. 
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Ensuring the protection of the minority shareholders is considered economically advantageous as 
it helps increase the national gross domestic product (GDP).
312
 For instance, minority 
shareholders’ investments consolidate and, consequently, increase their savings. When allocated 
to investment, these savings can stimulate further additional increases in capital. Amending 
investment regulations thus can improve the business environment, facilitating the flow of 
capital to areas of high productivity. Therefore, it can be rightly argued that economic growth 
depends to a significant degree on the protection granted to minority shareholders. 
The idea of an inextricable link between national economic growth and the effective protection 
of shareholders’ rights has been proposed by a considerable number of studies on the grounds 
that adequate protection encourages investment. This leads to improvements in the business 
environment, such as increased transparency and credibility, which in turn promote financial and 
economic stability. For instance, the good investment and business reputation of a developed 
country such as the UK is based in part on the high level of protection of minority shareholders 
against detrimental manoeuvres by company directors, as well as the existence of solid liability 
standards and rules. In contrast, manipulation and the pursuit of special interests are rife in 
countries in continental Europe and the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia.
313
 
 
5.2 Saudi Ownership Structure 
The board of directors is vested with the ultimate authority to govern corporations and is 
primarily responsible for monitoring company activities to verify the implementation of 
company objectives set by shareholders during the annual GSM. The board is accountable to the 
shareholders and liable for any misrepresented or falsified information reported to the 
shareholders and regulators. Along with the board of directors, internal and external auditors and 
government authorities exert monitoring and regulatory powers over management.
314
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Saudi companies have one-tier boards composed of an odd number of members, from a 
minimum of three to a maximum of eleven. In a JSC, the board of directors is composed of a 
majority of non-executive members that possess the appropriate set of skills, technical 
knowledge or analytical experience. Independent directors make up anywhere from 30% to 75% 
of the board. In most companies, the roles of chairman of the board of directors, CEO, or other 
executive position, such as managing director or general manager may not be conjoined in one 
person although it is estimated that two out of every one hundred Saudi companies have a 
chairman who also serves as chief executive.
315
 
The CMA requires that companies annually submit a list of the names, nationalities and other 
pertinent details of board members and the senior management. Companies must immediately 
inform the CMA of changes to this roster. The controlling stake in most Saudi firms is 
concentrated in families, financial and industrial institutions and the government. Ownership 
disclosure is required, including making publicly available updated lists of major shareholders 
who own at least 5% of the company’s equity. Shareholders also have the right to be informed of 
company matters, including inspecting the minutes of the GSM and the report detailing the 
names and amount of shares held by each.
316
 
The ownership structure has implications for an organisation’s dividend policies and governance. 
Studies have demonstrated a significant relationship between dividend declarations and firm 
performance based on empirical evidence that strongly support the signalling model.
317
 The 
signalling model asserts that declarations of dividends inform investors about the company’s 
performance and immediately affect investment behaviour involving the company. Investors are 
loss averse to dividend reductions relative to the reference point set by prior dividends.
318
 
A study by Solomon shows that firms listed in the Saudi market also tended to confirm agency 
theory as evidenced by the significant, positive relationship between dividends and institutional 
ownership. This relationship has important implications for corporate governance. Institutional 
ownership through individuals or families tends to support better corporate governance because 
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of the higher level of transparency and disclosure and the greater number of independent 
members in the board. These factors taken together lead to better performance and, according to 
signalling theory, higher dividends.
319
 
 
5.3 The Board of Directors in the Institutional Framework 
The board of directors manages publicly listed corporations. As it leads the company, the board 
is accountable for the actions of the entire organisation. Board members are elected by 
shareholders, usually on an annual basis.  
The owners are also the managers and are liable for running their businesses in proprietorships 
and partnerships. Shareholders own corporations but are not their direct directors because it is 
illogical to have large numbers of owners making decisions. A small group is needed that can 
meet regularly and make managerial decisions for the corporation; namely, a board of directors 
that represents the interests of the shareholders.
320
 
 
5.4 The Principal Fiduciary Duties of the Board of Directors 
Sometimes, boards of directors of corporations misuse their powers. Therefore, it is important to 
have a supervening authority to constrain such behaviour. The international corporate 
governance frameworks have imposed certain duties and obligations upon corporate board 
members to keep them working for the interests of shareholders and keep them liable to 
questioning under company law jurisprudence.
321
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5.4.1 General Overview 
The wide-ranging powers granted by law to boards of directors create a perceived risk that these 
powers might be abused and board members deviate from their objective of stewarding the 
corporation according to stakeholders’ interests. Due to the keen interest of foreign investors, 
emerging international governance principles have shaped a set of obligations investors expect of 
boards of directors.  
These duties are intended to ensure that board members properly discharge their functions and 
direct their decisions towards the welfare of the corporation and its stakeholders. The duties of 
the board as mandated by corporate governance principles support the principal-agent 
relationship between the board and the shareholders, according to the company and commercial 
laws of most nations with free market economies. As agents, boards of directors have fiduciary 
duties to shareholders; that is, they are mandated to manage the corporation in a manner that 
maximises wealth creation for shareholders. 
The CL and CGR make no reference to either the principal-agent relationship or fiduciary duty. 
This absence is consistent with empirical studies that show that the concept of fiduciary duties 
has not developed in the Middle East.
322
 In most jurisdictions, fiduciary duties refer to three 
major duties: the duty of care, the duty of loyalty and the duty to act within one’s powers. The 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance are consistent with this concept and recognise two 
important aspects of the board’s fiduciary duty: the duties of care and loyalty. While not 
explicitly mentioned, these duties are implicit in the provisions of the CGR and the CL, as shown 
in this section. 
 
5.4.2 Duty of Care 
The duty of care is a party’s legal obligation ‘to act towards others and the public with 
watchfulness, attention, caution, and prudence’ in a manner in which a reasonable person in the 
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same circumstances would do.
323
 The duty requires that the board of directors and firm 
executives make informed decisions by gathering all relevant facts and material, giving them due 
consideration and then selecting the best option.
324
 The duty of care is incumbent upon board 
members and is their top-most priority in all matters pertaining to the corporation.  
This duty is internationally recognised. For instance, under the UK Companies Act, board 
members are required to always act with a measure of skill and care reasonably expected of 
people possessing their knowledge and experience.
325
 The criteria in this definition are subjective 
because the reasonableness of an action depends a great deal on its specific context and 
circumstances. The duty of the carer should meet that requirement although the response may be 
any one of a number of possible actions. 
Unfortunately, in Saudi jurisprudence, the CGR and CL do not explicitly mention the criteria for 
board members’ level of due care in the way that the UK Companies Act does. Therefore, 
unscrupulous board members can seek cover behind the ambiguity of the law, and regulators and 
enforcers of the ‘duty of care’ do not have a clear standard of measure, even a subjective one, by 
which to judge whether an infraction has been committed. The problem is compounded by the 
CL provision
326
 that holds a corporation to be bound by all acts of the board of directors 
considered within the limits of its competence. The duty of care requisite becomes moot when 
determining whether the limits of competence have been violated because of its lack of definition 
under Saudi law. Shareholders are left to the mercy of the board’s actions, even those patently 
negligent or careless.  
The general rule is that directors are not liable for the actions of the company because it has a 
separate legal personality. This protection of directors is the corporate veil. However, civil law 
makes exceptions to this rule. Directors are trusted by the owners of a company, or the 
shareholders, to make decisions in their interest. These include investment decisions to increase 
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shareholders’ wealth.327 For example, if a director pursues a business venture without 
consultation or research and that venture fails, he is personally liable for the loss of money. 
Directors who breach their duties can be held liable if the company incurs losses. Therefore, 
directors need to always carefully consider whether their actions are in the best interests of the 
company. They must discharge their duties honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of 
shareholders. 
 
5.4.3 Duty of Loyalty 
The fiduciary duty of the board of directors includes the requirement to discharge the duty of 
loyalty. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, this duty is the legal requirement for the board of 
directors and executives to perform all their actions in good faith and with the best interests of 
the shareholders in mind.
328
 In practice, this means that the board may not engage in acts that put 
them in the position of a conflict of interest or engage in acts such as insider trading; whereas the 
‘duty of care’ addresses acts of negligence, duty of loyalty deals with acts of bad faith or malice. 
Under duty of loyalty, board members may not place their personal interests or those of others 
before shareholders in the conduct of their duties as fiduciary agents.
329
 Unlike duty of care, 
however, acts that constitute duty of loyalty are more evident and easily determinable because of 
their malicious intent. Duty cares relates to the requirements of sharia laws because of the 
obligation of the workers to maintain transparency. The law commits people to the obligation of 
service, which means that it will find them guilty if they neglect duty.  
 
Duty of care was introduced in October 2006 by the CGR, whose Article 11d orders directors to 
serve the interest of all shareholders, not just a select group. Moreover, under CGR Articles 4a 
and 4b, shareholders can access all information they need to exert their rights. The CL includes 
redress mechanisms for shareholders who are entitled to take legal action against directors but 
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the law does not provide such mechanisms for minority shareholders. So far, a liability suit 
against directors has yet to be filed.
330
 
 
 
 
5.4.4 Conflicts of Interest among Board Members 
Among board members, conflicts of interest are situations in which the neutrality of board 
decisions is compromised by considerations of personal interests, whether material or moral, of 
board members, their relatives and friends.
331
 Conflicts of interest are present when opportunities 
for formal exploitation to serve private interests arise.
332
 It must be noted that, for a conflict of 
interest to materialise, the board and members need take no overt action; the very opportunity for 
personal interest to clash with corporate interest is sufficient. At this point, compliant board 
members should refrain from participating in deciding the matter or otherwise acting on it. 
The CL specified the meaning of conflicts of interest, and these provisions were adopted in the 
CGR without modification.
333
 The most commonly conceived conflict of interest scenario is 
board members profiting from a transaction involving the use or disposition of company 
properties. This is the overt face of conflict of interest. However, there are more subtle situations 
that should, if they do not already, constitute conflicts of interest involving board members. For 
instance, non-executive members of the board are often considered the element that creates 
balance in board decisions because of the relative disinterest of outsiders to the organisational 
hierarchy. However, non-executive members are likely to have shareholdings not only in the 
corporation on whose board they sit but also in potentially competing companies. Non-executive 
members may even have a greater interest in other companies, even non-competitors, whose 
interests are contrary to those of the organisation. For example, board members could covertly be 
pre-empting possible lucrative contracts in their favour or in favour of their more lucrative 
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holdings rather than allowing the natural course of action where the transaction takes place to the 
benefit of the company they direct.
334
 
The CL articles adopted in CGR refinement provisions enforce conflicts of interest restrictions. 
CGR Articles 18 (a) and (b) exhibit an intention to introduce exceptions to conflict of interest 
restrictions:
335
 
(1) When the board member has secured annual permission from the corporation’s shareholders in an 
ordinary general meeting to perform an act which would otherwise constitute a conflict of 
interest; 
(2) When the board member informs the board and shareholders concerning any private undertakings 
or commercial contracts performed for the benefit of the corporation; and 
(3) When the board member is the primary bidder in a general bidding. 
The third instance raises questions about whether such a situation should warrant being made an 
exception because membership in the board enables one to have knowledge of the corporation’s 
affairs that other bidders do not have, thus creating an unfair advantage.
336
 In all cases, the board 
member involved must fully disclose to the other board members and the shareholders the full 
extent of personal interest in any corporate matter. 
 
5.4.5 Disclosure of Information by Directors 
Directors must regularly disclose information at least annually or when circumstances have 
changed. Directors must act in good faith and disclose to the board and external auditors any 
commercial or external interests that could create a conflict of interest:
337
 
 All business interests (direct or indirect) in any other company, partnership or other 
business venture; 
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 Membership in trade, business or other economic organisations; 
 Shareholdings, share options and/or other interest in the company; 
 Any interest direct or indirect in any transaction with the company; and 
 Any gifts, monies, commissions, benefits or other favours extended or received from any 
party. 
A director who decides to leaves or is removed from an organisation before the end of the term 
ought to release the causes of his resignation or elimination to the company’s external auditors 
and, if necessary, to shareholders if the reasons are objection to joint fraud, corruption or other 
activities or conduct inconsistent with the shareholders’ interests.338 
 
5.4.6 Insider Dealing 
Insider trading occurs when an individual uses knowledge of private information to realise a 
profit
339
 on the sale of the firm’s securities that otherwise could not have been gained. Board 
members’ fiduciary duty requires them to fully disclose to the board and shareholders any 
information such a member has provided that led to any form of personal gain.
340
 According to 
the CML, insider information has not been disclosed to the public but is obtained by an 
individual with legitimate internal access to the firm. If such information were released to the 
public in an untimely manner, it would have a material effect on the market price of securities.
341
 
Insider trading is the act of making personal gains from deliberately trading on securities based 
on insider information. This takes advantage of the firm’s shareholders and tends to destabilise 
the legitimate workings of the stock exchange by introducing greater volatility in market prices 
which distorts the true value of stock. Stock market volatility caused by inefficient information 
dissemination discourages legitimate stock market participants from trusting the Stock 
Exchange, thus harming the Saudi economy. Generally in Saudi legislation and in international 
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markets, insider trading is considered a crime for which an individual may face fines and 
imprisonment. 
 
5.4.7 Board’s Duty to Act within its Powers 
The wide-ranging duties of the board members directly affect corporate governance and how the 
firm is governed. Left unrestricted by legislation, the board’s actions are not monitored within 
the corporation as the board itself oversees the entire organisation. This opens up the 
organisation to abuses at the highest levels, a vulnerability which justifies the enactment of 
restrictions to rein in the vast powers accorded to the board. The UK Companies Act prohibits 
the board from acting ultra vires, that is, beyond its legal power and authority. The company is a 
juridical person and may exist only according to its charter or constitution. It cannot exercise any 
power or perform any act with legal effect that it is not authorised to do so by its constitution or 
articles of association. So, too, the board of directors, whether acting jointly or individually, is 
prohibited from acting outside the powers conveyed upon it by its constitution, and these powers 
may be exercised only for the purpose for which they are given.
342
  
The CL also limits the board’s powers to the provisions in the CL, the firm’s articles of 
association and to resolutions that are enacted during the corporation’s GSM. The CL is 
cognisant of the power of the board to delegate to one or more of its members the performance of 
an act or acts within its power. Some restrictions on the board include prohibitions on selling or 
mortgaging property or relieving the corporation’s debtors of their obligations, except when so 
authorised in the corporation’s articles or the CL.343 
Under the CGR, the board of directors also has the right of delegation to sub-committees, such as 
nomination, remuneration and audit committees.
344
 The right to delegate does not minimise or 
absolve the board of directors of the responsibility for these duties. In so delegating the 
performance of these acts, the board should explicitly define the powers delegated and those 
reserved for itself because the sub-committees are bound by the limits of the instrument of 
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delegation which empowers them. The work delegated should be within the limits of the board’s 
powers; any delegation beyond the board’s jurisdiction is null and void.345 Among the other 
limitations set by the CGR is that the company may not grant a cash loan to any board members 
or act as guarantor for any loan between any member or members of the board and a third 
party.
346
 This safeguards investors’ capital in the firm against abuses or commingling of funds by 
members of the board. 
 
5.5 Role and Responsibilities within Board Members’ Powers 
The board of directors performs the crucial role of providing strategic direction for the company 
and monitoring management to ensure that all its actions serve the interests of the shareholders. 
Due to the board’s broad powers and accountability to shareholders and company, Saudi 
regulations consider it the appropriate instrument by which corporate governance practices may 
be propagated within listed companies.
347
 The Saudi position is consistent with the principles of 
the OECD and other international conventions that view the board of directors as the repository 
of accountability for the corporate governance of the firm. The responsibilities of the board of 
directors include: 
(1) Fulfilling their functions according to the company’s articles of incorporation, with a 
duty of care and in good faith;
348
 
(2) Representing the shareholders and acting on their behalf and in the interest of the 
company, for which reason they should not detach themselves from the shareholders but 
closely identify with their interests;
349
 
(3) Training new board members in the skills and competencies necessary to ensure 
performance of their functions and allow for a smooth transition and continuity;
350
 
(4) Consenting to and directing the company’s technical policies, such as: 
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(a) Formulating a full set of policies for the company, including the overall work plans 
and risk management rules, and conducting regular assessments of these policies, 
(b) Deciding on the manner by which the firm can best pursue capital formation, set the 
company’s financial goals and ratify its budgets, 
(c) Setting the strategic targets of the firm and monitoring progress towards their 
attainment, 
(d) Conducting a periodic review of internal controls involving the financial and 
accounting processes in the preparation of financial reports; 
(5) Formulating a written policy legitimising relationships with all groups of stakeholders 
and securing their rights in the company’s operations.351 
The inclusion of the fifth responsibility as an official objective of the CGR means that Saudi law, 
through the CGR, recognises and marks a major step towards harmonising Saudi standards with 
those of international corporate governance, in particular the OECD Principles. 
 
5.6 Board Membership Categories 
According to the CGR, board members fall into three categories: executive, non-executive and 
independent members. Executive members hold full-time administrative positions in the 
corporation and draw monthly salaries.
352
 Non-executive board members hold neither 
administrative positions nor draw monthly salaries. The CGR stipulates that non-executive 
members should hold the largest number of board seats and regularly receive information about 
the corporation’s submissions in a satisfactory manner so as to effectively enforce their 
jurisdictions.
353
  
The difference in roles between the executive and non-executive board members is evident. 
Executive board members know how the company is run. This provides them with a grounded 
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understanding of how optimal corporate performance can be achieved. However, they are 
beholden to the company, particularly the chief executive, for their livelihood, and thus their 
decisions might be partial in so far as they affect personal interests. On the other hand, non-
executive board members are not as knowledgeable about the company at the operational level 
but are not as easily influenced because they earn very little from the corporation and therefore 
can form more independent decisions. 
The third type of board member enjoys full independence. The CGR contains strict regulations to 
prevent any violations of this independence. In Article 2, the CGR forbids a person from sitting 
as an independent board member if he/she:
354
 
(1) Owns a controlling interest or holds the position of senior executive for two years in 
the company or in one of its subsidiaries; 
(2) Owns or is a representative of a legal entity that owns 5% or more of the company or 
its group; 
(3) Is a board member of any company within the body of the company of which such a 
member is scheduled to be member of its board; 
(4) Has been an employee and a partner of the company or a partner of any other 
company, including external auditors or senior suppliers, for at least two years; 
(5) Is a relative (e.g. parent, spouse or child) of any board member or senior executive of 
the company or one of its subsidiaries. 
 
5.7 Board Meetings 
In Saudi Arabia, board meetings are customarily open to debate in order to improve the board’s 
discharge of its supervisory tasks in so far as they involve transactions by publicly listed 
corporations. Open discussions result in a full disclosure of the facts, and when malpractices or 
questionable dealings are uncovered, open debate provides immediate resolution of such 
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controversies. In addition to such customs, the CGR mandates the following practices during the 
conduct of board meetings:
355
 
1) The board convenes meetings upon the request of the board chairman, who may 
convene the board for an irregularly scheduled meeting upon the written request by at 
least two board members.
356
 
2) A record of the minutes of the meeting shall be kept, including a tally of votes by 
agreeing and dissenting members.
357
 
3) Sufficient time should be provided for the board to adequately fulfil its duties, 
inclusive of preparation time for meetings and sub-committee meetings. 
4) Board members should be provided documentations in a suitable and timely manner 
to enable them to sufficiently peruse the material before board meetings.  
The CGR does not require any specific number of meetings, and this has allowed the boards of 
several companies to be remiss in holding meetings. This diminishes the effectiveness of boards 
as oversight bodies and increases the opportunities for mismanagement.
358
 The CL stipulates that 
for the meetings of the board to be valid at least half but no less than three members must be in 
attendance unless the company’s article of association provide for a higher number. To be 
adopted, the resolutions of the board must be approved by a majority of the directors present. In 
case of a tie, the chairman’s vote decides the vote unless the articles of association state 
otherwise.
359
 
 
5.8 Board Sub-Committees 
Many fundamental precepts of the CGR are drawn from international corporate governance 
principles. Among these sources, the Cadbury report states that in order for a board to be 
effective it must be appropriately structured and governed by a defined set of procedures. This 
structure and procedures are realised by the appointment of committees tasked with specific 
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oversight functions, including audit, remuneration and nomination.
360
 CGR Articles 12 to 15 
mandate the creation of at least two obligatory sub-committees. These are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
5.8.1 Audit Committee 
The idea of the audit committee as a fixture of the board of directors was first broached in 1978 
when the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) began to require all listed corporations to establish 
an audit committee comprised of independent members.
361
 The task of the audit committee is to 
monitor the missions of the corporation and act as a watchdog. Its aims are to ensure 
accountability inside the corporation and to protect the company’s investors. It does so primarily 
by ensuring that the corporation’s accounting and auditing procedures remain consistent and 
compliant with standards.
362
 Benefits expected from effective oversight by an audit committee 
include higher quality financial statements; a culture of self-control which discourages fraud; and 
empowerment of non-executive board members to have a constructive voice in the governance 
of the corporation. The CGR specifies four compulsory elements of the audit committee:
363
 
(1) It must have at least three members. 
(2) Members should either be non-executive or independent members. Corporation 
executives may not be on the audit committee. 
(3) Audit committee members should be sufficiently qualified and possess the skills 
required in the accounting, auditing and finance professions. 
(4) Members should have neither direct nor indirect interest in the submissions and 
contracts of the corporation. 
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The CGR lays out the essential functions of the audit committee:
364
 
1) To assist in planning a written statement to the internal audit system, control such 
internal audit system and confirm its usefulness; 
2) To advocate to the board the discharge and appointment of external auditors with 
their corresponding remunerations; 
3) To examine, jointly with the external auditor, the corporation’s audit plans; and 
4) To verify the external auditor’s comments in the board’s annual financial report and 
to issue official opinions on the basis of this report. 
 
5.8.2 Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
The nomination and remuneration committee is tasked with the following functions:
365
 
(1) Advise on the appointment of new board members, determining that such board 
members embody honour and honesty when assuming their position on the board; 
(2) Update the required capabilities and qualifications for board membership; 
(3) Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the board and its structure and recommend 
possible improvements; 
(4) Investigate the independence of the board’s non-executive and independent members; 
(5) Ensure that conflicts of interest do not exist within the board; and 
(6) Formulate the procedures by which the remuneration of board members and top 
executives is determined. 
The major task of the remunerations committee is to set the pay for executive members of the 
board so it risks being a self-serving committee that acts only in its own interests. Therefore, in 
order to guard against conflicts of interest it is mandated that the majority of its members be 
independent and non-executive directors. However, members of the nomination and 
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remunerations sub-committee are themselves placed in their positions by the board so they might 
feel beholden to those executive members. 
The framers of the CGR appear to have overlooked the fact that it fails to (1) specify how the 
sub-committee members should be compensated; (2) set a minimum number of members for the 
nomination and remunerations committee as for the audit committee; and (3) set a standard level 
of maximum executive compensation, such as linking executive compensation to the 
performance of the firm.
366
 These shortcomings open the independence of the board up to 
question, and the uncertainties in the composition of the nomination and remunerations 
committees introduce structural uncertainties in the legitimacy of their decisions. 
 
5.8.3 Board Members’ Compensation 
The payment of board members is a statutory right founded on the principle that the performance 
of functions must be accorded rightful compensation. Compensation levels are set in the UK 
through the Combined Code but not in Saudi legislation.
367
 The UK Code states that the level of 
remuneration should be adequate to attract, retain, and motivate directors to maintain the quality 
of the successful company, but in no case should the remuneration be in excess of what is 
necessary. Most importantly, the pay of executive directors must be correlated with their 
individual performance, as well as that of the corporation.
368
 The pay–for–performance link is a 
crucial corporate governance practice which has gained widespread acceptance globally, 
especially after the 2008 economic crisis when exiting bank executives received huge bonuses 
while their companies went bankrupt or took government bailouts. 
In Saudi Arabia, a 1992 Ministerial Resolution limits the maximum remuneration for non-
executive and independent members to the equivalent of $53,333 per member and an $800 fee 
for attending board meetings.
369
 The majority of listed companies generally ignored the 
resolution. However, it did spark a debate about the matter of maximum executive compensation. 
The Saudi Consultative Council (i.e. the legislative body with jurisdiction over commercial and 
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corporate rules) declared that the annual compensation for board members, including executives, 
should not exceed $133,333.
370
 
The CGR itself sets no maximum limits on board members’ compensation. Theoretically, listed 
companies are required to submit a written record of the proposed compensation, on which 
shareholders vote during the legally mandatory GSMs. The CGR also requires that the articles of 
association of firms describe how the compensation of board members is determined and 
awarded, inclusive of salaries, bonuses and other payments.
371
 However, the majority, if not all, 
listed companies have arbitrarily set the compensation of board members. In 2011, 33 
corporations paid US$32 million to their board members while their companies took a loss. 
These salaries also violated the CL provision
372
 that companies may pay compensation to board 
members only after distributing a dividend of not less than 5% of the company’s capital to 
shareholders. Companies that incurred losses could not distribute dividends to shareholders but, 
nonetheless, board members granted themselves substantial compensation. 
 
5.9 Corporate Governance and Comparison 
Corporate governance in countries such as Saudi Arabia is esoteric. Although awareness of it is 
increasing, corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is still inferior to the US and UK systems. 
Most Saudi firms are family controlled instead of board controlled. However, the situation has 
improved in the past decades.
373
 
Haniffa and Cooke discuss corporate governance in emerging economies.
374
 The banking sector 
in Saudi Arabia has been found to have the best corporate governance.
375
 Good corporate 
governance entails financial reporting, and due to globalisation some firms in Saudi Arabia use 
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the internet to inform their stakeholders about their corporate governance practices, including 
financial reporting.
376
  
Normally, business institutions in emerging markets can be understood with agency theory and 
the effect of CEO duality. It has been observed that CEO duality does not positively affect 
business organisations with large boards and low top management ownership but institutional 
ownership does. CEO duality can work in the context of smaller boards overseeing large 
management staff as the management decide on a CEO without hesitation and lengthy 
discussions. As a result, not only in Saudi Arabia but also in most Middle Eastern countries and 
Egypt, companies are reducing their boards and increasing top management ownership.  
Differences exist between common law and civil law countries and between common law and 
Islamic law countries such as Saudi Arabia. Corporate governance is at higher levels in common 
law countries, and disclosure is positively associated with corporate governance.
377
 The size of 
the capital market also decides the extent of disclosure and nature of corporate governance. 
Enlarging the capital market could encourage management to adhere to good corporate 
governance and make necessary financial disclosures. As most Saudi firms are smaller than US 
and UK ones, vertical growth could enhance corporate governance. In addition to the size of the 
capital market, the ‘legal and institutional environment also plays a crucial role in shaping 
corporate governance’.378 
Corporate governance also depends on shareholding patterns. As mentioned, family-owned 
businesses do not have the same standards of corporate governance as board-controlled 
businesses. In another finding, economic reforms played a role in reducing shareholding 
concentrations.
379
 Thus, the economic reforms had, and still have, a positive effect on corporate 
performance in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the imposition of corporate governance regulation 
prompts voluntary corporate social disclosure practices. In the absence of regulation, companies 
have no necessity to disclose financial information.  
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Financial disclosure by corporate houses in Saudi Arabia has improved since 2006 and is 
gradually following US and UK corporate governance. However, social and cultural factors 
prevent Saudi Arabia from simply adopting US and UK regulations of corporate governance and 
disclosure practices. The conditions that existed in Saudi Arabia before globalisation are ‘likely 
to render imported Western corporate governance models unworkable’.380 However, 
globalisation has changed the situation and, due to necessity, the Saudi government has started 
making regulations to put disclosure and good corporate governance into practice.
381
 
 
5.10 Summary 
This chapter has examined the status of minority shareholders and their rights and duties in 
general and under the CL. The problems and current remedies for protection of minority 
shareholder have been identified. Within this, abuse of power by major shareholders to block 
minority shareholder's interests in the firm has been considered and the role of corporate 
governance in providing remedies for these has been discussed. Given its large stake in the Saudi 
business platform, Saudi ownership has also been considered.  
This chapter also considered the role of shareholders and stakeholders in corporate governance 
provisions and presented the CGR. The structure of the board of directors and its principal 
fiduciary duties has been set out: the duty of care, duty of loyalty and duty to act within the 
board’s powers. Board members’ roles, responsibilities and powers and the determination of 
their compensation—a sensitive topic in corporate governance in the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis—have been discussed. As such, this comparison between the western and Islamic 
perspectives on corporate governance clear that the fundamentals of the two cultures with a 
consideration of the methods of doing business. For instance, the Islamic nations consider that 
there should be no price fixing as well as monopolies because of the feeling that such moves 
exploit people. There is a consideration that the Muslim countries value free-market economies, 
where there are no manipulations of the people for the benefit of a few individuals. There is also 
the fact that the chapter will highlight that people who engage in business should have 
equitability, which explores the fact that traders should not hoard goods because of the 
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exploitative nature of such acts. Unlike the Islamic nations, the western approaches have 
different perspectives of the same regulations. For instance, they do not consider religious 
attachments to corporate governance, which means that they have allowances price controls 
among other aspects.   
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Chapter Six 
 
Issues Involving Corporate Transparency in the Saudi Capital Market 
 
6.1 Overview  
In this chapter, disclosure and transparency issues in Saudi Arabia are discussed as they pertain 
to the Saudi capital market. Disclosure provisions in the CML and problems that result from 
inadequate disclosure are examined. Insider dealing, price manipulation and possible reforms of 
Saudi law are addressed. Finally, a brief account of voluntary disclosure and its impact on the 
mandatory disclosure of financial information by SSE-listed companies is given, as well as the 
WB’s findings on Saudi companies’ disclosure practices. 
 
6.2 Saudi Arabia’s Approach to Disclosure and Transparency 
From the earlier discussion of general corporate governance in Saudi Arabia, there appears to be 
in place a regulatory framework that sets the conditions for the adoption of effective corporate 
governance. However, this framework has shortcomings. The CL and the CGR, the two legal 
frameworks that establish corporate governance requirements for business corporations, are 
sometimes complementary and consistent but, in other cases, are contradictory or inconsistent 
and interfere with each other. This problem was discussed in the analysis of the Saudi corporate 
governance framework in Chapter 4.  
Transparency and the disclosure of information are determinants of development and economic 
growth and without them economic progress cannot be sustained. The robustness of activity in a 
market economy depends to a great extent on complete, timely and accurate information which 
determines resource allocation, improves the efficiency of market activity and increases 
production, which drives the economy. The preceding chapters, particularly the discussion of 
scandals and disclosure, demonstrated that SSE listed companies still fall short of the standard of 
transparency desirable for an efficient market, in part because Saudi Arabia is an emerging 
142 
 
economy and Saudi corporate culture is still assimilating the corporate governance culture. The 
behaviours of individuals involved, such as board members, executives and investors, are 
conditioned by the customary Saudi social relations and have yet to be adjusted to the constraints 
of abiding by international standards that are different to accustomed behaviour. 
 
6.3 Disclosure Provisions in the Capital Market Law 
The CMA Listing Rules aim to protect investors and contribute to the development of the capital 
market. They are more specific and detailed than the earlier rules under the Ministry of 
Commerce, which were ambiguous, restricted market access and were time consuming.
382
 The 
CML LR describe the information disclosure required for companies to list their securities in the 
stock market. The law also orders listed companies to abide by periodic reporting and disclosure 
requirements.  
The CML disclosure rules meet the international standards set by the IOSCO, Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision and the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The comparability of the Saudi 
and London stock exchanges is qualified by the innate structural differences between an 
emerging market only a few decades old and a developed, mature market. Emerging markets are 
prone to problems not present in developed markets, such as a lack of transparency and risk 
management, weak market infrastructure and investor misbehaviour.
383
 
Another problem is the lack of predictability in the immediate time
384—for instance, when there 
are insufficient counter buy and sell orders in the market then the prices of the particular stock 
become volatile. This major problem enables unscrupulous traders to work together to employ 
manipulative techniques to ‘paint the tape’. This is a form of market manipulation where a group 
of market players conspires to influence the market price of a security by buying and selling it 
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among themselves. This creates the impression that there is significant trading activity in the 
stock and so they are able to take advantage of less savvy investors.
385
 
Another characteristic of the Saudi market is the noticeably few listed companies, numbering 
only 113 compared to the average of 300 to 350 in other emerging markets. Consequently, the 
SSE is a relatively illiquid market, focusing on a small number of stocks, with trading activity 
concentrated on a small number of dealers. Ideally, a stock exchange has larger firms, but in 
Saudi Arabia the largest 20 or so companies are not listed because they are family or state owned 
and have no public ownership.
386
  
The LR can be easily understood by investors who do not usually seek expert advice in regards 
to investment decisions. The language used is clear although the rules are nearly identical to 
those of LSE.  
The concepts of disclosure and transparency are very important in the business world and 
financial market. When applied, the concepts ensure that information is shared publicly and the 
financial system is controlled. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the IOSCO 
Technical Committee strongly recommended the adoption of such concepts by security 
companies and banks. They provide a logical, clear basis for all investor decision making and 
market discipline, which helps clarify firms’ management strategies and expose their risks. 
Companies that practice transparency and disclosure can be evaluated easily and protect 
themselves from suspicions in the case of financial crises.
387
 The two Committees urge firms to 
provide clear summaries of their activities, including quality and quantity. In addition, all risks—
credit, market and liquidity—should be declared to the public, and how these factors affect them 
should explained. According to the Committees’ recommendations, firms should detail their 
policies in dealing with the expected and existing risks.  
For better financial comprehension, it is also important to separate trading and non-trading 
activities. Compared with developed countries, the Saudi CML represents a good attempt to cope 
with the international standards regarding disclosure of information. The CML includes 
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provisions addressing the prohibition of market manipulation, security issuers, members of 
management and majority shareholders.  
Sufficient, adequate information has to be disclosed in order to create a full picture of investment 
affairs, including the issuer’s financial position, securities to be issued, rights and privileges. If 
the information is inaccurate, the issuer or person responsible must compensate the affected 
investors. All these measures will help create a solid investment environment in the Saudi capital 
market.  
Some articles in the Saudi LR mandate disclosing information about securities before issuing 
them. Such information has to be sufficient for an investor to assess the financial position, 
activities and related aspects of the company and help make decisions about it.
388
 This 
information should also convey all aspects of the rights attached to the shares (e.g. voting, 
dividends, repurchase). 
Moreover, the financial status of the company or the issuer and their administration body has to 
be clear and unambiguous.
389
 In the FSA rules, Article 2.1.1 outlines the content of the necessary 
information, while Annex I includes the minimum disclosure requirement for shares’ registration 
documents, similar to the Saudi rules.
390
 
Through August 2006, the CMA has published 16 prospectuses which fulfilled the information 
requirements in annexes 4 and 5 of the LR.
391
 However, the new regulations have not changed 
the LR’s restriction of information access to only well-established corporations. In contrast, the 
FSA accepted 25 prospectuses in the second half of July.
392
 In both cases, the authority must 
approve the prospectus under SSE rules before publication. 
 The CMA takes other appropriate steps, such as asking the applicant to appear before the 
authority for questioning, providing further information or undertaking relevant studies. This 
person has to be aware of all related matters that might be discussed when appearing before the 
authority in order to give adequate answers.  
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According to the SSE rules, the issue must make disclosure to the authority if the existing 
securities will increase by less than 10% because of the issue or if the shares are issued due to a 
bonus to the listed shareholders of the company. However, a prospectus is not required if the 
issuer’s employees are granted shares or the issue is due to converting debts.393 If no increase in 
the securities is expected, a prospectus is not required, following Section 1.2 of the FSA 
Prospectus Rules. This also applies in cases when an employer grants shares to employees. 
According to the Saudi rules, the issuer must publish a prospectus fourteen days before posting it 
online and releasing it in hard copy offered free of charge to the public.
394
 In contrast, Article 
3.2.2
395
 of the UK rules adopts the principle of reasonableness, requiring the prospectus to be 
published six days before the IPO. According to Article 3.2.3, if a major change occurs in 
relation to the prospectus or the documents after approval, a supplement is needed.
396
 The FSA 
also addresses inaccurate information and mistakes mentioned in the approved prospectus.  
The authority can demand a higher level of disclosure by asking for more information or 
requiring other obligations in sectors such as insurance.
397
 Article 26 of the LR favours listed 
companies regarding disclosure rules:  
In the opinion of any issuer, disclosure of any matter required by these Rules would be unduly 
detrimental to the issuer, and omission is not likely to mislead investors with regard to facts and 
circumstances, essential knowledge for the assessment of the securities in question, the issuer 
may apply for a waiver from the relevant requirement.
398
 
The rules of the LSE also allow some exceptions to the disclosure of certain business activities:  
In long-term contracts, where disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the applicant or 
against the public interest, a waiver from the requirement of making a material contract publicly 
available can be granted subject to the UKLA discretion. The waiver may be granted only for 
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specific parts of a contract and, generally, will not be granted merely on the grounds of 
commercial sensitivity.
399
 
The SSE rules do not offer a justification for not disclosing information. The FSA does not 
consider the sensitivity of business information or exempt parts of the transaction that may affect 
the issuer.
400
 The purpose of imposing further obligations is to guarantee the continuous release 
of information to treat market participants equally.
401
 The LR mention such obligations, 
especially with regard to significant developments and the necessity to make them public.  
In addition, the CMA and shareholders should be informed about interim accounts approved by 
the issuer’s board of directors, as well as the annual accounts that must be prepared according to 
SOCPA criteria.
402
 If a firm fails to submit such reports to the authority, it could be subject to 
disciplinary action, such as a fine or suspension of its securities.
403
 
In addition, the authority should be informed of investors who own 5% or more of voting shares 
in a firm at the end of the trading day, as well as any increase or decrease of 1% or more.
404
 The 
aim of disclosure of interest is to draw the attention of other shareholders to the new shareholder 
or those whose shares have increased. Such shifts in shareholding can result in significant 
changes in the aspects of the firm, such as its articles of association or board of directors.
405
  
Furthermore, Almelhim argues that the disclosure of interest will make the shareholders aware of 
firms’ financial status and help protect their interests. The authority requires that issuers notify it 
regarding their capital and changes, including those to holdings or ownership of more than 5% of 
the listed securities.
406
 Moreover, all decisions related to company activities, such as payment or 
non-payment of dividends, purchases, draws, redemptions, and changes to the rights attached to 
any listed securities, must be reported to the CMA without delay.
407
 In comparison with the UK, 
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the FSA requires that the information be published on time to help the market function properly. 
However, disclosure of information to the SSE has to follow certain criteria, including 
continuous obligations. Any activity that might influence the company shareholders must be 
reported, and such measures have to be in compliance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards, as stated by the LR.
408
 
 
6.4 Disclosure and Transparency in Saudi Arabia  
In a discussion of corporate governance, it can be argued that disclosure and transparency mean 
that firms release to the public their financial status, activities, decisions and any related 
company information that concerns investors.
409
 This definition lends these concepts significant 
importance in capital markets in general and in corporate governance specifically, whether local 
or global.
410
 
The first OECD Principle of Corporate Governance is: 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be 
consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among 
different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.
411
 
The application of disclosure as required by corporate governance results in making public 
information that helps investors, shareholders and all other parties interested in a company in 
order for them to make their decisions regarding their investments. Such information must 
accurately reflect the company’s real situation in the capital market in order to provide a 
comprehensive picture for all those interested. Disclosure includes sharing the real financial 
status of the company in the market with all relevant parties, which makes clear the managerial 
process and allows the detection of any act of fraud.
412
 In addition, this supports the rights and 
benefits of shareholders as the board of directors’ behaviours are visible, and it cannot lead the 
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company to achieve its interests at the expense of shareholders. Shareholders can decide whether 
to sell or buy shares in the company.
413
 
In this context of corporate governance, the Winter Report states that: 
Disclosure can be a powerful regulatory tool; it creates an incentive to comply with best practice, 
and allows members and third parties to take necessary actions. Disclosure requirements can be 
more efficient, more flexible and easier to enforce.
414
  
The Saudi CMA emphasises the concepts of disclosure and transparency in the CGR, requiring 
all companies listed in the market to apply them.
415
 Article 9 of the CGR on disclosure in the 
board of directors’ report declares that: 
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the content of the report of 
the board of directors, which is appended to the annual financial statements of the company, such 
report shall include specific disclosure requirements.
416
 
Furthermore, other articles of the LR stipulate related requirements.
417
 In comparison with the 
rules of other developed countries, the LR of the CGR have very similar requirements to the 
LSE.
418
 These requirements are found in UK legislation: the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules, FSA Listing Rules and the UK Corporate Governance 
Code.
419
 
In general, such requirements of corporate governance are almost identical in Saudi Arabia and 
the UK. The greatest similarities are in the rules applied to the listed corporations in both 
countries. Slight differences emerge in the level of development of the capital market in these 
countries.
420
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The Saudi CGR requires that corporations include the concepts of disclosure and transparency in 
their articles of association, including mechanisms to apply them to the board of directors and 
releasing information to all relevant bodies interested in the company.
421
 The board of directors 
is responsible for leading the company and its activities in order to benefit all partners in the 
company. This aim can be achieved through disclosure and transparency.
422
 
 
6.4.1 Annual Board Report and the Importance of Disclosure and Transparency 
After the 2006 SSE crisis, it became clear that companies had ignored most disclosure and 
transparency requirements for annual reports, and accurate, precise information about the 
financial status of companies was lacking. Only a few documents, such as auditors’ reports, 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, were correct.
423
 The same pattern was seen during 
the global financial crisis (2007-2008) where no true, reliable information was shared.
424
 
Under the CGR, companies have to disclose updated information and make it accessible to all 
interested parties. In addition, annual reports should pay special attention to shareholders.
425
 The 
annual board reports serve as the most reliable source of information about Saudi companies 
although these reports are difficult to understand.
426
 It seems that many shareholders are 
unfamiliar with the legal and financial terms used in these reports; therefore, the language should 
be simpler and easier to comprehend.
427
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As a step towards facilitating access to information and providing understandable reports, many 
corporations have started to use modern means of communications, such as the Internet, in order 
to make it easier for shareholders and interested parties to access the information they need to 
make investment decisions.
428
 Many listed companies in Saudi Arabia have used technology to 
present their boards’ annual reports. 
Providing a clear, satisfactory board annual report needs the efforts of auditors with high levels 
of expertise
429
 who can practise disclosure and transparency by disseminating significant 
information about the company’s true financial status, as is required by corporate governance 
worldwide. The OECD Principles stipulate that: 
An annual report should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified auditor in 
order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the 
financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all 
material respects.
430
 
Experienced auditors can provide good board reports which comply with the CGR provisions 
related to disclosure and transparency in corporate governance.
431
 Some scholars argue that well-
known, large companies in Saudi Arabia, such as Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 
and Saudi Telecommunications Company (STC), should disclose information and make their 
reports available before smaller companies do as these larger businesses already have qualified, 
expert auditors working for them.
432
 Such large companies should also provide additional 
information through more regular supplements than small businesses.
433
 High-level international 
companies frequently present their board annual reports of their activities in a specific way, 
including the expected risks and profits, which lower-level companies usually cannot do.
434
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6.4.2 Disclosure and Transparency Requirements of the Annual Board Report 
The Saudi disclosure and transparency requirements can be found in the rules of corporate 
governance in many countries. These concern the sharing of firm information and the production 
of board annual reports. In comparison with the provisions regarding disclosure and transparency 
in the UK, for example, the CGR emphasises disseminating company information and board 
annual reports to interested parties in an accessible manner and offers recommendations on how 
to do so in the approved manner of listings.
435
 The disclosure and transparency requirements for 
board annual reports of listed companies are as follows:
436
 
1) A detailed description of the board’s main activities; 
2) The board’s plans and decisions regarding the company’s structure, expansion, future 
prospects and expected risks; 
3) A statement of any material differences between the most recent and next operations; 
4) An explanation of any deviation from the accounting standards espoused by the SOCPA; 
5) Data about each subsidiary and its scope of business, main country of operation and 
assimilation; 
6) An explanation of any issues related to rights that the board issues or grants, such as 
convertible debt instruments, options and warrants; 
7) A report of the board meetings and the names of members who attended during the past 
financial year; 
8) An account of any waivers to any rights of the board of directors. senior executives or 
shareholders of the listed company to dividends or compensation; 
9) The annual audit results of the value of the corporation’s internal control measures. 
                                                 
435
 The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, September 2014) 27. 
436
 LR (n 388) Articles 43, 44 and 45; CGR (n 7) Article 9. Also, the CMA Board issued Resolution No 1-36-2008, 
dated 10 November 2008, making Article 9 of the CGR compulsory for all listed companies. 
152 
 
The CRSD and the CMA Board have judged many cases related to disclosure and transparency, 
mostly the non-application of these requirements by listed companies. Almost all such cases are 
subject to Article 9 of the CGR and Articles 43, 44 and 45 of the LR.
437
 The CRSD and the CMA 
Board enforced these resolutions. These match Article 59-B of the CML:  
The Capital Market Authority Board may request the Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
Disputes to impose a fine upon the persons responsible for an intentional violation of the 
provisions of the Capital Market Law, the Implementing Regulations, and the rules of the 
exchange. As an alternative to the foregoing, the Capital Market Authority Board may impose a 
fine upon any person responsible for the violation of the Capital Market Law, the Implementing 
Regulations, and the rules of the exchange. The fine that the Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes or the Capital Market Authority Board can impose shall not be less than 
$2,666 and shall not exceed $26,666 for each violation committed by the defendant.
438
 
Companies which did not comply with the corporate governance principles failed to include in 
their board annual reports the necessary information related to the practice of disclosure and 
transparency mandated by the CGR and LR. However, the failure of some listed companies to 
adhere to disclosure and transparency requirements is not uncommon. Theoretically, the rules 
and principles of disclosure and transparency are clear but, in practice, the application of such 
rules is generally weak, possibly attributable to soft follow-up by the CMA Board with fines and 
punishments not severe enough to be a deterrent. A better mechanism is needed to compel listed 
companies to fulfil the requirements of disclosure and transparency. For instance, instead of the 
CMA Board, the CRSD could mediate cases dealing with any violation of the rules by listed 
companies in order to make them pay attention to the requirements when preparing their board 
annual reports. 
The Saudi disclosure and transparency requirements, if applied by enough companies to avoid 
violating the rules and suffering the consequent penalties, can enhance corporate governance in 
the Saudi capital market. Corporation board members and top executives must develop and apply 
such rules and principles. Listed companies have violated the following principles of disclosure 
and transparency. 
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1. The principle in Article 9-F of the CGR: 
Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the company by the Capital 
Market Authority Board or any other supervisory or regulatory or judicial body (to be mentioned 
in the board annual report).
439
 
This principle was violated by some companies, including the Saudi International Petrochemical 
Company. A case was brought against it when the company’s 2009 annual financial report failed 
to mention that the CMA Board sentenced it at the beginning of that year. Consequently, it was 
fined by the CMA Board.
440
 In another example of a violation, the Al Ahsa Development 
Company did not include required information in its 2010 annual financial report and was fined 
$26,666 by the CMA Board.
441
 These fines were imposed lawfully under Article 9-F of the CGR. 
The CMA Board makes an effort to ensure that listed companies abide by the CGR by following 
up on the application of disclosure and transparency and imposing penalties and other 
punishments. Thus, any sentence should be mentioned in the company’s annual report. Failure to 
do so is considered a violation of the rules and regulations set by the CMA, CRSD and other 
Saudi judicial organisations.
442
 
2. The principle in Article 9-B of the CGR: 
Names of any joint stock company in which the company board of directors’ member acts as a 
member of its board of directors (to be mentioned in the board annual report).
443
 
An example of the violation of this principle comes from the Al Baha Investment and 
Development Company. Its 2010 board annual financial report did not mention the names of 
those serving as board members in more than one company. The CMA fined this company 
$13,333. This is a typical punishment for a violation of the above principle.
444
 In such cases, it is 
suggested that the CMA Board should warn or fine persons who are members of more for not 
displaying this information appropriately. This will help in dealing with conflicts of interest.
445
 
3. The principle in Article 44-C of the LR: 
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The company shall announce, through the electronic applications, its interim and annual accounts 
immediately upon approval by the board and such statements must not be published to the 
shareholders prior to their announcement in the stock exchange.
446
 
Regarding violations of this Article, the Southern Province Cement Company was fined $13,333 
by the CMA. In 2008, the company published its profits by posting the chairman of the board’s 
speech online, which is not considered an official declaration, before informing the CMA and the 
Stock Exchange of its profits.
447
 This decision was issued in accordance with Article 9-J of the 
CGR, which states that ‘the stock exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the 
corporation general meeting’.448 
The fine imposed on this company is quite fair. It is in accordance with the regulations and rules 
set by the CMA and the SSE as they are the authorised and responsible bodies concerned with 
stating the behaviour of the listed corporations. Corporations must inform these official bodies of 
the board’s annual financial report and any other important information, and not publish 
information before the stated time in order to ensure the fairness of the market. Conduct to the 
contrary constitutes legal grounds for punishment.
449
 
4. The principle in Article 45-9 of the LR: 
A description of the listed company dividends policy (to be included in the board annual financial 
report).
450
 
An example of a violation of this principle is the case involving Alahli Takaful Company. The 
company’s 2009 annual financial report did not explain its dividend rule. The CMA Board fined 
it $13,333 in accordance with this Article.
451
 The annual financial report must detail the 
distribution of dividends to all shareholders to ensure equitable treatment. 
Legally, this case follows the CMA rules regarding the corporations that breach this principle. 
However, it is suggested that the imposed fines be increased to prevent such violations and 
emphasise the significance of disclosing the distribution mechanism for dividends in order to 
protect shareholders’ rights. The means of distributing dividends is required to be stated only in 
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the company’s articles of association and ordinary general meeting and is not stipulated by the 
CGR or LR. Therefore, it is recommended that the CGR mandate disclosure of the dividends 
distribution policy.
452
 
5. The principle in Article 45-21 of the LR: 
A statement of the amount of any outstanding statutory payment on account of any zakat, taxes, 
fees or other charges with a brief description and the reasons therefore (to be included in the 
board annual report).
453
 
Saudi Fishers Company violated this principle with its 2009 annual report as it did not include 
the zakat and income tax it had paid. The CMA Board imposed a fine of $13,333 on the 
company according to the above principle.
454
 Zakat is a certain amount of money deducted from 
the rich to be given to the poor and is one of the pillars of Islam. Paying zakat demonstrates that 
the company is fulfilling its duty towards society. Doubling this fine is suggested to act as a 
deterrent. 
6. The principle in Article 45-11 of the LR: 
A description of any interest, options and subscription rights of the company directors, senior 
executives and their spouses and minor children in the shares or debt instruments of the company 
or any of its subsidiaries, together with any change to such interest and rights during the last 
financial year (to be mentioned in the board annual report).
455
 
In its 2009 annual financial report, STC did not mention the interests, preferences and donation 
rights of its board members and top executives. As a result, it was fined by the CMA Board.
456
 
Since this case involved a major company, the CMA could suggest that it be arbitrated by the 
CRSD. STC’s behaviour could be attributed to a conflict of interest among its board of directors, 
so the CMA might not be capable of handling it well. In such a case, it could have been 
presented to the CRSD.
457
 
7. The principle in Article 45-3 of the LR: 
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A summary, in the form of a table or a chart, of the assets and liabilities of the company and of 
the company’s business results for the last five financial years or from incorporation, whichever 
is shorter (to be included in the board annual report).
458
 
Arabia Co-Operative Insurance Company provides an example of a violation of this principle. Its 
2010 board annual financial report did not include accurate figures for company assets and 
liabilities nor did it mention any business results for the past five financial years. In this case, the 
CMA imposed a fine imposed in accordance with Article 45-3 of the LR,
459
 which requires 
accurate figures describing the company’s performance in the most recent five years to be 
provided in the annual report. The company deserved such punishment in order to encourage the 
application of disclosure and transparency, and to provide investors with useful information 
about the company’s productivity and an analysis of business results in recent years.460 
8. The principle in Article 43-A of the LR: 
A corporation must notify the Capital Market Authority and the public without delay of any 
major developments in its sphere of activity which are not public knowledge and which may have 
an effect on the corporation’s assets and liabilities or financial position or on the general course of 
its business.
461
 
In addition, Article 43-B-7 of the LR stipulates that ‘the increase or decrease in the net assets of 
the company equal to or greater than 10% … be included in the board annual report’.462 Al 
Masafi Saudi Arabian Company violated the above-mentioned principle by failing to notify the 
CMA and SSE about its board recommendations to increase its capital by the deadline of July 
2008. For this violation, the CMA Board fined the company $26,666.
463
 A company that intends 
to increase its capital should notify the CMA and SSE; otherwise, it will be liable to a penalty as 
occurred in this example.
464
 
9. The principle in Article 43-B-2 of the LR: 
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Any debt outside the company’s ordinary course of business, in an amount equal to or greater 
than 10% of the book value of the company’s net assets (to be included in the board annual 
report).
465
 
In a 2011 board annual financial report, the Saudi Cement Company did not mention its debt to 
the Samba Financial Group. Under the above principle, the CMA punished this company with a 
fine.
466
 Violations of this principle hide important company information and concerns from the 
CMA and investors. This weakens the application of disclosure and transparency. The penalty 
for such violations and the application of these rules should be strengthened, such as by 
postponing trade in shares of the violating company and informing investors about such 
behaviour.
467
 
 
6.5 Problems in Cases of Inadequate Disclosure 
If disclosure is insufficient, problems arise, such as a lack of transparency due to weak rules or 
application. Abuse will prevail in the market and securities, and investors will lose confidence in 
the market activities.  
To meet these challenges, the CML contains provisions to enhance transparency. This law 
requires the publication of a prospectus for the firm to be listed. The required information in the 
prospectus includes the issuers of the securities, their business activities, the individuals in 
charge of management, the principal shareholders and any information material to assessing the 
risks of investing in the stock.  
The prospectus is more than a mere brochure because it commits the firm to the truthfulness of 
all information in it. An investor who buys primary shares on the basis of the information in the 
prospectus may file for damages against the firm if any inaccurate material information was 
presented in or intentionally omitted from the prospectus.
468
 In a few instances, the prospectus is 
not required but these are few and act more as exemptions, with the general rule favouring full 
disclosure in the prospectus. 
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A number of additional obligations are imposed on certain sectors, such as insurance and mining, 
as they are associated with greater public risks. However, a gap in the rules governing disclosure 
favours listed companies. Article 26 allows for the waiver of disclosure requirements when, in 
the opinion of the issuer, the disclosure would be detrimental to the issuer, and the omission is 
not likely to mislead investors’ assessment of the securities.469 Application for the waiver, of 
course, must be made to authorities, and in the course of the application the nature of the waived 
information should be made evident.  
This measure might be necessary, especially in highly competitive firms that maintain industrial 
secrets. However, the provision is also open to abuse and possible connivance between 
authorities and the issuer to allow more than necessary leniency for the non-disclosure of matters 
vital to the investor but unfavourable to the image of the issuer. This defect in the provision is 
highlighted by its failure to qualify in what manner the undisclosed information would be 
‘unduly detrimental’ to the issuer. Admittedly, this description could cover a broad range of 
situations and even be used to exempt the disclosure of information which impinges significantly 
on public interest.
470
 
 
6.6 Regulations Addressing Market Abuse 
Lapses in compliance with disclosure and transparency standards are hugely detrimental to the 
effective functioning of the financial markets and slow down economic development. A lack of 
transparency can result in insider dealing, conflicts of interest and price manipulation in the stock 
exchange, among other adverse repercussions. Stock market regulators are aware of the possible 
loopholes in market regulation and have intensified efforts to eliminate irregular trading and poor 
disclosure in order to encourage more participants to invest in the equities market. In the SSE, 
most trading is conducted by retail investors who are the most vulnerable parties because of the 
danger of losing their life savings to unscrupulous market players.
471
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6.6.1 Market Manipulation 
It has been observed that market manipulation takes place in all stock markets, even developed 
ones although arguably to a much lower degree. An aim of the SSE is to reduce the frequency 
and severity of market manipulation. Jarrow argues that only major investors can change prices 
to manipulate the market for their own interest.
472
 He differentiates between the manipulator and 
the major trader and views market manipulation trading positively as it accumulates wealth 
without risk. Jarrow thinks that although other people believe the major trader has sensitive 
information and behaves accordingly, the major trader actually controls prices through the large 
size of his trade.
473
 
However, Gale and Allen identify intentional stock price manipulation as a major issue 
throughout history. Market manipulation generally has been viewed as immoral behaviour since 
the founding of the first stock exchanges. Early brokers manipulated stock prices by quickly 
selling certain securities. Prices fell when fearful investors also sold them, and then brokers 
bought the shares back at a lower price. Early brokers also made profits by spreading false 
rumours about company’s prospectuses.474 
Article 49 of the CML defines market manipulation as any act which creates a false or 
misleading impression of the market or the prices or the value of securities. Market manipulation 
also includes inducing third parties to buy, sell or subscribe to securities or to refrain from doing 
so or to permit or prevent them from exercising the rights associated with such securities. Other 
methods of manipulation of securities prices include conducting false sale activities without real 
transfer of ownership.
475
 Such behaviours prevail in Saudi Arabia due to the weak actions of the 
CMA and the structure of ownership.
476
 
In deceptive transactions, an investor sells securities from one fund and buys the same amount 
from another fund which he manages. This practice creates the impression that trading in this 
share is active which increases in its price. Such practices are enabled by a lack of market 
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education among investors and a scarcity of expert market makers. Tracing such practices in the 
Saudi market, Taher noticed that the share prices of 70 out of 81 companies traded in the market 
were overvalued as a result of mass speculation. Within a month, the price of the securities of 
some firms rose 200% despite losses, leading to a sharp price correction.
477
 
Among the harmful effects of such practices are that investors who suffered losses might not be 
able to raise local funds later or subscribe widely to future IPOs. These practices have created 
social crises that have negative consequences for many people.
478
  
The FSA classifies market manipulation as three offences: firstly, encouraging transactions in an 
investment by giving a misleading impression of the supply, demand or price to keep the price of 
that investment at an abnormal level; secondly, entering into transactions to trade that employ 
fictitious devices; and thirdly, spreading misleading information about a financial instrument. 
In February 2006, a great crash in the Saudi market caused financial catastrophe, especially for 
small investors. Looking for the reasons behind the crash, specialists argued that market 
manipulation was among the main causes. Consumers started to spend less due to the financial 
crisis, and the CMA has fought against the negative consequences of the crash. 
After a prosperous period, the SSE reached more than 20,000 points in February 2006 but then 
collapsed by 50%. Despite a lack of proactive measures, the CMA responded by taking steps to 
protect investors.
479
 These measures lowered the daily fluctuation rate in the SSE from 5% 
instead of 10%. The CMA attempted to increase market liquidity and transparency in capital 
market activities and allowed foreign residents to trade directly with local exchanges.
480
 In 
addition, the CMA aimed to prevent market manipulation. It declared that, in early February 
2006, three investors had violated CML Article 49 by creating a false impression of the prices of 
securities of the eight firms. As a punishment, the CMA levied a large fine against the investors 
and banned them from working in listed firms or trading in the market for three years. However, 
the CMA did not give any details about how the manipulation took place.  
                                                 
477
 Nehad Taher, A Clearer Path for Investors (2004) <http://www.thebanker.com/World/Middle-East/Saudi-
Arabia/A-clearer-path-for-investors?ct=true> accessed 26 July 2014. 
478
 All the IPOs in the SSE have been massively oversubscribed. 
479
 The CMA did not intervene to eliminate market manipulation before the crash in February 2006. 
480
 IMF (2006). 
161 
 
Dudley states that there ‘is a widespread acknowledgement that market manipulation almost 
certainly happens in some corners of the Tadawul’.481 Regulations are in place but are not well 
enforced by the CMA, which often resorts to charging and collecting fines from those who 
violate regulations. The CMA has imposed $140,000 fines on companies trading on the SSE, 
mostly from penalties for failing to disclose important information about companies. For 
instance, the Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Company was fined SR50,000 in April 2013 for failing 
to disclose the expected financial impact of stopping production at some units for maintenance. 
In May 2013, the United Cooperative Assurance Company was fined SR100,000 for not 
disclosing its financial results for the previous year.
482
 
Despite these disciplinary actions, violations of the stock market regulations still occur. The fines 
are not high enough compared to companies’ net profits to act as deterrents. The SR50,000 fine 
imposed on Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical for violating Clause (A) of Article (40) of the 
LR and Sub-clause (5) of Clause (A) of General Instructions was taken into account by 
companies in the announcement published by the SSE on 15 December 2013. It contained false 
information on reaching an agreement with shareholders to boost its financial performance. It 
claimed the agreement would have a financial impact of nearly SR1 billion of the company’s 
revenues and SR1.3 billion in subsequent years. In future years, the financial effect will be only 
on the net profit. 
 
6.6.2 Irregular Trading 
Amidst inadequate disclosure, insider dealing flourishes. The practice is defined as using critical 
information about price in a firm before publishing it to gain financial benefits. Many countries 
have adopted legal measures to criminalise and prevent insider trading. According to 
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Friedman,
483
 honest competition between the players in the capital market is necessary, and all 
players should have the same information in order to create a fair and competitive environment. 
No player should have access to insider information during the process of securities trading.  
However, Manne
484
 argues that insider trading is fruitful because it creates company value, such 
as new investments. Similarly, Beny
485
 and Bhide
486
 contend that large shareholders’ access to 
inside information enables them to obtain greater trading profits than other shareholders, which 
serves as compensation for monitoring the firm’s performance and guiding it to avoid risks. 
Carleton and Fischel
487
 likewise assert that insider trading can be considered compensation for 
managers as they direct the company, and this motivates them to provide better management. 
Without the benefits of insider trading, the researchers argue, managers would less productive. 
Other specialists take an opposing view of insider trading. Among them, Gilligan advocates 
preventing insider trading as it creates an imbalance of opportunities and perpetuates unfairness, 
abuse of position and confidential information, and loss of integrity and confidence.
488
 He 
explains that insider dealing negatively affects liquidity and increases opportunities for serious 
abuse and crime. Rider and Ashe
489
 contend that insider dealing should be controlled because it 
harms confidence, allows the abuse of trust and supports unfairness.
 
 
Insider trading can be seen in abnormal, unusual fluctuations in the value of a company’s stock. 
Meulbroek
490
 finds that illegal trading based on inside information caused stock price run-ups of 
target firms before takeover announcements.  
Nevertheless, insider trading is not completely illegal, some aspects of it are legal. Some 
members of companies, such as managers and employees, may trade in stock in their own firms 
on the condition that they report their trades to the relevant bodies of the stock market. This 
practice is permitted even though insider trading often accompanies illegal trading of stock. In 
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fact, illegal insider trading is considered that which occurs when buying or selling a security in 
violation of a regulatory rule or a relationship of trust and confidence at the time of possessing 
sensitive private information about the security. According to the SSE, the concept also includes 
misappropriation of such information.
491
 
Article 35 of the LR prohibits trading by company insiders ten days before the end of a quarter or 
the publication date of the quarterly report, whichever is shorter, and 20 days before the end of a 
financial year or the publication of the interim account. The CMA used these regulations to fine 
more than forty insiders at thirty-five companies for insider trading during the prohibited periods. 
The CMA referred some insiders for investigation about the release of material information.
492
 
The absence of transparency allows insider trading to flourish. In response, the CMA enacted 
stricter regulations, including judiciary measures seven years ago. Under these regulations, the 
CMA investigated hundreds of cases of the market, and referred approximately 30 to court. 
Some parties involved were fined and even imprisoned.
493
  
In April 2013, the CMA issued a statement that it had detected ‘irregular trading activity’ in the 
stock trading of three listed companies suspected of violating the agency’s rules and regulations. 
The named firms were Tihama Advertising and Public Relations Company, Tourism Enterprise 
Company and Saudi Indian Company for Cooperative Insurance. In its statement, the CMA 
pledged to investigate these companies but as of July none had been held accountable.
494
 
The strong financial position and continuous progress of a company’s operations encourage 
investment. Based on misleading information, these companies’ securities increased, and the 
major shareholder sold his shares a few days later without notifying the CMA Applying Article 
50(a) of the CML and Article 30 of the LR, the authority suspended all trading in the market 
until further notice and started investigating the case.
495
 The CMA press release did not mention 
the names of the insiders or the amount of loss caused to other investors. 
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In addition to companies, the CMA punishes individuals. In at least nine cases in 2013, the CMA 
fined individuals a total of SR950,000 for dealing in securities without securing the proper 
authorisation. The fines ranged from SR50,000 to SR200,000. Many such enforcement actions 
are hidden from the public, conducted in private, negotiated settlements.
496
 These settlements let 
companies and individuals escape the notoriety of committing a dishonest act in the finance 
industry, which requires a reputation for honesty and integrity. 
 
6.6.3 ‘Name and Shame’ 
In the financial industry, reputation is given much weight because of the fiduciary trust due to 
one’s financial partners and collaborators. Consequently, a financial practitioner or institution 
suffers from being found guilty and fined for violating CMA regulations. Tim Please, a lawyer at 
the Saudi-based Clifford Chance International Law Firm, calls this the ‘name and shame’ 
penalty, explaining that ‘some sanctions are never put to a name’.497 The practice is to publicly 
state that the offending company broke a different rule, such as accounting regulations or filing 
deadlines for financial statements, which does not appear as malicious as fraud charges.
 
 
In the Saudi stock market, 85% to 90% of the trades are done in the name of retail investors, or 
local individuals trading through brokers. Retail investors often lack information and 
professional advice and typically engage in trading driven by sentiments (i.e. fear and greed), not 
deep analysis. Markets dominated by these investors experience volatility and market swings 
which sometimes gives the impression of irregular or insider trading. Therefore, it is important 
that the SSE develop larger investor groups (such as mutual funds) or institutions to stabilise 
markets driven by professional analyses, not emotional trading. Opening up stock exchanges to 
international investors could have the same effect. The recent appointment of Mohammed al-
Sheikh as chairman of the CMA’s board of governors might also help reduce volatility. Al-
Sheikh, a former lawyer in Washington, DC and executive director of the WB, has expressed 
receptiveness to the idea of opening the market to foreign buyers.
498
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6.7 Regulatory Response to the Market Crash of February 2006 
A major cause of the market collapse of February 2006 was rampant market manipulation. Major 
speculators used their large resources in a relatively thin market to take advantage of more 
inexperienced retail investors trading in speculative shares. The relative inexperience of market 
regulators also contributed to the crash as they failed to detect market manipulation practices 
early enough to prevent abusive market activity.  
Since the crisis, confidence in the SSE has gradually recovered although the CMA warns that a 
largely retail market with irregular trading patterns is prone to high volatility (i.e. sudden swings 
in market prices). After the crisis, a new market structure was introduced with the purpose of 
increasing transparency in the Saudi market by opening it to deeper, broader participation by 
institutional and foreign investors.
499
 
 
6.8 Saudi Compliance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
The previous section identified the three major legal issues concerning disclosure and 
transparency. This section examines the extent to which Saudi Arabia has complied with the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. It evaluates specific areas that should be addressed 
by corporate governance principles.  
 
6.8.1 Investor Protection 
The Kingdom has complied with principles relating to basic shareholder rights. The Securities 
Depository Center has secured registration of shareholders
500
 and made company information 
easily accessible to all shareholders allowed to participate in GSMs in person or by proxy. These 
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members can suggest inclusion of items in the GSM agenda, call for a GSM and nominate, vote 
for and remove board members.
501
 
An extraordinary general assembly (EGM) is required to carry out activities, such as changing 
the company’s articles of association, authorising large transactions and increasing authorised 
capital. When new shares are issued, shareholders have pre-emptive rights. Special attention is 
paid to the disclosure of related party transactions when the LR dictate prompt disclosure to the 
CMA in case any transaction is carried out between the company and a connected person.
502
 Any 
contract between the company and a director, CEO or chief financial officer should be reported 
to the board. Good corporate governance ensures that companies use their resources more 
efficiently in a way that protects minority shareholders, leads to better decision making and 
improves relations with workers, creditors and other stakeholders. It is an important condition for 
attracting the patient capital needed for sustained, long-term economic growth.
503
 
Saudi Arabia’s CGR does not reference related party transactions. This absence has raised 
concerns among many investors and brokers that industry insiders might abuse their positions 
and carry out improper activities, such as market manipulation, trading insider information and 
improperly trading with shares in investor accounts.
504
 In response to these concerns, the CMA 
issued a Market Conduct Regulation provision in the CML to ensure that ‘insider trading’ was 
well defined and prohibited in order to avoid market manipulation.
505
 
Other liability provisions protect investors, although the general rule is that directors are not 
liable for the actions of the company, which is considered a separate legal person. This 
protection of directors, called the corporate veil, has exceptions under civil law. Directors are 
trusted by the owners of a company (the shareholders) to make decisions in their interest. These 
include investment decisions that should increase shareholders’ wealth.506 For example, if a 
director pursues a business venture without consultation or researching it and the venture fails, 
he is personally liable for the loss. Directors who breach their duties can be held liable if the 
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company incurs losses. Therefore, directors need to always carefully consider their actions to 
ensure that they are in the best interests of the company. They must discharge their duties 
honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of shareholders.  
The recent growth in equity markets has spurred the emergence of a new class of financial 
intermediaries in the Kingdom, including research analysts, fund managers and investment 
managers. Their regulation falls under the mandate of the Authorised Persons Regulation to fulfil 
the major principles of the IOSCO ‘Statement of Principles for Addressing Sell-side Securities 
Analyst Conflicts of Interest, 2003’.507 The CGR motivates finance managers to disclose their 
voting direction or policy in the GSMs of the companies in which they invest. This disclosure 
helps build a good business image of corporate governance.
508
  
Such an image brings benefits to the market, including increasing funds and representation of 
foreign investors in the boards of the firms listed in Saudi Arabia. Representation of foreign 
investors in the boards can transfer ideas about global corporate management to Saudi firms.
509
 
However, the SSE is weak and not in line with the indicators of even emerging markets; for 
example, Morgan Stanley assessed the SSE as having little foreign ownership of companies, 
lacking certain tools and procedures and not applying best practices.
510
  
CMA regulations govern takeovers. A shareholder who obtains more than 50% of company 
shares might be required by the CMA to make a tender offer for all outstanding shares. This 
measure serves as a protection mechanism, especially for minority shareholders.
511
 
 
6.8.2 Disclosure 
Companies in Saudi Arabia are expected to produce quarterly and semi-annual financial 
statements, which include balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, notes, audited annual reports 
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and cash flow statements.
512
 Annual reports should describe the issuer, its business, board 
information, officers and issuer’s staff. In addition, annual reports should include a management 
statement that highlights the present and future developments that are expected to have 
significant impacts on the firm’s financial position.513 Various Saudi companies provide this and 
other information on their websites.
514
 
It is important to note that compliance with non-financial disclosure requirements has been 
described as weak. Despite the low level of compliance, the LR appears fairly complete and 
requires significant disclosure. Although companies are expected to disclose some important 
information, such as corporate objectives, dividend principles and board composition, it is clear 
that disclosure remains haphazard, especially in areas dealing with nomination procedures, board 
member qualifications and ownership benefits.
515
 
The corporate governance framework calls for the disclosure of the beneficiaries but only to the 
CMA, not the public. A shareholder who exceeds the 5% threshold must inform the company 
and CMA, which may decide whether to make that information public. An online initiative 
called Tadawal publishes ownership information of shareholders with both more or less than 5%. 
Although annual reports are expected to give information about significant shareholders, public 
disclosure of beneficial ownership has remained a major concern, making Tadawal a noteworthy 
initiative.
516
  
Financial statements should be prepared in accordance with local accounting standards and the 
financial reporting requirement. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry requires that all 
companies keep Arabic language accounting books and records within the Kingdom. These 
documents include the general ledger, daily journal and inventory book.
517
 The inventory book 
includes a detailed trial balance of all the assets, liabilities and performance for the financial 
year. It should be comparable with a detailed income statement and balance sheet.  
                                                 
512
 CML (n 5) Article 45.
 
513
 WB (n 85) 4. See also LR (n 388) Articles 43, 44 and 45. See also CGR (n 8) Article 9. Also, the CMA Board 
issued Resolution, No 1-36-2008, dated 10 November 2008 making Article 9 of the CGR compulsory on all listed 
companies.   
514
 Al-Nodel and Hussainey (n 84) 13. 
515
 WB (n 85) 4. 
516
 ibid. 
517
 Latham & Watkins (n 94) 20. 
169 
 
Companies operating and registered in Saudi Arabia must comply with SCOPA accounting 
standards. International Financial Reporting Standards can be used as a guide in cases where the 
SOCPA principles do not apply. However, most companies are encouraged to apply the 
international standards as more than a guide in order to attract investors. During a lecture entitled 
‘Presentation and Disclosure in the Financial Statements of Companies’ given in Mecca at an 
Industry and the Chamber of Commerce event, the engineer Adel emphasised the importance of 
applying international standards. Doing so enables investors to invest in countries other than 
their own. The difficulties of applying and implementing different accounting standards can 
prevent investors from entering into a market in other countries.
518
 
The following are the main accounting and auditing regulations: International Financial 
Reporting Standards; SOCPA standards; company regulations; income tax regulations; and 
additional accounting standards issued by the SAMA for financial institutions. 
These statements are then audited according to the National Standards of Auditing. The SOCPA 
standards do not in any way converge with the International Financial Reporting Standards.
519
 
Although compliance with national standards has been found to be quite high, there is a strong 
push to converge the two standards in order to improve financial reporting and assure 
investors.
520
 The legal basis for implementing accounting and auditing standards are quite 
explicit, and SOCPA’s authority is generally respected. However, the quarterly reviews of the 
audits are considered ineffective.
521
 Some have called for real-time disclosures in both Arabic 
and English in order to resolve ‘the irregularities and abuses among traders in a fair and firm way 
in front of everyone’.522 
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6.8.3 Enforcement 
The CMA has the mandate to examine and take enforcement action. For example, in 2006, 83 
cases were forwarded to the CMA, some through shareholder’s referral reports.523 A good 
number of these cases involved market manipulation and disclosure delays. The administrative 
remedies and penalties at the CMA’s disposal are daily suspension of trading activities, 
warnings, penalties and cease and detest orders.
524
 The CMA must present cases warranting 
heavy fines or imprisonment to another body.  
The CMA understands the need for better corporate governance and has adopted a three-phase 
approach to improve the implementation of corporate governance. In the first phase, the CMA 
published the CGR
525
 and in the second, it educated market participants about how to apply 
regulations. In the third phase, the CGR will be revised, and all sections of regulation made 
mandatory. Corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is still a promising aspect because the CMA is 
working to educate market players on the importance of implementing and applying corporate 
governance.
526
 
 
6.9 Development of Saudi Regulations 
Saudi laws, especially those related to the concepts of disclosure, transparency and listing rules, 
need reforms. Ways to increase the application of these concepts need to be found. The CML and 
LR regulations dealing with disclosure seem identical to the recommendations of IOSCO and the 
Basel Committee and the standards of developed countries’ markets, particularly the LSE and 
NYSE. Jurisdictions vary between countries.  
Any reforms of disclosure rules and provisions of disclosure require a good understanding of the 
market structure and investors’ thinking. In 2004, the SSE was extremely attractive.527 Although 
owners directly managed most funds in the market, most investors did not have enough 
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experience to manage their investments. This environment encouraged major speculators to 
manipulate the market, spreading rumours and making false transactions. One suggestion to 
prevent such misbehaviour and strengthen transparency is to encourage investment institutions to 
participate in the market in order to support fair competition based on transparency and 
increased, sufficient publicly available information.  
Usually, the available information about the SSE is thought to be true. In an attempt to 
strengthen transparency and disclosure in the capital market, the CMA takes disciplinary actions 
to punish firms that do not publish interim accounts on time or comply with the necessary 
standards.
528
  
Investors and interested parties can look for information about the market, securities and related 
issues on the websites of companies, newspapers, the CMA and Ministry of Commerce. 
Specialised institutions authorised by the CMA evaluate new corporations to gain objective, 
trustworthy information and make it available to investors.  
However, insufficient company disclosure was not the main reason for price manipulation in the 
SSE. Among the others, the most important is small investors’ lack of experience. They do not 
know how to manage their funds or to get and use information, and need to be educated about 
the conditions of the financial market and how to achieve their goals. In order to educate this 
type of investor, the CMA has begun running specialised programmes and bulletins on television 
and in newspapers to warn small investors about the dangers of rumours in securities trading. 
The agency also tries to explain the correct way to get credible information and encourages using 
investment funds. Another method of education could be to offer courses through licensed 
institutions to enable small investors to manage their investments and do so under market 
mechanisms.
529
  
Another cause of price manipulation was a gap in rules disclosure regarding notification about 
any person who owns 5% or more of any class of voting shares or convertible debt instrument 
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and about any increase or decrease by 1% or more in an issuer’s ownership.530 Such notification 
must be given by the end of the trading day. This raises the question: What if a speculator buys 
and sells shares within one trading day? To address this gap, the CMA needs to control and 
monitor the market more strongly. It has taken some steps to do so, including establishing the 
Securities Depository Center. This centre controls the most important activities, namely 
executing transactions, transferring, settling, clearing, and registering ownership of securities 
traded on the SSE. Through this centre, the CMA can track all transactions, ownership transfers, 
security trading details and other market activities and investigate whether they are legal. The 
CMA thus exercises its power to prevent the illegal dealings in the market.
531
 
Suspicious deals and price manipulation can be detected by comparing the amount of securities 
traded on the individual level by investors. Some stock exchanges use technology to issue 
notifications and warnings about suspected trading deals and price movements in the market. 
Specialist staff examine these notifications when needed.
532
 In addition, false transfer of 
ownership—when an investor sells and buys in different funds he owns and changes prices 
without an actual transfer of ownership—can be detected.  
It has become clear that the SSE suffers from price instability and desperately needs a solution to 
control the risk of price manipulation. To that end, it is proposed that the percentage of shares 
which must be reported to the SSE as securities when the price fluctuates during trading is less 
than 5% of a total class of a firm’s shares. To develop possible solutions to market manipulation, 
the CMA has made use of the experience of developed markets, especially the UK. Despite great 
efforts to control mass speculation, the CMA lacks experience of doing so, and relying on other 
countries’ experiences saves time. Price manipulation could also be stopped through jurisdiction 
punishments against offenders with the aim of deterrence. 
To some extent, the CMA regulations are too loose and not strong and strict enough, and allow 
industry insiders and market manipulators some protection to achieve their goals. Fines levied by 
the CMA go to the agency itself
533
 even though it does not suffer any damage from violations. 
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Logically, the harmed investors should receive these fines as compensation for their losses and 
appropriate punishment of manipulators. Islam considers abusive behaviour in the market to be 
prejudicial and prohibits insider dealing as cheating and a criminal offence.
534
  
Under the CML, major shareholders and insiders should notify the CMA about their investments, 
including its term, purposes of ownership, the financial source of the transaction and any changes 
in purpose. The law forbids insiders and major shareholders from disposing of their shares within 
ten days of the date of notification. As a proposal to increase the safety of safe market 
transactions, this period should be lengthened and these shareholders should be required to gain 
approval to dispose of their shares.
535
  
Islamic law is flexible and can suit any place at any time. It addresses personal, social and 
economic issues. Almost all laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia are derived from its general 
guidelines and principles. The CML adopted the Islamic view of market transactions, prohibiting 
abuse as it harms other dealers in the market. However, the relevant bodies must revise the 
existing rules and laws to cope with new developments in the fields of finance and trade. 
 
6.10 Other Issues in Saudi Arabia’s Business and Legal System 
6.10.1 Duplication in the Company Law and the Corporate Governance Regulations 
While the CL and CGR are crucial measures in the governance framework, they overlap in 
certain areas, thus creating a certain amount of ambiguity in the interpretation of corporate 
requirements and standards. The CL is implemented by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
and the CGR by the CMA. The CL oversees the establishment and regulation of all forms of 
companies allowed by law, including joint liability, limited partnerships, limited liability, 
professional and JSCs.
536
 The CGR is enforceable against Saudi listed companies that are traded 
on the SSE. The overlap occurs among listed companies regulated by both the CMA and the 
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Commerce Ministry, creating a dual system of corporate governance for both the listed 
companies and the SSE. Compounding the dilemma is that the corporate governance provisions 
in the CL are not integrated under a single title but are scattered throughout the law. 
Consequently, the CMA and CL corporate governance provisions lack coherence and are not 
integrated or sufficient. 
The CGR requires more stringent disclosure and transparency in corporate board annual reports 
than the CL.
537
 The CGR demands greater details about the board nomination, remuneration and 
audit sub-committees. The CL and CGR also give their own definitions of shareholders’ rights, 
including the rights to vote, attend GSMs, receive dividends and bring legal action against a 
board member. 
Both laws also give their own descriptions of board activities, such as the conduct of board 
meetings, remunerations of board members and conflicts of interest among board members. In 
the CGR, Articles 3, 5–7, 12 and 16–18 are similar to the CL Articles 66, 69–71, 73–80, 82–84, 
87, 88, 93–95, 107 and 108. An example of the similarities in the laws’ provisions occurs 
regarding conflicts of interest (CGR Article 18-B and CL Article 69).
538
 Where such Articles 
consistently agree, there is little controversy, but conflicting codes invite controversy. Where 
these two laws do not comply with another, there is the need to harmonise them and formulate a 
single code applying to all corporations whilst marking listed companies as having special 
disclosure obligations. 
 
                                                 
537
 CGR (n 8) Articles 8-15. 
538
 Faleh Al Kahtani, ‘Current Practices of Saudi corporate governance: A case for reform’ (PhD thesis, Brunel 
University 2013) 93. 
175 
 
6.10.2 Segregation of Duties within Board Members’ Powers 
The distribution of powers among board members is proven to improve corporate governance, 
mostly due to increased disclosure and transparency to market participants. This distribution 
further eases and makes more efficient the board’s supervisory role. The separation of the roles 
of chairman and chief executive, formerly unified in one individual, is also considered good 
corporate governance practice as it reduces the likelihood of conflicts of interest.
539
 
The CL does not specifically prohibit a single individual from serving as both board chairman 
and CEO,
540
 and many corporations still follow this model. However, the CGR has taken a step 
towards segregating these duties by prohibiting one individual from holding the positions of 
chairman along with other top positions in the corporation, such as CEO, managing director and 
general manager.
541
 Therefore, the CGR has taken a positive step towards the adoption of 
international standards, increasing accountability and allaying suspicion of the board’s 
involvement in corruption, malpractice and conflicts of interest.
542
 
 
6.10.3 Lack of Competent Professionals in the Capital Market 
The CL assumes that capital institutions employ qualified professional in the various fields. 
However, businesses do not always do so. Some take advantage of their autonomy to employ 
cheap labour with little experience. These employees then have to undergo rigorous training 
before they can perform their tasks. The securities commissions are expected to ensure that only 
qualified candidates are selected for jobs.
543
 
The growth of financial institutions in Saudi Arabia has created a need for professionals that are 
familiar with both Islamic principles and financial products. There is a scarcity of trained 
professionals in the capital market who have a good understanding of Islamic and conventional 
finance, which some believe might hinder economic growth in Saudi Arabia. Attempts to solve 
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this problem have fuelled the need to create educational institutions and courses that equip 
students with the necessary skills. 
The reduction in qualified professionals in many capital market institutions has been attributed, 
in part, to difficulties attracting and retaining competent employees.
544
 Companies often employ 
cheap labour to minimise costs but overwork their employees, resulting in low productivity. For 
example, existing employees bear an extra work burden during the training of new employees, 
which can decrease productivity. 
To solve this problem, capital markets must hire competent individuals who possess the requisite 
skills, are masters in their specialty and need little training.
545
 Doing otherwise, as the capital 
market is doing now, can be considered under-utilisation of human labour, which poses serious 
problems. It is important to note that, when human capital is not used properly, the desired 
outcomes may not be attained.
546
 In such instances, companies experience significant losses and 
reduced effectiveness, output and customer satisfaction.  
 
6.10.4 Implementation of Restrictions, Rules and Punishment 
The CML provides general rules covering a wide range of areas, including the stock exchange. 
The sanctions and penalties for violations of laws do not seem to apply to price manipulation in 
the stock market,
547
 which is a major form of market abuse. Larger traders and investors have 
been noted to frequently change market prices for their own advantage. Market manipulation is 
perhaps the easiest way for the powerful to generate wealth with minimal risk. Larger traders are 
well informed and, in most cases, have a say in company politics.  
To reform the laws controlling the capital market and its related issues, it is necessary for the 
relevant bodies and authorities in Saudi Arabia to cooperate to construct rules and laws to 
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improve the investment environment. The SSE, CMA and Ministry of Justice, along with other 
relevant influential departments, must attempt to create as good a market system as possible. For 
example, the Ministry of Justice needs to reform the law to cover violations such as market abuse 
and manipulation of the stock market.
548
  
Sanctions and punishments could include freezing assets and other judicial actions performed in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and SAMA as the banking regulator. The first priority of 
reform should be to protect small investors. Next are foreign institutional investors and crafting 
appropriate rules for their activities once they may enter the SSE. All these efforts are necessary 
to fully reform the Kingdom’s financial system.549 
Major players’ power to influence stock prices hurts the public while accumulating wealth for 
those in power. Small traders lack the knowledge and experience to take advantage of the market 
so only knowledgeable traders reap maximum benefits.
550
 The lack of market markers has also 
encouraged this practice. In Saudi Arabia, market manipulation is an offence but market abuse is 
not regarded as a criminal offence. The CML addresses this issue, and in the wake of the 
February 2006 market crash,
551
 the CMA has developed to protect investors. However, 
investment activity remains low. Policy measures and regulations effected after the crash to 
govern the stock market prices, particularly the CML, are insufficient simply because market 
abuse is not regarded as a criminal offence in Saudi Arabia.
552
  
 
6.10.5 Lack of Disclosure of Company Information 
The CL governs disclosure and emphasises the significance of auditing and accounting reports 
which follow SOCPA and local accounting and auditing standards.
553
 Listed companies must 
present annual and quarterly reports with financial statements and establish audit committees. 
The absence of a securities regulator has made monitoring the implementation of reporting and 
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disclosure standards more difficult.
554
 Regulators monitor issues related to disclosure. A study 
found that most Saudi firms, especially those not performing well, observe the obligatory 
reporting requirements but rarely disclose information voluntarily.
555
 Reforms to monitor 
compliance with auditing standards are needed.  
The presence of several authorities in the Saudi capital market allows for regulatory loopholes. 
Saudi Arabia, along with other nations such as Japan, has yet to harmonise its accounting 
standards with international accounting standards. The establishment of a Saudi Securities and 
Exchange Commission could play the role of monitoring and overseeing the state of disclosure in 
Saudi Arabia. However, there is no agreement on the model of corporate governance to be 
established. Current policies do not encourage companies to voluntarily disclose company 
information. Companies disclose information only to observe the rules.
556
 
 
6.10.6 Government Involvement in Business Ownership and Management 
Government-linked companies have a commercial objective which is controlled by the Saudi 
government. The government then has a direct controlling stake and the power to make 
important decisions and appointments, including board members and senior management 
members.
557
 Government ownership does not necessarily translate into greater transparency. 
Some government-owned companies fail to comply with all the transparency and disclosure 
regulations.
558
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6.11 Banking and Financial Services as Critical Sectors 
Financial institutions and the banking sector play highly pivotal roles in the adoption and 
establishment of corporate governance principles in the Middle East and North Africa.
559
 They, 
not capital markets, provide the primary means of business financing. Banks must improve their 
own disclosure and transparency policies and adhere to the twelve international standards for 
financial stability:
560
 
(1) Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies (IMF) 
(2) Special Data Dissemination Standard/General Data Dissemination System (IMF) 
(3) Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD) 
(4) International Standards on Auditing (IFAC) 
(5) International Accounting Standards (IASB) 
(6) The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Nine 
Special Recommendations on Financing Terrorism (FATF) 
(7) Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (CPSS) and 
Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (CPSS-IOSCO) 
(8) Code of Good Practices in Fiscal Transparency (IMF) 
(9) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO) 
(10) Insurance Core Principles (IAIS) 
(11) Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (World 
Bank) 
(12) Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
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Many countries apply international accounting standards, and this aids potential investors from 
other countries. These standards have been harmonised among many countries, which has 
eliminated the obstacle of different rules and standards to foreign and even domestic 
investments. The lack of such standards hinders investors and economic growth, but with the 
implementation of an international standard countries such as Saudi Arabia reduced the difficulty 
of its national standards, attracted investors and supported general economic growth. However, 
this is only being adopted in the bank and insurance sectors.
561
 
Saudi Arabia’s efforts to adopt the international standards spurred a number of neighbouring 
countries to do so as well in order to increase economic investment in their countries and 
diversify their economic activities and resources. These steps will contribute to an improved 
economy and long-term development. This patent illustrates that disclosure of financial 
statements is vital for both investors and the players in a financial institution in order to identify 
appropriate strategies for whatever business situations arise for the investor. Disclosure and 
transparency gives clients access to information that reveals the true status of each financial 
company. The science of accounting has become an urgent necessity for JSCs where several 
people make decisions, unlike older firms managed directly by the owner.
562
 
Capital markets should receive high priority in reform in order to nurture economic growth and 
national development.
563
 The CMA helps govern activities that do so, especially in foreign 
exchanges. These activities increase trade between countries, which in the long run improves the 
country’s economy.564 Financial institutions are the key players in this field and, therefore, 
should implement and develop sound corporate governance to offer better, more responsive 
services. 
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6.12 Enforcing Disclosure: Role of Authority  
The CMA is an independent body established to deal with corporate governance.
565
 It is 
responsible for drafting and enforcing rules and guidelines that achieve sound corporate 
governance and for enforcing disclosure by organisations. Put briefly, corporate governance was 
established to guide and manage all business internal and external to companies.
566
 This effort 
established a precise system which defines the responsibilities and duties of companies’ board of 
directors and executive management while protecting the rights of shareholders and stakeholders 
of all sizes. In the CMA’s 2008 annual report, the agency states its plans to create an independent 
department to monitor listed companies’ compliance with corporate governance regulations.567 
According to the CMA’s 2009 annual report, six companies failed that year to release their board 
of directors’ reports for the preceding year in accordance with the CGR requirements compared 
to 11 companies in 2008. 
As mentioned earlier, the CMA reserves the right to compel any organisation or company to 
make the required disclosures.
568
 The CMA also governs the stock exchange and share prices of 
listed companies. The SSE works closely with the CMA to monitor the financial activities of 
most major companies in Saudi Arabia. The agencies aim to increase the credibility of the SSE 
and listed companies by enforcing clear, transparent regulations for organisations.
569
 
The CMA also collaborates with the SAMA in raising awareness of the importance of corporate 
governance among companies, shareholders and stakeholders, and encouraging the development 
of director training programmes to build a cadre of qualified directors. The enhancement of 
corporate governance practices remains instrumental to better protect investors, improve 
company oversight and increase confidence in capital markets. These authorities play a major 
role in the implementation of reforms and in overseeing the adoption of corporate governance, 
which ultimately attracts more investors, spurs development and grows the economy.
570
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6.13 Amending and Reforming Commercial Regulations 
Commercial regulations deal mainly with restrictions and laws at a regional level. For example, 
under the 1962 Commercial Agency Regulations, investors who are not Saudi nationals are not 
permitted to act in any way as commercial agents in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, all commercial 
agents must be registered with the Ministry of Commerce. In 1981, the Ministry adopted 
implementation rules stipulating that Saudi distributors were responsible for registering the 
foreign investors they represented.  
It is recommended that an independent body governs the establishment and implementation of 
laws and regulations on corporate governance principles. Such bodies include the CMA and the 
IMF. These draft, adopt and amend disclosure and transparency and corporate governance rules 
and regulations for financial sectors and other organisations.  
Saudi Arabia has no single, available, complete code of corporate governance, even though the 
CMA has issued a code which companies are recommended to follow. However, enforcement of 
this code not strict.
571
 It has been proven that regions and countries which implement quality 
corporate and public governance principles obtain improved market activities and development. 
This benefit is mainly associated with economic policy reforms, particularly in privatisation, 
trade, and investment policies. This has reduced the cost of doing business, increased economic 
efficiency and eliminated barriers and obstacles to diversified export growth and foreign direct 
investment.
572
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6.14 Guidance from Foreign Experience and International Organisations 
Foreign experiences and assistance from international organisations that have adopted a 
corporate governance system are very helpful in resolving any doubts a company might have 
before implementing disclosure and transparency. These examples demonstrate the benefits of 
corporate governance, such as more investors and higher quality standards and development in 
the long run. 
Countries with substantial experience in corporate governance can provide support to 
stakeholders in a developing market, such as the SSE and players in banking and financial 
institutions. This assistance reinforces organisational ethics of disclosure, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency. These countries could help Saudi Arabia draft disclosure laws 
and form agencies to monitor the implementation of reforms.
573
 
Studying previous examples of countries which have implemented corporate disclosures rules 
can help in the enforcement of workable regulations in developing countries.
574
 Saudi Arabia 
could borrow ideas from developed countries, such as the United States, to examine the 
differences in investor capacity and development between companies and organisations with and 
without sound corporate governance. In this context, the challenge is to transform international 
standards and regulations into national and regional regulations. This effort requires complete 
commitment from both the responsible authorities and the region attempting to assimilate 
corporate governance principles. Successful incorporation of these standards into a regional 
institutional and legal framework while modernising and reforming the latter to create the 
infrastructure for effective corporate governance requires keeping in mind the specific reason for 
implementation, including objectivity, commitment, and transparency.
575
 Doing so makes it 
easier to implement a national corporate governance system that bears fruits. 
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6.15 Transparent and Accountable Regulators and State Officials 
Regulators are the authorities responsible for enforcing the restrictions and rules that govern the 
adoption of corporate governance principles. State officials should be transparent and 
accountable, setting examples for the stakeholders that are expected to adopt the corporate 
governance system. Such officials will also set an example of transparency for government-
owned companies, some of which, as mentioned, fail to comply with all disclosure regulations.  
In cases where the personnel spreading the concept of corporate governance are not accountable 
and responsible themselves, it will be a difficult task for others to adopt the same concept. 
However, adoption is easier when the regulators and state officials themselves have developed 
sound corporate governance. 
Corporate governance entails full disclosure of information that is relevant to clients and 
investors. Therefore, while enforcing corporate governance regulators need to be forthright and 
transparent about what kind of information the organisation should disclose and to what extent. 
Disclosure and transparency entail a flow of timely, verifiable, reliable, economically 
accountable and political information about policies and outcomes involved in certain decisions 
and events. This information helps clients and investors to make decisions based on expectations 
in the information provided. This disclosure system entails a public policy framework to identify 
information important and relevant in the market and political processes, and to ensure that 
quality information is accessible to the entire public instead of a privileged few.
576
 
A vital characteristic of transparency and disclosure is the importance of information as a public 
good. Therefore, information should be a matter of concern for the public and government 
officials. These officials should set public disclosure standards and regulations and ensure that 
companies—whether private or public—apply the recommended international accounting 
standards and accordingly disclose information and reports.
577
 Better quality information 
available in the market increases resource utilisation and the economic efficiency of workers, 
consumers and producers. 
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Transparency and information disclosure is essential in financial fields to ensure that capital and 
financial resources are allocated where they are useful and most productive. The availability and 
dissemination of quality, timely information about companies depends on accounting practices 
and standards, as well as on good corporate governance. In systems with poor corporate 
governance, capital might be mismanaged and financial resources may not be put to their best 
uses.
578
 
The Implementation and Regulatory Committee has two major roles in establishing corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. Its first function is to help prepare all necessary documents and 
information. Its second function is to work closely with the media and ensure that these 
documents and information reach the responsible stakeholders and audiences, thus raising 
awareness of corporate governance.
579
 The Committee plans and runs forums and training in 
corporate governance principles. These duties of state officials and the regulatory body need 
deep transparency and accountability. 
A corporate governance action plan and corporate sector reform programmes require complete 
information and detailed assessments in order to prioritise actions and formulate remedial 
government policies for dealing with hindrances and obstacles in the process. The development 
of the action plan involves full accountability and responsibility; thus, the regulatory body and 
state officials involved should uphold high standards of corporate governance and general 
information sharing/disclosure.
580
 
A combination of these solutions is the ideal means to achieve a sound system of corporate 
governance.
581
 To encourage transparency in the Saudi capital market and develop corporate 
governance standards, the CMA, in decision No 1-20-2008, dated 19 May 2008, certified a 
modification to Clause (a) of Article 18 of the CGR: ‘A Board member shall not, without prior 
authorisation from the General Assembly, which must be renewed each year, have any interest 
(whether directly or indirectly) in the company’s business and contracts. The activities to be 
performed through general bidding shall constitute an exception where a Board member is the 
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best bidder’.582 These steps will help to protect the rights, investments and reserves of the 
company, investors and shareholders.
583
 Nevertheless, this improvement is only a small step, and 
a complete overhaul of the system is needed to develop the corporate sector and make sure there 
is sufficient corporate governance in Saudi Arabia.
584
 
 
6.16 Summary 
This chapter has dealt with the issues that involve corporate transparency in the Saudi capital 
market. Topics discussed included the Saudi approach to disclosure and transparency, CML 
disclosure provisions and regulations addressing market abuses, such as price manipulation, 
irregular trading and name and shame. The regulatory response to the market crash of February 
2006 has been described, followed by the degree and manner of the country’s compliance with 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. This compliance includes investor protection, 
disclosure and enforcement. Shortcomings in the legal framework, such as a lack of separate 
regulation, scarcity of competent staff in the capital market and cultural and environmental 
factors, have been explained. Finally, the chapter describes the types of reform and necessary 
conditions for the effective implementation of the principles of corporate governance, 
particularly the tenets of disclosure and transparency. A discussion has also been provided on the 
manner that it is necessary to act should poor corporate governance occur, namely, the failures of 
disclosure, insider trading and the processes involved in addressing the anomalies that ensue. 
Naming and shaming is considered an ideal option in the Islamic world as religion is intrinsic to 
people’s daily lives – going against the moral codes of corporate governance can be equated to 
going against religion and thus hurting people’s confidence in the system.  
Transparency and the disclosure of information are determinants of development and economic 
growth and, without them, economic progress cannot be sustained. The robustness of activity in 
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a market economy depends to a great extent on complete, timely and accurate information which 
determines resource allocation, improves the efficiency of market activity and increases 
production, which drives the economy. The preceding chapters, particularly the discussion of 
scandals and disclosure, demonstrated that SSE listed companies still fall short of the standard of 
transparency desirable for an efficient market. In part, this is because Saudi Arabia is an 
emerging economy and Saudi corporate culture is still assimilating the corporate governance 
culture. The behaviours of individuals involved, such as board members, executives and 
investors, are conditioned by the customary Saudi social relations and have yet to be adjusted to 
the constraints of abiding by international standards which are different to accustomed 
behaviour. The Saudi approach to disclosure and transparency has also been examined, 
particularly the board annual report. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion and recommendations  
 
The chapter proceeds to discuss recommendations on transparency and disclosure traditions that 
are primarily aimed at developing Saudi Arabia’s stock market. This thesis categorises the 
recommendations into three classes: structural, procedural and substantive. Recommendations 
under the structural issues transverse issues and parts of the government that regulate CMA, and 
especially in transparency and disclosure needs that target a wide variety of sectors including the 
financial services sector. The substantive issues entail the contents and compliance documents; 
and finally the procedural issues involve governance code and regulatory bodies tasked with the 
oversight roles. The chapter then discusses the need for future research areas in corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. The chapter concludes with the contributions to knowledge, which 
it provides in six areas.  
 
7.1 Conclusion  
The most important rationale for this study was to offer a way to reform the Saudi corporate 
governance disclosure framework from a legal perspective. The research set out to present a 
common understanding of how existing corporate governance disclosure implementations are 
perceived by business practitioners, as well as to examine the adequacy of the current corporate 
governance disclosure framework.  
The thesis is composed of seven chapters. The first chapter identified the research problem and 
its framework. It confirmed the vital role of disclosure and transparency in enhancing corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. Corporate governance is perceived as essential for leadership and 
participation in worldwide trade and investments, and disclosure and transparency appears to be 
key to corporate governance. The principal concern of multinationals and international 
businesses and investors is the elimination, or at least the minimisation, of risk and exposure to 
189 
 
loss. The assurances provided by full information shared through transparency and disclosure is 
vital in risk reduction. 
This chapter employs critical and comparative analysis, focusing on Saudi Arabia’s attempts to 
enhance corporate governance as viewed against international standards and practices. It also 
highlights the general background, significance, methodology, aims, questions, scope and 
limitations of the research. The chapter ends with a brief description of the thesis structure in 
order to provide an understanding of how it reaches logical conclusions that address the research 
problem and questions. 
Chapter two is grounded in real states and practices. The subsequent fact-based analyses are also 
grounded in the practices and rules of corporate governance explained in this chapter. The 
definitions, ideas and their importance explained here intend to prepare the platform for a 
dialogue of the Saudi situation. The scope, implications, beneficiaries and models of corporate 
governance are presented, along with the range of theories that affected the improvement of 
schools of thought on corporate governance (shareholder, stakeholder and agency theory). 
Finally, a brief description of the development of corporate governance in foremost jurisdictions 
(the UK-US, Germany and OECD) is introduced to boost the basis for comparison and contrast 
with Saudi Arabia. 
In this chapter, the descriptions, theories and models of corporate governance are presented and 
considered. Further to these three, international principles that are of varying importance are also 
discussed briefly in an attempt to derive appropriate information from them. Definitions common 
in the social sciences and law have comparatively different semantic interpretations, and the one 
at hand is not so different. Agency, shareholder and stakeholder theories have been examined in 
connection with the latest theories developed in corporate governance literature in the academic 
world. Essentially, these are Western achieved theories but they have been found to be relevant 
in different parts of the world. Nevertheless, it is apparent that both theories mirror differently 
the performance of a company, and so they embody different perspectives. However, the chapter 
is much more focused on the shareholder theory rather than the agency theory. 
The third chapter describe the twin concepts of disclosure and transparency and clarifies how 
they have located a global benchmark of corporate governance. Their significance, advantages 
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and the principles by which they function are analysed from a theoretical perspective. Scandals 
and disclosures in real-world global and regional events are investigated in relation to 
understanding how a lack of transparency and disclosure can undermine corporate governance 
efforts. Information gained from this study of global disclosure and transparencies are adapted in 
the next section to the realities in the Saudi capital market.  
In this chapter, the practices associated with these concepts in Saudi Arabia are also identified. 
Examples are given which recommend the extent of the application of these conceptions by 
listed companies and the importance of disclosure and transparency in contributing accurate 
information and generating a good investment environment. Moreover, disclosure and 
transparency requirements are described and a range of these requirements which listed 
companies have infringed and the fines imposed by the CMA Board are mentioned. This follows 
the naming and shaming approach for punishing violators.
585
  
Disclosure and transparency are both valuable to a company. In this context, disclosure takes the 
form of accurate, timely reports to managers and employees. Managers, in particular, need 
information to support decision-making, especially during contingencies which require prompt, 
proper and decisive action. An empowered managerial structure enables the firm to build 
leadership traits down the chain of command, developing a group of future high-level managers 
and increasing the productivity, growth and profitability of operations.
586
 
Disclosure to employees is imperative in matters pertinent to the conduct of their jobs and 
personal circumstances. Employee engagement is a vital, useful tool in employee retention and 
job satisfaction and can be secured only in an atmosphere of trust and open communication 
between firm and employee.
587
 It is important that a firm not only improve communication with 
its workforce but also that it be perceived as doing so in good faith, with concern for employee 
welfare. 
Chapter four has evaluated the Saudi legal structure for the capital market and has explored the 
historical background of the country and the Basic Governance Law. The present practices of 
and improvements to the Saudi corporate governance framework and regulations have been 
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analysed. Moreover, the application of the Sharia theory of accountability in the Saudi business 
environment has been identified. This lengthy chapter gives a comprehensive analysis of the 
current practices and the improvement of the corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia. 
Background knowledge of Saudi Arabia’s legal constitution and its development over the years 
is extremely important in understanding the development of corporate governance to the present. 
The basics of Saudi Arabia’s legal structure are rooted in Islam, and the doctrines of the religion 
fuels corporate governance. However, there are codified statutory laws, and four sets of laws laid 
out by the monarch have been helpful in the creation and development of the corporate 
governance in the country. The Basic Law of Governance, Regional Law, Council of Ministers 
law and the Consultative Law are the four statutory laws that were codified in 1992. In addition, 
the country’s CMA ratified several changes and instituted a set of corporate governance 
regulations which was to grow in tandem with international standards. This chapter has described 
the institutional infrastructure that supports the corporate governance framework in Saudi 
Arabia. The government agencies and institutions charged with the oversight and regulation of 
corporate activities to ensure compliance with corporate governance principles have been 
identified: the CMA, with its General Department of Corporate Governance; the CRSD, under 
which are the Securities Disputes Committee and the Securities Conflict Appeal Committee; the 
SSE; the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; and accounting and auditing professions regulated 
by the SOCPA. Finally, the Saudi ownership structure has been highlighted. 
Furthermore, the chapter introduces the CMA; its core functions in lieu of corporate governance, 
and its functions and other roles within the public sector. The chapter engages in an in-depth 
discussion and exploration of institutional corporate governance structures of both public and 
private institutions. Within the body of the chapter, the stock exchange becomes an important 
item of discussion with respect to corporate governance as well as an avenue for retribution in 
cases of malpractice and issues that go against good and ethical corporate governance. Finally, 
the chapter provides a raft of comparisons on corporate governance practices in other parts of the 
world in relation to present corporate practice in Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter five has examined the status of minority shareholders and their rights and duties in 
general and under the CL. The basis of problems and current remedies for protection of minority 
shareholders is identified in detail. Abuse of power by major shareholders to block minority 
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shareholder’s interests in the firm is also considered. The role of corporate governance in 
providing remedies is discussed. Saudi ownership, given its major stake in the Saudi business 
platform, is also discussed.  
This chapter also considered the role of shareholders and stakeholders in corporate governance 
provisions and presented the CGR. The chapter explained the structure of the board of directors 
and its principal fiduciary duties: the duty of care, duty of loyalty and duty to act within the 
board’s powers. Board members’ roles, responsibilities and powers and the determination of 
their compensation—a sensitive topic in corporate governance in the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis—have been discussed. 
Chapter six dealt with the concerns involving corporate transparency in the Saudi capital market. 
Themes discussed consisted of the Saudi approach to disclosure and transparency, CML 
disclosure provisions and regulations concentrating on market abuses, such as price 
manipulation, irregular trading and name and shame. The regulatory response immediately to the 
market collapse of February 2006 is described, followed by the degree and manner of the 
country’s compliance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. This agreement 
includes investor protection, disclosure and enforcement. Shortcomings in the legal framework, 
such as a lack of separate regulation, scarcity of competent staff in the capital market and 
cultural and environmental factors, are explained. The chapter also described the sorts of reforms 
and essential conditions needed for the effective implementation of the principles of corporate 
governance, mostly the tenets of disclosure and transparency. A discussion has also been 
provided on the manner that it is necessary to act should poor corporate governance occur, 
namely, the failures of disclosure, insider trading and the processes involved in addressing the 
anomalies that ensue. Naming and shaming is considered an ideal option in the Islamic world as 
religion is intrinsic to people’s daily lives – going against the moral codes of corporate 
governance can be equated to going against religion and thus hurting people’s confidence in the 
system.  
Transparency and the disclosure of information are determinants of development and economic 
growth and, without them, economic progress cannot be sustained. The robustness of activity in 
a market economy depends to a great extent on complete, timely and accurate information which 
determines resource allocation, improves the efficiency of market activity and increases 
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production, which drives the economy. The preceding chapters, particularly the discussion of 
scandals and disclosure, demonstrated that SSE listed companies still fall short of the standard of 
transparency desirable for an efficient market. In part, this is because Saudi Arabia is an 
emerging economy and Saudi corporate culture is still assimilating the corporate governance 
culture. The behaviours of individuals involved, such as board members, executives and 
investors, are conditioned by the customary Saudi social relations and have yet to be adjusted to 
the constraints of abiding by international standards which are different to accustomed 
behaviour. The Saudi approach to disclosure and transparency is also examined, particularly the 
board annual report. 
 
7.2 General Findings 
This section will use the findings from the thesis to answer the research questions mentioned in 
the first chapter. 
(1) What is corporate governance as conceived in the West and as understood under 
Sharia principles? 
In the developed markets of the West, corporate governance is seen as a pragmatic tool for 
reducing risks in investing and business. Its practices and principles are directed at ensuring 
fairness in an environment where those in power are tempted to maximise results in favour of 
their own interests but to the detriment of others. Corporate governance is conceived of as a legal 
device to protect the rights of parties who might be taken advantage of by powerful corporate 
boards and executives.  
In Sharia law, corporate disclosure is founded on the concept of fairness and the duty to God to 
do what is right and just. It is more of a moral than a legal obligation. Corporate disclosure is a 
matter of personal morality, in which an individual acts from goodwill and honesty, not 
according to legal rules. This concept achieves a balance between the corporate governance 
common in the West and the Sharia laws applied in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia.  
(2) How is corporate governance, particularly disclosure and transparency, observed and 
practised in Saudi Arabia? 
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While fairness is expected in all dealings by Saudis, this principle is ambiguous when applied to 
real world controversies and concrete conflicts of interests. Presently, the statutory and 
regulatory enforcement of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia leaves much to be desired. The 
regulatory mechanisms have not reached the level of international standards, and local customs 
still influence the behaviours of participants in the financial and other sectors. There is every 
indication, however, that the efforts to professionalise industry and more effectively enforce 
corporate governance will make Saudi Arabia an international investment destination. 
(3) How have the Saudi legal framework and practices developed regarding international 
standards for corporate governance, particularly disclosure and transparency? 
In the development of a legal framework for corporate governance in Saudi Arabia, the CGR and 
CL have laid the foundation but the supporting regulations require further work. The UK 
Companies Act and securities legislation inspired Saudi laws but the country needs to address 
loopholes and amend provisions to better address the needs and issues of its emerging market 
economy. Concentrated shareholding companies, especially listed companies, are the main 
concern of Saudi law, in addition to dispersed shareholding companies, as mentioned in Chapter 
Three. 
 
7.3 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are suggested to achieve the level of transparency and 
disclosure practices which will aid the development of the SSE. These recommendations are 
categorised as structural, substantive and procedural. 
 
7.3.1 Structural Issues 
Structural issues affect the institutions and organs of government involved in the regulation of 
the CMA transparency and disclosure requirements.  
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7.3.1.1 Special Regulation of the Banking and Financial Services Sector 
The domestic and international linkages between financial and banking institutions have 
increased the vulnerability of global markets to the adverse effects of contagion during global 
crises. These sectors, therefore, should be strengthened by reform and regulation to build 
structural strengths which will make the Saudi economy resilient. These rules should be 
transmitted to companies’ stakeholders through corporate governance disclosure tools. Financial 
institutions and banks should be more transparent because of the vulnerability to which they 
subject the stock market. 
 
7.3.1.2 Competent Regulatory Personnel 
Regulators are the authorities responsible for monitoring, evaluating, assessing and applying the 
provisions of rules. In the case of any violation, they may issue corrective action notices and 
enforce compliance. Regulators formulate the rules that govern the adoption of corporate 
governance principles. In order to set an example for stakeholders that are expected to adopt the 
system of corporate governance and disclosure, these officials must be accountable and 
transparent and uphold the highest standard of probity when dealing with stakeholders. These 
behaviours will also set an example of transparency for entities affiliated with the government.  
 
7.3.2 Substantive Issues 
These issues involve the provisions and content of compliance documents. 
 
7.3.2.1 Expanding Subjects of Breaches which Attract Sanction 
The CML provides general rules covering a wide range of areas, including the SSE. The 
sanctions and penalties for violating laws do not seem to apply to price manipulation and other 
malpractices in the stock market. Price manipulation is perhaps the most common form of 
market abuse. It has been noted that the more seasoned larger traders and investors often shake 
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up share prices for their own advantage. For the powerful, market manipulation is perceived as 
the easiest way to generate wealth with minimal risk. More experienced, larger traders are better 
informed and, in most cases, can understand and voice their opinions on issues that might affect 
share price. Such traders might also have other sources of information and so can deal with the 
company politics. In most Anglo-Saxon regimes, the lack of compliance or deficiency in meeting 
disclosure requirements can lead to the filing of criminal charges. However, in the Saudi capital 
market, this is not so. Therefore, certain malpractices should be criminalised to increase 
confidence in the daily transactions in the stock market. 
The notion of transparency is still a rule, not a hard and fast legal requirement, and the absence 
of transparency does not itself constitute a violation of the law deserving of punishment. The 
level and the lack of transparency are ambiguous and difficult to define. Disclosure pertains to 
the submission of specific reports and filings at a prescribed time and in a specified form. This 
mandate is more severe and stringent for companies listed and traded in the open exchanges 
because of the higher public interest and public policy in them. The obligation to be transparent 
should be elevated and the lack of it criminalised due to the same public interest and policy 
considerations. To do this, all breaches must be codified so that they can lead not only to civil 
remedies but also to criminal prosecution. 
 
7.3.2.2 Legislative Reform Supporting an Independent Code 
Even with well-constructed laws, issues arise where there is a failure of enforcement. Non-
compliance renders disclosure requirements moot and ineffectual if they remain merely 
suggestive or adopted on a ‘complain or explain’ basis. General awareness of the importance of 
transparent dealings by corporate managers should be increased. Regulatory authorities, state 
officials and the media should all be well versed in transparency as they play vital roles in its 
enforcement. Chapter 5 showed that these institutions scrutinise and evaluate corporate 
behaviour, seeking accountability and integrity which serve the common good. Although 
promoting the concepts of disclosure and transparency in Saudi Arabia might not be easy, the 
government needs to exert great effort through legislation or a separate code to encourage 
companies to adopt disclosure and transparency rules, especially in the stock market. 
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7.3.2.3 Codify the Rights and Interests of Minority Shareholders 
Saudi law relevant to minority shareholders reveals a great deal of overlap and interaction among 
provisions; this has resulted in ambiguity and conflicting rulings. Numerous problems, including 
abuse, negligence, fraud, infringement, expropriation, oppression and misuse, are not dealt with 
explicitly in statutes but can be expected to arise in private firms. The courts’ role in handling 
minority shareholders’ claims is also vague. Most literature on Saudi legislation relating to the 
protection of minority shareholders takes an economic, political or legal viewpoint and 
concludes that Saudi law displays little concern for the minority shareholder. 
Legal provisions that explicitly address minority shareholders in private companies and their 
rights are rare, and those that do exist are uneven and vague. These provisions give majority 
shareholders ultimate authority in the vast majority of situations and allow them to make the 
final decision in nearly all matters. These provisions do not give minority shareholders any 
explicit right to pursue legal action in the case of conflict, offering minority shareholders 
minimal real protection. Put simply, Saudi Arabia lacks clear, comprehensive regulations 
regarding minority shareholder protection. The current laws appear to hand over unlimited 
authority to majority shareholders, which can lead to disastrous consequences for the firm and its 
minority shareholders. 
The general belief is that the optimum remedy for this problem is to codify the rights and 
interests of minority shareholders and the remedies they may seek. Any codification should 
largely follow the example provided by UK statute. 
A key failing in Saudi Arabian company law is the lack of statutory recognition of minority 
shareholder interests and rights. Therefore, it is suggested that a non-exhaustive list of minority 
shareholder interests and rights be included in legislation: 
 A list of the issues which may be ratified only unanimously; 
 The rights to be present at all meetings and to be active in company decision making; 
 The right to access data, reports and other information and papers relevant to the 
company; 
 The right to a clear exit procedure ensuring that shares are bought at a reasonable price; 
 The right to bring legal action on the firm’s behalf, when necessary. 
198 
 
 
7.3.2.4 Complementary Reform Proceedings and Commercial Regulations 
Commercial regulations in Saudi Arabia exist mainly at the regional level and are not seen as 
compatible with the legal process, as seen in the case of SITC discussed in Chapter 4. Reforming 
and amending these regulations will make adopting them easier for organisations and companies 
and encourage the implementation of corporate governance, transparency and disclosure 
principles. 
 
7.3.3 Procedural Issues 
Upon the successful introduction of a corporate governance code and regulatory body, problems 
may still arise from improper definitions of redress procedures. These issues are procedural and 
worth mentioning. 
 
7.3.3.1 Regional and International Cooperation 
A market economy, such as Saudi Arabia’s, can attain a world-class reputation only by 
performing well internationally. Regional and global alliances, therefore, are crucial to support 
Saudi Arabia’s efforts. Multilateral agreements with institutions that possess reputations for 
superiority or excellence in corporate governance regulation will enable Saudi Arabia to 
expeditiously make the needed changes. A favourable reputation for the Saudi economy in 
general will positively affect the stock market. These relationships are important because the 
close-knit regional economy exhibits great volatility during times of crisis. 
 
7.3.3.2 Access to Redress 
Presently, the redress methods for parties to challenge the content of listed companies’ 
mandatory reports are incoherent. There should be a trouble-free way to raise issues with the 
regulatory body. Members of the public should be able to raise issues through whistle-blowing 
provisions. Such redress will serve two purposes. Firstly, it will ensure that corporations do not 
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become inured to malpractice and that corruption in public office is exposed. Secondly, easy 
access to information (e.g. outside the prescribed period) will ensure that corporate managers do 
not see their obligation only as drawing up a report once a year but as an ongoing, year-round 
matter. If needed, the court could be burdened with the task of permitting waivers for certain 
disclosures involving sensitive personal liberties. 
  
7.4 Future Research  
In Saudi Arabia, a public awareness campaign about corporate governance is needed to inform 
about the importance of adequate disclosure and transparency to companies regulated by the 
CMA. Future research could pursue the following aims. 
(a) A comparative study of Saudi Arabia and GCC companies. A thorough study of the 
prevailing structural situation in these countries will be useful in understanding the 
possibility of harmonising regional corporate governance practices. These steps could 
help align Saudi corporate governance with GCC countries, which have nearly identical 
political and banking systems. Any positive experience could help bridge the gaps in 
Saudi corporate governance.  
(b) Research on the various institutions within the corporate governance regulatory 
framework to determine whether they efficiently meet the economic requirements of 
Saudi Arabia, especially the stock market.  
(c) Research on minority shareholder rights, especially under family ownership. In 
addition, future study should examine the advantages and disadvantages of adopting an 
independent, mandatory code for disclosure and transparency in the stock market.  
 
7.5 Contributions to Knowledge  
Upon a careful consideration of all the outcomes of this research, I identify the following 
contributions to knowledge. 
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(a) The first contribution of this thesis is highlighting the gap in the literature regarding a 
legal perspective of the present role of disclosure and transparency in enhancing 
corporate governance and its principles in Saudi Arabia.  
(b) The second contribution is the suggestions for the implementation of corporate 
governance practices, particularly disclosure and transparency, as observed and practised 
in Saudi Arabia.  
(c) The third contribution is the recommendations for the development of the Saudi legal 
framework and practices based on international standards of corporate governance, 
particularly regarding disclosure and transparency.  
(d) The fourth contribution is the description of the Islamic perspective of corporate 
disclosure and transparency, which can result in better corporate performance.  
(e) The final contribution is identifying internal and external factors that influence the 
efficiency of corporate disclosure provisions in Saudi Arabia which inform investment 
decisions. 
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